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This thesis examines the conception and role of hatred in the Theogony and Works 
and Days of Hesiod. Chapter One focuses on Styx as the central figure of hatred, and 
examines how she can be understood as hate in relation to her function as oath and 
river. Based on this, I analyse what is revealed about the role of hatred in Hesiod’s 
cosmogony and the newly ordered universe established by Zeus. Chapter Two 
introduces the children of Styx and examines them as a group before focusing on the 
first two children, Zelos and Nike, to investigate them closely in order to understand 
how the qualities they represent interact with and inform our understanding of hate. 
Chapter Three examines the other two children, Kratos and Bie, for the same 
purposes. In Chapter Four I take what has been discovered in the previous chapters 
and present a model and understanding of hatred that can then be used to examine 
instances in the texts where hate is mentioned. It will also be used to cautiously 
suggest and analyse instances in the poems where, even though hatred is not explicitly 
mentioned, elements of hatred appear to be at work.  
 
This analysis aims to contribute to our understanding of emotions in the ancient world 
and the history of emotions, as well as deepening our understanding of Hesiod’s own 
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I have written this thesis with a goal to make it as accessible as possible. Numerous 
fruitful conversations with academics from other fields of study has only strengthened 
my firm belief in the value of interdisciplinary collaborations. As such, I have adopted 
several conventions that an experienced Classicist might consider overly explanatory. 
My hope is that these decisions will make my work more accessible to the public at 
large, academics from other disciplines, and students of Classics less familiar with the 
material at hand. To this end I have endeavoured to give the dates for all ancient 
authors whose works I discuss, or of the dates of the work if the authorship is 
uncertain. I have also given explanations for points of Greek grammar and translation 
that a scholar more familiar with ancient Greek will already understand. These 
explanations and comments are generally confined to footnotes. For the same reason I 
have, whenever I have adapted a translation, given an explanation for the changes I 







In the last few decades research into the nature and function of emotions has 
burgeoned. It now encompasses a wide array of approaches, including neurological, 
ethical, cognitive, psychoanalytical, sociological, and evolutionary perspectives. The 
history of emotions and their representations in cultures has also become an area of 
great interest to scholars, and classicists are no exception. Recent publications have 
addressed the topic of emotions in the ancient world more broadly,1 while other works 
have focused on specific emotions.2 But there has been very little work surrounding 
hatred.3 Indeed, this is the case for all disciplines that examine emotions. Compared to 
the wealth of research accorded to emotions such as love and anger, the amount of 
scholarship dedicated to hatred is minor.  
 
The purposes of this work are twofold: first, to broaden our understanding of Hesiod, 
his conception of cosmogony and universal governing principles, and the role hatred 
plays in his thoughts; secondly, to contribute to our understanding of the history of 
emotions. The contemporary relevance is obvious: anything that provides us with a 
potential model for how to understand a society’s beliefs about the roles, functions 
and morality of emotions invites us to compare and reassess our own understanding of 
emotions. For what has always been evident is that emotions both structure and 
disrupt the interactions of people. What is equally evident from a mere glance at the 
current state of the world is that the way the majority of the West handles its 




My intention when I first began my research was to investigate hatred in archaic 
literature more broadly, including both philosophical (Empedocles) and tragic 
(Aeschylus) texts, as well as both Hesiod and Homer. It became apparent, however, 
that I had not the space to do justice to them all. Given the choice between presenting 
                                                
1 E.g. Konstan (2006a); Chaniotis (2013); Chaniotis & Ducrey (2014); Cairns & Fulkerson (2015); 
2 E.g. Harris (2001); Braund & Most (2003); Konstan & Rutter (2003); Kalimtzis (2012); Fulkerson 
(2013); Sanders (2014); Caston & Kaster (2016); Lateiner & Spatharas (2016).  
3 Konstan is a rare exception. See (2006b).  
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a brief overview of four sources, or an in-depth choice of one source, I opted for the 
latter. Of the four candidates, I chose to focus on Hesiod. He alone presents Hate as a 
personified figure, in the character of Styx. Styx’s appearance in Hesiod is in the 
Theogony, but there is much that is relevant to an investigation of hatred in the Works 
and Days as well. These two poems will be my focus. It is now accepted that the 
ending of the Theogony as we have it has been altered and added to; the disagreement 
is only over where the ‘genuine’ Hesiod ends. But even those scholars most generous 
in their retention of Hesiodic material think that the original poem ended at verse 964. 
I shall therefore include nothing past that point. For the same reason I have excluded 
the Shield of Herakles. The current consensus is that it is spurious, and indeed, it has 
been considered of dubious authenticity since antiquity. 
 
The contents of the Theogony and of the Works and Days differ vastly. The former is 
a cosmogony, giving Hesiod’s account of the construction and ordering of the 
universe, while the latter is a combination of practical and moral advice, along with a 
healthy dose of reproach towards Hesiod’s brother Perses. Examining both poems 
therefore gives us insight into how Hesiod perceived emotions to function for both 
gods and men.  
 
 
What are Emotions? 
In order to study the function of a specific emotion we must first have some notion of 
what an emotion is. The abundance of literature on the topic attests to the complexity 
of defining and understanding emotions. Glancing at the history of the study of 
emotions it is immediately clear that there are few things that are universally agreed 
upon. Nico Frijda and Klaus Scherer summarise four ‘relatively uncontroversial’ 
features of emotions. Firstly, they are occasioned by an event that the subject 
considers important in that it is ‘directly linked to its sensitivities, needs, goals, 
values, and general well-being’. Secondly, emotions provide a ‘strong motivational 
force’ for a response to the triggering event, producing what they term ‘a state of 
action readiness’, in which the subject is ready to respond to the event in a way it has 
determined will help achieve a desired aim (e.g. fleeing, appeasing, intimidating). 
Thirdly, emotions engage the entire person. Finally, emotions bestow ‘control 
precedence’, i.e. they claim ‘priority in the control of behaviour and experience’ 
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(though they do not always get it – sometimes emotions override concerns for 
consequences, sometimes concerns for consequences override the expression of 
emotion).4 
  
Note that this list also attempts to define emotions as distinct from other ‘affective 
states’ such as moods, attitudes, and preferences. Hatred is often classified as a mood 
rather than an emotion. However, the distinctions between emotions and moods are 
not hard and fast, and hate is just as often classified as an emotion. In a series of 
studies conducted by Beverley Fehr and James Russell, participants showed a 
tendency to categorise hatred as an emotion. When asked to list examples of 
emotions, hatred was the sixth most common example, given by 44.5% of 
participants. In a second study that asked participants to assign general ‘categories’ to 
specific words, hatred was again the sixth most common word to be categorised as an 
emotion (again 44.5% of the time). In another study ‘hate’ was highly rated as an 
‘extremely good example’ of an emotion (second only to love in one study, and to 
anger and love in another). In a final study not a single participant disagreed with the 
statement that hate was an example of an emotion.5  
 
When it comes to Hesiod, there is no evidence of a distinction between emotions and 
moods – indeed, though things we might call emotions or moods are present in 
Hesiod, no words are used that we might take to mean either ‘emotion’ or ‘mood’. 
Given the absence of a distinction, I shall use the term ‘emotion’ when discussing 
hatred in Hesiod.  
 
The discussion of the differences between moods and emotions, and which emotional 
states belong in which category is but one of the battlegrounds in the field of emotion 
research which is relevant to us. We must also address another: the issue of whether 
emotions are universal or culturally specific.  
 
 
                                                
4 Frijda & Scherer (2009).   
5 Fehr & Russell (1984). These results were replicated by Shaver et al. (1987).  
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Universal Versus Culturally Specific Emotions 
With the exception of a few individuals, the experiencing of emotions is universal to 
humans. This much can be agreed upon. Which emotions, if any, are universally 
experienced is where the disagreements begin. At first glance we might consider it 
obvious that some emotions are universal – could there really be a culture or people 
that lacked anger, or love? But as Keith Oatley notes, even within a culture, what we 
consider an emotion such as love to be has changed: ‘If you were to hear now of a 
father forbidding his 39-year-old daughter to marry… you would regard the father’s 
possessive emotions as inappropriate… In other words, our idea of love and even its 
experience in relation to parents and to partners has changed’.6 Of course, we could 
say that whilst the cultural norms surrounding the appropriate expression and targets 
of an emotion have changed, there is some core element that remains unchanged and 
universal – surely the neurological processes involved in love have not changed in the 
past century?  
 
Throughout the history of the study of emotions, multiple lists of basic emotions have 
been proposed. The Nāṭyaśāstra, a Sanskrit treatise on dramaturgy, attributed to 
Bharata, and compiled some time between 300 BCE and 200 CE, contains a chapter 
that discusses eight sthāyi-bhāva. As Richard Shweder, Jonathan Haidt, Randall 
Horton, and Craig Joseph note, translating this into English immediately poses a 
problem – there is no single satisfactory English equivalent, and suggested 
translations include ‘emotions’, ‘mental states’ and feelings’.7 We shall discuss the 
issue of translation in more detail shortly; for now, I shall present the vocabulary 
adopted by Shweder et al., who list them as: sexual passion, amusement, sorrow, 
anger, fear, perseverance, disgust, and wonder.8  
 
Compare this list to attempts by contemporary Western scholars to produce a list of 
basic emotions. Carroll Izard and Sandra Buechler proposed a list of ten: interest, joy, 
surprise, sadness, anger, disgust, contempt, fear, shame/shyness, and guilt. 9 
Immediately we see that there is some overlap (anger, fear, sorrow/sadness), but also 
some differences: contempt, shame, and interest are missing from the Nāṭyaśāstra; 
                                                
6 Oatley (2004: 9). 
7 Shweder et al. (2008: 410).  
8 Shweder et al. (2008: 411).  
9 Izard & Buechler (1980: 168). 
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sexual passion and perseverance are missing from Izard and Buechler’s list; and the 
overlap between amusement/joy, sorrow/sadness, and wonder/surprise is highly 
debateable.10 What of disgust? Despite being translated using the English word 
‘disgust’, Shweder et al. suggest that the word in question, jugupsā, is ‘more like a 
domain of the loathsome’.11 
 
The most famous list compiled by a contemporary Western scholar is that of Paul 
Ekman, produced using data from studies of the recognition of emotions through 
facial expressions. Along with E. Richard Sorenson and Wallace Friesen, Ekman 
identified six universal basic emotions: happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, disgust, 
and fear.12 Ekman and Friesen conducted further research and, in a study comparing 
the ability of American college students and New Guineans to recognise emotive 
facial expressions, found that the New Guineans struggled to distinguish fear from 
surprise.13 Based on this research, Ekman and Harriet Oster adjusted the list to just 
five emotions, combining fear and surprise as one,14 and later Ekman and Friesen 
separated out disgust and contempt.15  
 
Jonathan Haidt and Dacher Keltner conducted similar studies using a group of 40 
American participants and 40 Indian participants, and noted that even among the basic 
emotions, some were easier for participants to identify than others: anger was the 
most well-recognised of Ekman’s list, and contempt the least. They also found that 
embarrassment was more frequently identified than Ekman’s contempt or fear, and 
that American participants were notably better at recognising Ekman’s basic emotions 
than Indian participants.16 Based on their results, they suggested that a gradient model 
of recognition was far more appropriate than attempts to classify an emotion as either 
culturally specific or universal.17  
 
Even with those emotions that had the highest recognition rates, the effects of culture 
                                                
10 Schechner (1988) tried to make such comparison with Ekman’s list of basic emotions but, as 
Shweder et al. note, the facial expressions do not correspond (2008: 411-12).  
11 Shweder et al. (2008: 412).  
12 Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen (1969). 
13 Ekman & Friesen (1971:128).  
14 Ekman & Oster (1979: 531). 
15 Ekman & Friesen (1986). See also Ekman & Heider (1988).  
16 Haidt & Keltner (1998: 257; 261).  
17 Haidt & Keltner (1998: 263).  
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still loom large: the circumstances under which an emotion might be felt, and if felt, 
might be considered moral or immoral, productive or destructive, appropriate or 
inappropriate, as well as how it might be publicly demonstrated, are all governed by 
societal and cultural norms. This is not something proponents of universal emotions 
dispute. Ekman et al. are only too happy to attribute any difference in facial 
expressions of basic emotions to the influence of culture.18  
 
If we approach the issue of universal emotions from the perspective of a translator, an 
obvious flaw with much of the research that has been done comparing the display of 
emotions between cultures emerges. There is a notable absence of consideration and 
discussion of the translations used and precise meanings of the words chosen - 
sometimes this important aspect of the methodology it is not documented at all. 
Pointing to the fact that English speaking scholars have assumed that English words 
are appropriate for naming universals, Anna Wierzbicka rightly asks, ‘how is it that 
these emotions are so neatly identified by means of English words?’19 This criticism 
is, of course, equally applicable to the study cited above regarding the classification of 
hate as an emotion – we cannot assume that all contemporary cultures would answer 
in the same ways.  
 
But translation is possible because the vast majority of the time we can find words in 
each language with enough semantic overlap so as to allow meaningful 
communication. However, the fact that there is never perfect correlation means that, 
even if universal emotions do indeed exist, our access to them is always filtered 
through our culture and language. No theory of emotional universals can be accurate 
unless it first takes account of the meaning of all different emotion words in all 
cultures. Though my aim is to study ‘hatred’ in Hesiod, the results will also be just a 
tiny part of the work necessary to understand ‘hatred’ in more universal terms.20  
 
                                                
18 Ekman (1992c).  
19 Wierzbicka (1986: 584).  
20 Despite arguing against the methodology of Ekman and Friesen, Wierzbicka, along with Goddard, 
does think that some sort of universal concept of some emotions can be reached by using a 
‘metalanguage’ containing around 60 ‘semantic primes’ that can be ‘can be expressed equally well and 
equally precisely in other languages’ (2004: 155-6). But their own examples of their metalanguage in 
action include definitions that fail to properly distinguish different emotions from each other, and 
certainly lack the cultural nuance that we are interested in at present.  
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However, whilst my own approach is based on the premise that there is something 
different about Hesiod’s concept of hatred compared to the contemporary Western 
concept, we must also understand whether Hesiod himself understood emotions as 
either culturally specific or universal. Clearly, this is not a question that Hesiod 
explicitly addressed, but the answer is nevertheless obvious. Hesiod’s focus is 
cosmogony – an explanation of how the universe began, and why it is the way it is. 
Through the actions of successive generations of gods, Titans, and other divine 
beings, the world is shaped into the form that Hesiod saw before him, and those 
deities include many emotions personified as physical, external forces (e.g. Eros, 
Styx, Philotes, Aidos). As personified forces they are out there in the world, visiting 
whom they will. It is the same physical manifestation of an emotion that visits and 
interacts with all humans, and even other gods. Hesiod’s emotions are universal – not 
in a contemporary psychological or evolutionary sense, but in the sense that they 
pervade the universe and represent some of its governing forces.  
 
 
Translation and Emotional Language 
Quite apart from this issue of whether emotions are culturally specific or universal, 
language is an important component of understanding and studying emotions, 
especially for our current investigation, given the textual nature of the evidence. 
There are several issues of language that we must address.   
 
Whilst acknowledging the importance of language in understanding and 
communicating about emotions, Andrew Ortony, Gerald Clore, and Alan Collins also 
point out that ‘the enterprise of mapping emotion words onto emotion structures’ is 
not the same as establishing the nature of the emotions themselves.21 Whilst this is 
certainly the case, language is still, of necessity, the way we understand the nature of 
the emotions, and understanding the connotations of emotion words and the contexts 
in which they are used will clearly aid any endeavour to establish the nature of the 
emotion being studied. Though I take as a starting point a group of words (which we 
will discuss in more detail later) already identified as being translatable to ‘hate’, the 
ultimate goal is to understand the emotional structures Hesiod has applied those 
                                                
21 Ortony, Clore & Collins (1988: 2).  
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words to. Thus, the reader must bear in mind that when I discuss Hesiod’s ‘hatred’ I 
mean ‘the emotion represented by the cluster of Greek words discussed, which have 
been identified as meaningfully translatable by the English word hatred.’  
 
Of course, a specific emotion need not be explicitly mentioned in a text in order for it 
to be understood that a certain character is feeling that certain emotion. Once the 
nature of the emotion represented by a certain word has been examined using the 
instances in which that word appears, we will have an understanding of the types of 
relationships and situations that the emotion appears in, how it operates, what types of 
actions it provokes, what, if any, moral sentiments are attached to it, and how it is 
physically portrayed – the elements of emotional experience that others have referred 
to as ‘scripts’. Using this information we can then tentatively look elsewhere in the 
text to see if there are other instances in which the script associated with the emotion 
word is present, even when the emotion word itself is not. This line of enquiry can 
only be pursued cautiously because, without a direct statement of what the emotion in 
question is, there is always room for error. Hesiod rarely gives descriptions of facial 
expressions or postures (information which would be highly useful in identifying a 
script) and focuses instead on actions and genealogy, and the same action can be 
prompted by many different emotions – or none at all. Nevertheless, examining the 
genealogy will allow us to investigate related concepts, which will help provide 
tentative insight into what action scripts are relevant to understanding his conception 
of hatred.  
 
But even the above considerations do not represent the full complexity of the 
linguistic issues we must consider even before we turn to ancient Greek: English itself 
has a notable amount of words that are taken, by different people, at different times, 
to be synonymous, or very closely associated, with ‘hate.’ When we combine this fact 
with the reluctance of emotion theorists to define what they mean by specific emotion 
words a highly frustrating situation emerges.  
 
One clear example of the problem is evident in Robert Solomon’s attempts to 
differentiate between ‘contempt’, ‘resentment’, and ‘hatred.’ Solomon defines 
‘contempt’ as an emotion felt by one who considers themselves ‘superior’ towards 
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those that they consider ‘inferior’.22 But the linguistic examples of metaphors given as 
examples of how we talk about those we hold in contempt – “a rat”, “a worm”, 
“scum”, etc. are highly identifiable elements of what we now call ‘hate speech’ due to 
their use by genocidal regimes to dehumanise their victims and justify violence 
against them. Solomon then says that the people towards whom we direct such 
language are those we ‘loathe’, parenthetically commenting that this is a ‘variety of 
contempt’, without defining it any further.  
 
As for hatred, Solomon simply says that it ‘is an emotion of equality’ and that it 
‘seeks out equals’.23 But this explains nothing. Whilst it makes sense that inequality 
between two parties can cause negative emotions between them, it cannot be the case 
that it is the relationship of equality that causes hatred. What is it that an equal does 
which causes us to hate them? Solomon does not say. It is hatred between ethnic 
groups and nationalities that Solomon later claims cause war and violence,24 but such 
hostilities are driven by the fact that at least one group thinks that the other is inferior. 
By Solomon’s own definition, the feeling involved in ethnic conflict should be 
contempt, not hatred. The alternative is to commit to the idea that hatred, and thus 
war, only happens between groups that consider themselves equals. I do not believe 
that this is the position that Solomon intended to assume, but rather a slippage in 
terminological uses that undermines the attempt to distinguish them.  
 
Resentment, on the other hand, Solomon (clearly influenced heavily by Nietzsche) 
defines as ‘the feeling of the weak towards the strong… in history, slaves resented 
their masters. Resentment is always on the defensive and it is always looking up at 
those considered oppressive.’25 But it is not at all clear that this power dynamic is 
understood by lay people as essential to resentment. When we turn to the Oxford 
English Dictionary we find the first definition is a ‘sense of grievance; an indignant 
sense of injury or insult received or perceived; (a feeling of) ill will, bitterness, or 
anger against a person or thing; the manifestation of such feeling’. There is no 
mention here of a power dynamic; further, both anger and indignation closely 
associated with resentment in this definition are emotions that Solomon has elsewhere 
                                                
22 Solomon (2006: 211). 
23 Solomon (2006: 211-12). 
24 Solomon (2006: 180).  
25 Solomon (2006: 211).  
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defined as quite distinct from resentment.26 
 
All of this shows us two things. First, that even when the very nature of certain 
emotions is under discussion, our own language use frequently frustrates the 
distinctions we are trying to impose. Solomon uses contempt and hatred 
interchangeably, even whilst defining them as separate things. Secondly, it 
demonstrates (some of) the large range of emotions (or words) that, in English, we 
associate with hatred.  
 
The problem can be seen even more starkly with the below map (Fig. 1). For each 
word, arrows have been drawn to other words that are mentioned in the Oxford 
English Dictionary definition for that word. If we examine the interrelations following 
the direction of the arrows, we see that: seven have one degree of separation from 
hatred, six have two degrees of separation, two have three degrees of separation, two 
have four degrees of separation, one has five, and another one has six (surprisingly, it 
is contempt). Ignoring the direction of the arrows we have: ten words with one degree 
of separation, six with two degrees of separation, three with three degrees of 
separation, and two with four degrees of separation. ‘Intense dislike’ is missing from 
these lists, for the obvious reason of not having its own dictionary entry.  
 
Hatred is given in the meanings of: enemy, animosity, enmity, detestation, 
abhorrence, and malice. And hatred’s meanings are: malevolence, loathing, hostility, 
animosity, intense dislike, and aversion. Hatred is given as an obsolete meaning for 
loathing, though I am at a loss to explain why they think it obsolete. Note that the 
only overlap between those words that mention hatred in their definition, and those 
words included as part of the definition of hatred is aversion (and loathing).   
 
                                                
26 Solomon (2006: 20): Anger and (moral) indignation are distinct from each other; but ‘righteous’ 
anger is the same as (moral) indignation (175); both lack Solomon’s specification that we consider the 






And this is not even a complete list: repulsion, offensiveness, distaste, antipathy, 
horror, and evil are all given as part of the meanings for at least one word represented 
in the map.27 What this demonstrates is that the exact meaning of hatred is highly 
complex (and perhaps even unsolvable) even when working in one language, let alone 
when we involve the extra hurdle of translation.  
 
What does all of this mean for an inquiry into hatred in Hesiod? One simple answer is 
that it means that we must recognise that, just as there is a constellation of closely 
                                                
27 Marcus (2002: 119) laments the plethora of words English has for the ‘phenomenon’ of hatred, 
listing: ‘malice, animus, malevolence, ill will, animosity, bitterness, hate, hostility, disgust, aversion, 
antipathy, abhorrence, distaste, repugnance, enmity, displeasure, umbrage, petulance, resentment, 
repulsion, annoyance, disapprobation, disapproval, and antagonism’ as ‘only a few of them’ (yet in the 




related words in English, so too, there will be in Ancient Greek. Whatever words we 
start our investigation with, we must be open to the possibility of other, closely 
related words revealing themselves. 
 
We turn now to investigate how contemporary theorists define hatred. There are a 
plethora of different approaches to emotions which we could turn to for attempts to 
define hatred. Some, such as evolutionary and neurological approaches are of no use 
to us; they are simply not relevant to Hesiod. Others, such as the phenomenological 
perspective will provide some limited insight, but Hesiod’s texts lack the type of data 
that would be required to make this a highly fruitful avenue to pursue. A useful 
starting point for understanding hatred will be to examine prototype analyses of the 
emotion. Having gained a basic insight into qualities associated with hatred, we will 
be better placed to examine hatred from two more perspectives: psychological, and 
sociological. These are the dominant, and complementary, modes that I will utilise in 
examining hatred in Hesiod. Due to a dearth of research that specifically looks at 
hatred as a moral or immoral emotion, I have not included a separate section on such 
an approach. The morality of hatred, however, is inextricably interwoven throughout 
both the sociological and psychological approaches.  
 
The discussion of these different modes of analysis and the definitions they produce 
will illuminate the complex nature of hatred, and reveal various elements of the 
emotion which we must take note of in Hesiod’s works if we are to truly understand 
the nature and function of hatred in his poems.  
 
 
What is Hatred?: Prototype Analysis 
Before we can discuss the best way to analyse hatred, we must have some 
understanding of what hatred is. As we have already seen, this is a question that has 
confused theorists. One approach that might shed some light on at least the lay 
understanding of hatred is that of prototype analysis. We have already seen this type 
of analysis used to demonstrate that the lay concept of hatred strongly identifies it as 
an emotion, rather than a mood. The theory behind such analyses eschews the notion 
that a certain quality can be said to simply belong or not belong to a category, and 
instead investigates the degree to which a quality or idea can be said to be typical of a 
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specific concept or category. The idea has seen notable use in the study of emotions – 
unsurprising, given the difficulty in defining specific emotions, and the conceptual 
overlap we have already seen demonstrated. A prototype analysis of a specific 
emotion is an investigation into which qualities or ideas are associated with an 
emotion, and to what degree. Those qualities that receive high recognition rates can 
be grouped as ‘core’ ideas relating to the central concept, whilst those still associated 
with the concept, but less strongly, can be classed as ‘peripheral’.  
 
In 1969 Joel Davitz conducted a study investigating the ideas associated with 50 
different emotions. The study had 50 participants, who used a pre-generated checklist 
of over 500 statements to describe different emotions, including hate, contempt, 
disgust, resentment, dislike, and anger.28 There was notable overlap between all five 
emotions, but particularly hate, contempt, anger, and resentment. All four had core 
physical component of the whole body feeling tense, and a psychological component 
of feeling easily irritated. They also all shared a feeling of a tense face/mouth, though 
this was reported by just under half of participants in the case of hate (48%).29  
 
The strongest overlap was between hate and anger, which also shared core 
characteristics of an impulse to ‘hurt, to hit, or to kick someone else’, or ‘to strike out, 
to pound, or smash, or kick, or bite; to do something that will hurt’, a sense of being  
‘caught up and overwhelmed by the feeling’ and of being ‘gripped by the situation’.30 
To a lesser extent (i.e. the quality was core for one emotion but peripheral to the 
other, or peripheral to both) they also shared physical characteristics of clenched teeth 
(38% for hate, 52% for anger), clenched fists (46% for hate, 52% for anger), 
‘muscular rigidity’ (42% for hate, 40% for anger), increased blood pressure (46% for 
hate, 72% for anger), a quickened heartbeat (38% for hate, 52% for anger), as well as 
the sensation of ‘a tight knotted feeling’ in the stomach (46% for hate, 38% for 
anger). The also shared characteristics of a sensation of a ‘narrowing of the senses’, 
where ‘attention becomes riveted on one thing’ (40% for hate, 52% for anger), of 
feeling about to explode or burst, (46% for hate, 48% for anger), wanting to ‘strike 
out’ or ‘explode’ but holding back (50% for hatred, 46% for anger), and feeling 
                                                
28 ‘Dislike’ was an odd case in that there were no results at all that were given by a majority of 
participants.  
29 Davitz (1969: 35-36, 42-43, 64-65, 79).  
30 Davitz (1969: 35-36, 64-65). 
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‘excitement’ or ‘over stimulated’ (34% for hate, 64% for anger) as well as desires to 
‘say something nasty’ (62% for hate, 42% for anger), and to get revenge (54% for 
hate, 40% for anger).31  
 
A peripheral component of hate that differentiated it from anger was a feeling of 
being ‘trapped, closed up, boxed, fenced in, tied down, inhibited’ (40%). This sense 
of feeling trapped can be grouped with other peripheral components of hate, such as 
feeling ‘under a heavy burden’ (34%), being unable to laugh or smile (42%), and a 
sense that it ‘seems bottled up inside’ (42%). None of these ideas were present in 
anger, and give a sense of hatred as something which feels restricting, confining, or 
limiting.   
 
Certainly Davitz’s study was not without flaws – many of the different characteristics 
either overlap or are very similar (e.g. the ‘to strike out, to pound, or smash, or kick, 
or bite; to do something that will hurt’ and the impulse to ‘hurt, to hit, or to kick 
someone else’). Further, the study looked only at what it feels like to experience an 
emotion, and did not look at what caused the emotion in the first place. It is 
illuminating nonetheless.  
 
In 1993 Julie Fitness and Garth Fletcher conducted a study designed to produce both a 
cognitive appraisal analysis and a prototype analysis for love, hate, anger, and 
jealousy in personal relationships. Later, in 2000, Fitness conducted a study of anger 
between colleagues in the workplace that also collected data on hate. Given that anger 
and hate were the only emotions common to all three studies, and that anger was the 
emotion that had the strongest overlap with hate in Davitz’s study, I shall continue to 
comment on both emotions. Of these two, the most useful to us is Fitness and 
Fletcher’s study, since, unlike Fitness’s workplace study, it focused exclusively on 
hatred. 
 
The results of Fitness and Fletcher’s study showed that the most – and only – 
common cause of hatred between couples was in situations where ‘their spouses had 
neglected, badly treated, or humiliated’ them – an answer given by 65% of 
                                                
31 Davitz (1969: 35-36, 64-65).   
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participants. This scenario was also the second most common cause of anger (33%), 
which was most frequently caused by feeling that their partner had been unfair to 
them (48%).32 This matched the findings of Fletcher’s workplace study, where anger 
did not vary between humiliating and non-humiliating events, but hatred was elicited 
more in events the participants found humiliating.33 Fletcher’s workplace study also 
investigated the difference between hatred based on the relative status of the hater 
compared to the target of their hate, and found that ‘respondents interacting with 
superiors and co-workers reported significantly more intense hate for the offender 
than respondents interacting with subordinates.’ i.e. hatred was more common when 
the subject felt they had less power in the situation.34 This result is similar to that 
obtained by Fitness and Fletcher, where hate was characterised as ‘effortful, and 
involving a high level of obstacles’, and with the fact that subjects ‘felt less in control 
of the situation.’35  
 
Another study conducted by Katherine Aumer-Ryan and Elaine Hatfield focused 
specifically on hatred, investigating how people conceived of hatred, who the targets 
of hatred were and how they try to handle their hatred. They found that the most 
common reasons given by participants as to why they hated someone were ‘defects of 
personality’ and ‘betrayal’, with betrayal being the most common reason given in 
instances where the target of hatred was a significant other.36 They also discovered in 
their study that ‘when attempting to define “hate,” most participants referred to other 
similar attitudes or emotions such as “extreme dislike,” “extreme disgust,” and 
“extreme anger.”’37 This matches the notable overlap between anger, dislike, and 
hatred seen by Davitz, though the correlation with disgust was less notable in Davitz’s 
results. 
 
Aumer-Ryan and Hatfield’s study also asked participants about what people and 
groups of people they had hated, rather than examining hatred within a specified 
relationship. But friends (28%), acquaintances (23%), family, (11%) and exes (11%) 
made up the majority of the subjects identified as being hated. ‘Groups’ of people 
                                                
32 Fitness & Fletcher (1993: 947).  
33 Fletcher (2000: 156).  
34 Fitness (2000: 157).  
35 Fitness & Fletcher (1993: 948).  
36 Aumer-Ryan & Hatfield (2007: 154).  
37 Aumer-Ryan & Hatfield (2007: 151).  
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such as telemarketers or pick-pockets were only given as targets of hate 5% of the 
time – though Aumer-Ryan and Hatfield deliberately steered away from ‘taboo’ 
hatreds such as misogyny and racism, which might well have impacted that result. 
Co-workers were also mentioned only 5% of the time.  
 
Fitness and Fletcher’s study was the only one that asked participants about the 
duration of the emotions being investigated. The responses indicated that hatred could 
last only seconds or minutes (37%), hours (40%), or days and weeks (22%). In 
contrast to this, anger was experienced predominantly as of very brief duration, with 
63% reporting it as lasting only seconds or minutes. Anger was also said to have 
lasted hours by 30% of participants and only 5% reported anger as lasting days to 
weeks. Thus, hatred frequently lasts a lot longer than anger, but is also capable of 
disappearing very quickly, and still, as with anger, usually lasts no longer than hours. 
Of course, a caveat to this is that Fitness and Fletcher’s study only allowed 
participants to give an answer of ‘days and weeks’ for the maximum duration of their 
hatred. Further, given that the study was confined to couples who were still together, 
one might suspect that if the hatred was not overcome – and lasted months or years, 
then the marriage was likely to have ended. Certainly, the fact that 11% of 
participants in Aumer-Ryan and Hatfield’s study gave their ex-partners as examples 
of someone they hated, suggests that the hatred can endure beyond the end of the 
marriage.     
 
In Fitness and Fletcher’s study, participants reported a ‘negative cognition’ about 
their partner in the case of anger and hatred 100% of the time, but those experiencing 
hatred also reported having negative feelings about themselves 73% of the time 
compared to only 32% for anger (thoughts such as ‘believing they deserved such bad 
treatment or blaming themselves for putting up with the situation’).38 Hatred was most 
the common emotion associated with a negative perception of the relationship 
between the couple (35%). Hatred, then, appears to have a far broader negative 
impact on the perception of the relationships and those in it.  
 
In terms of how emotions were expressed and acted upon, the most common 
                                                
38 Fitness & Fletcher (1993: 948). 
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expression for hatred was to say nothing at all, act coldly, and leave the situation, 
contrary to Davitz’s results in which there were strong desires to say something nasty, 
get revenge, and to strike out. But hate could also commonly be expressed verbally, in 
a hostile manner, with an accompanying behaviour of shouting and throwing things. 
A response of ‘behaving as usual’ was very slightly more common (27%) than the 
behaviour of yelling and throwing things (25%). But these more hostile and 
aggressive urges were all expressed more commonly in anger, and formed the 
predominant responses for anger. Despite anger being more likely to involve actively 
hostile words and actions, it was also more likely than hatred to be expressed through 
calm discussion (30% compared to 17%). Hatred and anger were equally unlikely to 
result in an urge to resolve the situation (6%), but only 2% of participants reported the 
urge to take revenge in the case of anger, compared to 15% in the case of hatred – 
though this is still significantly less that the 54% reported in Davitz’s study.39 
 
In terms of physiological symptoms, tense muscles were the most commonly reported 
symptom for both anger and hatred, and a tight stomach was the second most frequent 
symptom for both – again matching Davitz’s results. However, hatred could also 
manifest as a sick stomach (17%), which was a symptom absent in anger (though 
present only in the case of disgust in Davitz’s study). No one reported feelings of 
warmth or heat as a symptom of hate (compared to 20% for love and 22% for anger).  
 
Attempts to control hate and anger were both reported at around 74%. This is a 
notably higher rate of attempting to control the emotions than was reported by Davitz, 
but matches Davitz in there being similar reports of ‘wanting to explode but holding 
back’ between hatred (50%) and anger (46%). The most common reason given for 
attempting to control both of them was because they were felt to be destructive 
emotions (45%). 20% reported trying to control their hatred because they felt it was 
inappropriate, comparable to anger at 24%, but interestingly no one reported 
controlling their hatred because they feared their partner’s reaction, compared to 18% 
in the case of anger. The most common reason given for not controlling hatred and 
anger was because the participant wanted their partner to know how they felt (40% 
for hatred, 54% for anger).  
                                                




When asked to recall events eliciting each emotion, 68% of participants recalled an 
anger event that had taken place in the last 1-4 weeks, 23% 1-12 months ago, and 
only 8% recalled an event over a year ago. On the other hand, hate events were 
recalled 30% of the time at 1-4 weeks, 40% of the time at 1-12 months, and 30% of 
the time for over a year. Even when the event is over and the emotion has faded, it 
seems that the memory of hatred lingers whilst anger fades.  
 
The cognitive appraisal component of the study revealed that ‘appraisals of hate-
eliciting events were opposite those for love events in that they were appraised as 
unpleasant, effortful, and involving a high level of obstacles; their course was 
unpredictable, and compared with anger, subjects felt less in control of the 
situation’.40 This matches Davitz’s findings that feeling ‘gripped by the situation’ and 
being ‘caught up and overwhelmed by the feeling’ were central components of hatred.  
 
From this data, the dominant elements of hatred that we have seen are that is most 
likely to be caused by a sense of betrayal or humiliation, and unsurprisingly, also 
negative self-perception. It is more likely to be directed towards people we are close 
to. Physiologically, it is associated with bodily and muscle tension. Hatred can lead to 
the desire for revenge, and to physically harm, and can also manifest in violent verbal 
and physical outbursts. On the other hand, it can also lead to a desire to avoid, and 
accordingly, to actions of ignoring someone or acting coldly towards them. It is 
associated with a feeling of a lack of control and being overwhelmed. Finally, it can 
last very briefly, but also endure.  
 
 
What is Hatred?: Sociological Approaches 
Sociological approaches to the study of emotions examine the functions and effects of 
expressing or acting on an emotion with regard to their impact on relationships with 
others. These relationships operate on multiple levels; for instance, they can be dyadic 
(between two individuals), oriented towards an ingroup, or oriented towards an 
outgroup. ‘Positive’ emotions in such models have an obvious utility; gratitude, for 
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example, encourages reciprocity and cooperation. The utility of an emotion such as 
hatred is far less obvious. However, nearly all scholars working with sociological 
models accept that (at least some) ‘negative’ emotions can be useful so long as they 
are expressed in the right circumstances, towards the right targets, and are manifested 
appropriately. Embarrassment, for example, is an emotion that we might consider 
‘negative’ in that it is unpleasant to experience it, but it serves a useful reconciliatory 
purpose. Equally, ‘positive’ emotions, when expressed in the wrong circumstances, 
towards the wrong targets, and manifested inappropriately can be destructive. Our 
discussion of sociological models will be focused on negative emotions, since hatred 
in academic literature is always considered a ‘negative’ emotion. Ideally we would be 
able to focus specifically on hatred in our discussion, but given that hatred is often 
absent from these discussions, and that it is conflated and intertwined with other 
‘negative’ emotions such as disgust and contempt, we will frequently be forced to 
turn to those hate-adjacent emotions.  
 
Agneta Fischer and Anthony Manstead identify two social functions of emotion: an 
affiliation function, which helps ‘form and maintain positive social relationships’; and 
a distancing function, which aims to ‘establish or maintain a social position relative to 
others, and to preserve our self-esteem, identity, or power, sometimes at the expense 
of others’.41 Some emotions might have a more obvious affiliation or distancing 
functions than others – joy and gratitude are obvious candidates for affiliation 
functions, whereas anger, contempt, and hatred are obvious candidates for distancing 
functions. Fischer and Manstead argue that both negative and positive emotions, 
whether distancing or affiliating, can be socially functional (or dysfunctional) 
depending on the circumstances, noting that ‘anger, contempt, and even hate can be 
socially functional if they help to protect the self from destructive relations with 
others.’42 Distancing functions may also be necessary for pursuing individual, rather 
than group, goals. If we wish to beat someone in competition, for example, emotions 
that serve to distance us may be more useful than those which would enhance 
affiliation.43  
 
                                                
41 Fischer & Manstead (2016: 424). 
42 Fischer & Manstead (2016: 246). 
43 Fischer & Manstead (2016: 245).  
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The social distancing function ‘results from the negative appraisals of the actions or 
character of the person’, and they give examples of ‘tendencies’ caused by certain 
emotions. Anger and hate, they suggest, result in tendencies ‘to attack the other’, 
whereas contempt’s tendency is ‘to treat the other as an inferior being’.44 But negative 
emotions can also have, in the right circumstances, an affiliation function, positive 
emotions can also have a distancing function, and the same emotion might have either 
function depending on the circumstances. Fischer and Manstead claim that ‘the 
evidence suggests that negative emotions serve three specific social functions that all 
promote the more general affiliation function, namely, signalling, support, and social 
change.’45 But the extent to which a negative emotion can serve an affiliation function 
differs between individual emotions. If is far easier to make an argument for an 
affiliation function for anger than it is for contempt or hatred. 
 
For instance, anger, though it might have a short-term distancing effect can, in the 
long term, lead to affiliative outcomes. A subject’s expression of anger both reveals to 
its target that the angry person feels they have been wronged, or wants the target to 
modify their behaviour. In response, a target might accept that they have wronged the 
angry person, and take steps towards reconciliation such as apologising or displaying 
remorse or guilt.46 Fischer and Manstead point to the numerous works of other 
scholars that have revealed that verbal displays of anger, perhaps contrary to what we 
might expect, can aid the angry person in negotiation situations (though of course, it 
may backfire if the other party does not respond to anger in the way we might hope).47  
 
But even hatred and contempt can still have an affiliative function, albeit far narrower 
than that of anger. Emotions that demonstrate a distancing function at an intergroup 
level – i.e. felt by an individual towards an outgroup – can simultaneously have an 
affiliative function with other members of the ingroup. Thus, when expressed towards 
an outgroup, hatred and contempt could help strengthen identification with the 
ingroup.48 
                                                
44 Fischer & Manstead (2016: 429).  
45 Fischer & Manstead (2016: 427).  
46 Fischer & Manstead (2016: 429). 
47 Fischer & Manstead (2016: 429); See Van Kleef & Côté (2008) for the negative impact that 
hierarchical power dynamics can have on someone’s response to displays of appropriate and 
inappropriate anger in negotiations.   




In attempting to understand the role of hatred at the intergroup level, Eran Halperin 
conducted several studies using participants from the general Jewish population of 
Israel. Based on the results of the first preliminary study of 30 participants Halperin 
proposes the following ‘working definition’ of hatred:49  
Hatred is a powerful, extreme, and persistent emotion that rejects the group 
toward which it is directed in a generalized and totalistic fashion. Group-based 
hatred is provoked in consequence to recurrent offenses committed against the 
individual or his or her group. These offenses are perceived as intentional, 
unjust, threatening the person or his or her group, and of a nature with which 
in practice the individual has difficulty coping. This hatred includes cognitive 
elements that make a clear ideological, moral, and cultural differentiation 
between the in-group and the out-group while delegitimizing the out-group. 
The affective element of hatred is secondary, and it is manifested in 
unpleasant physical symptoms as well as in anger, fear, and a strong negative 
feeling toward the out-group to the point of a desire to harm and even destroy 
it. In the majority of cases, this desire is not realized and therefore is 
channeled to other behavioral directions, such as isolation from the object of 
the hatred, delight at the expense of the hated other, or taking part in political 
action against him or her.’50  
The strongest support was for hatred as ‘an immoral or nonlegitimate emotion’ 
(93.3%); a belief in the superiority of the ingroup (90%); the intentional nature of the 
offensive action committed by the outgroup and the belief that it is likely to reoccur 
(73.3%); an accompanying emotional response of anger (90%); and a desire for 
something bad to happen to the outgroup and a ‘need’ to engage in violent action 
against the outgroup (83.3%), with ‘complete detachment from the object of the 
hatred’ being the predominantly reported actual course of action participants would 
take (83.3%).51 
 
This gives us a core prototypical definition of hatred as an immoral or nonlegitimate 
emotion which is frequently accompanied by anger, a desire for something bad to 
happen to the outgroup, an equally strong detachment from the outgroup, and a belief 
in: the superiority of the ingroup over the outgroup, the intentional nature of the 
                                                
49 Note that Halperin also did not state which language these interviews were conducted in, or what 
word was used to mean ‘hatred’ if it was not English. The same is true for the second study. In the third 
study Halperin states that they initial phone interviews were conducted ‘by native speakers in Hebrew 
and Russian’, (2008: 726) which suggests that at least these two languages were used. No discussion is 
given to the terms used or any issues of translation.  
50 Halperin (2008: 718).  
51 Halperin (2008: 717-18).  
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offensive actions of the outgroup and the high likelihood that they will behave in such 
a way again in future.  
 
The next of Halperin’s studies, conducted with a group of 240 Israeli-Jewish 
university students, examined the relationship between hatred, fear, and anger. The 
results indicated that after a perceived (significant) offence has been caused by the 
outgroup towards either the individual or to other members of their ingroup, anger 
develops based on the belief that the offense was not “deserved”. If the participants 
judged that their group’s or their own ability to cope with future incidents of such 
affronts was low, then fear also developed. In cases where the offending party was 
perceived to have acted deliberately to harm the individual or others within the 
ingroup and the actions were judged to be representative of a ‘generalized evil 
character’ of the outgroup, then group-based hatred developed.52 There was still a 
significant positive correlation between fear and hate, but it was notably lower than 
the correlation between anger and hate. Halperin’s conclusion is that ‘hatred enables 
the individual to cope with feelings of fear and moderates them, while at the same 
time, the experience of anger continues to exist and is, in fact, sometimes “fueled” 
and intensified by appraisals associated with hatred’.53 
 
Halperin’s final study focused on the behavioural component of group-based hatred. 
This study is of particular interest to us because participants were asked to rate the 
intensity of eight separate emotional states: (angry, irritated, revolted, afraid, scared, 
worried, hatred, hostility) in response to various hypothetical scenarios. Anger, 
revulsion, hatred, and hostility are all terms that, as we have seen, appear to be closely 
related in English (though again, the language in which this study was conducted was 
not specified). Hostility and hatred were grouped together under ‘hatred’; angry, 
irritated, and revolted under ‘anger’; and afraid, scared, and worried were grouped 
under ‘fear’.54 Participants were also asked to express their approval (on a scale of 1-
6) for four different ‘emotion goals’: ‘Live and let live (create a safe environment)’, 
‘change attitudes and perceptions of out-group members (corrections)’, ‘removal or 
destruction of out-group’, and ‘do evil to out-group’; and five different ‘action 
                                                
52 Halperin (2008: 723-24).  
53 Halperin (2008: 724).  
54 Halperin (2008: 726). Note that this gives only two emotion words related to hatred as opposed to 
three for both anger and fear. 
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tendencies’: ‘avoid any social relations with out-group’, ‘support of education 
channels to create perceptual change’, ‘physical and violent action’, ‘support of 
political and social exclusion of out-group’, and ‘disengagement and separation 
(social and political) between the two groups’.55 
 
The results indicated that only hatred is associated with the willingness to do evil to, 
remove, or destroy the outgroup and that only anger is associated with a willingness 
to attempt to change the perception of the outgroup or ‘improve’ it.56 Fear is 
‘exclusively related to the tendency towards preventing any contact with the out-
group’, whereas hatred has a wider range of action tendencies: ‘support for political 
and social exclusion, violent actions, and disengagement of the groups’.57 In relation 
to intractable conflicts, then, anger has a ‘positive’ desire that tends towards diffusing 
a situation, whereas fear seeks to avoid the object of fear. Hatred lacks any desire to 
diffuse the situation and instead desires violence, exclusion, and disengagement. 
Halperin suggests the absence of a desire to attempt to ‘improve’ the outgroup when it 
is hated ‘reflects a despair of any potential change.’58  
 
Further research by Halperin and others has solidified these findings with regard to 
intractable conflicts. Halperin, Alexandra Russell, Carol Dweck, and James Gross 
argue that it is the presence or absence of hatred that is the predominant factor in 
whether anger will be constructive or destructive,59 and Halperin confidently claims 
after further studies on Jewish Israeli attitudes towards Palestinians that not only is 
hatred ‘a major emotional barrier to peace’, but that ‘it is the only emotion that 
reduces support for symbolic compromise, reconciliation, and even stands as an 
obstacle to every attempt to acquire positive knowledge’ about the outgroup (in this 
case, Palestinians).60 
 
The focus on intractable conflict means Halperin’s work provides us with further 
ideas which we should bear in mind when examining the works of Hesiod, given that 
                                                
55 Halperin (2008: 728).  
56 Roseman, Weist & Swartz found these desires to be associated with anger. However, hatred was 
missing from their study (1994). 
57 Halperin (2008: 728-9).  
58 Halperin (2008: 729).  
59 Halperin et al. (2011). 
60 Halperin (2011a: 40). See also Halperin (2011b).  
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there are certainly instances of what we might call ‘intractable’ conflict in Hesiod’s 
poems. The potential interrelations of anger and fear with hatred is something which 
we should therefore be aware of during our examination of the poems. When looking 
for evidence of an emotional script for hatred, we should also look for evidence of the 
absence or presence of anger and fear, and whether these have any impact on how 
hate is manifested.  
 
Halperin’s work focuses on inter-group violence. Less work has been done on intra-
group violence, but the work of Benny Temkin and Niza Yanay provides us with 
some useful insight into this area. Temkin and Yanay examined hate mail sent to 
members of the Movement for Citizens Rights and for Peace (CRM) – an Israeli 
political party. The hate mail was sent by Israeli citizens who clearly considered that 
the targets of their letters should belong to the same social ingroup as themselves. 
Temkin and Yanay argue that ‘functionally, the discourse of aggressive political 
letters can best be understood as aiming at the attainment of two main goals: to punish 
and to persuade.’61  
 
The letters expressed desires for harm to come to the targets, and overtly expressed 
that the writer was excluding them from their social/national group. But they also 
expressed a desire for the target to repent of their ways, abandon their current political 
and ideological stances, and return to the collective. This desire was expressed both 
through attempts to frighten (threats of violence if they do not change) and through 
more positive means (implying the benefits they will accrue if they change their 
ways).62 The letters utilised Nazi terminology and symbols, which Temkin and Yanay 
suggest clearly demonstrates that ‘the writers share the collective fears, anxieties, 
hate, and pain culturally associated with holocaust images.’63 This in itself indicates 
the acknowledgement of a shared cultural identity.  
 
The CRM, according to Temkin and Yanay, are seen as promoting values that weaken 
‘the moral basis of the national strength’. Thus, the letters are not only acts of 
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62 Temkin & Yanay (1988: 473-76).  
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aggression, but they are also ‘the expression of an intense sense of danger and fear’.64 
Hatred in this intra-group setting is a response to a fear that the moral character of the 
society, and its identity, are deteriorating. The letters suggest that in this intra-group 
setting, some forms of aggression (particularly, verbal aggression) aim both at 
punishment, but also attempt to change the mind of the hated target so that they may 
be reintegrated and the moral values and identity of the society refortified.  
 
 
What is Hatred?: Psychological Perspectives 
There are numerous psychological approaches we could take to examining hatred, but 
some of the recent work of Robert Sternberg focuses specifically on hatred, making it 
an ideal candidate for our current enterprise. Sternberg proposes a ‘triangular theory 
of the structure of hate’, arguing that what we call hatred is not a single emotion, but 
consists of three components. The first of these components is the ‘negation of 
intimacy (distancing), which seeks to distance the hater from the hated target. This 
distance is frequently sought ‘because that individual arouses repulsion and disgust in 
the person who experiences hate’. The feelings of this component are ‘somewhat’ 
slow to develop and fade. 65 The second component is passion, ‘which expresses itself 
as intense anger or fear in response to a threat.’ Whilst the two can lead to very 
different actions (anger to approach, fear to avoid), both are a response to a perceived 
threat.66 Unlike the distancing component, the passion component is ‘typically rapid 
in its growth and often rapid in its demise.’67 The final component is ‘decision-
commitment’, ‘which is characterized by cognitions of devaluation and diminution 
through contempt for the targeted group’. As with the distancing component, 
decision-commitment is usually slow in onset and slow in cessation.68  
 
Based on these three components, Sternberg produces a model comprising seven 
different ‘types’ of hate based on which of the above components is present:69 
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67 Sternberg (2003: 308).  
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69 Sternberg documents them in a table; I find a Venn diagram better reveals the overlapping natures of 







These different types of hate can lead to different results and courses of action (or 
inaction) and feelings about the target. For instance, in isolation the ‘cool hate’ of the 
negation of intimacy/disgust component produces a desire to have nothing to do with 
the hated other, to view them as subhuman, and perhaps to express ‘visceral 
prejudice’ against them. But when combined with the passion/anger-fear component 
to produce revulsion or ‘boiling hate’, the target is not only viewed as subhuman, but 
also as a threat requiring some course of action to eliminate or reduce. When the 
passion/anger-fear component is combined with the decision-commitment/contempt 
component, producing revilement or ‘seething hate’, individuals are not only 
currently seen as a threat (as with boiling hate, but unlike cool hate), but ‘always have 
been’.70 We may expect, based on Sternberg’s characterisation of the decision-
commitment/contempt component as one in which ‘the hater is likely to feel contempt 
toward the target individual or group, viewing the target as barely human or even as 
subhuman’, to find that in revilement the target is also viewed as subhuman. Instead, 
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Sternberg suggests, that ‘in these cases, the targeted group may be portrayed not as 
subhuman but as more than human’.71 I shall not discuss the details of the remaining 
‘types’ of hatred because Sternberg admits that these seven different types are 
‘probably not exhaustive, and, because they represent limiting cases, they are not 
mutually exclusive.’ Once again we are presented with a model with which neat 
distinctions can be drawn in abstract, but which blur and disappear in real life 
situations. Given this, we may query the practical utility of being able to distinguish 
these different types.  
 
Sternberg proceeds to propose that hatred should be understood as a ‘story’ because 
it, like love, has a ‘story-like’ quality that characterises its essence.72 Different stories 
involve different types of hatred. However, this analysis in terms of stories only 
demonstrates further the inapplicability of such neat categories to reality. For 
example, the story of the ‘impure other (vs. pure in-group)’, for which it is 
hypothesised that the element of the triangle of hate it will most incite is negation of 
intimacy/disgust can be indistinguishable from the story of the ‘morally bankrupt (vs. 
morally sound)’, for which it is hypothesised that the elements it will most incite are 
negation of intimacy/disgust and decision-commitment/contempt. And both of these 
may be indistinguishable from the story of the ‘enemy of God (vs. Servant of God)’ 
for which it is hypothesised that the elements it will most incite are Passion/anger-fear 
and decision-commitment/contempt, but not negation of intimacy/disgust.  
 
What is of interest to us in Sternberg’s model is that disgust in and of itself might be 
understood, in certain circumstances, as a form of hatred, as might contempt, or 
anger, or fear. Equally, we might take any combination of these emotions as a form of 
hatred. 
 
The fact that all these different attempts to theorise about hatred cannot do so without 
also mentioning emotions such as anger, contempt and disgust (among others) 
strongly indicates that, when we turn to examine hatred in Hesiod, we cannot fully do 
so without also being aware of how it might intersect with, or relate to, these other 
associated emotions.  
                                                
71 Sternberg (2003: 312).  





Hatred in Ancient Greek Literature 
Having established some idea of hatred based on contemporary investigations, let us 
turn now to the ancient sources. All the ancient Greek sources that address emotions 
approach them from the point of view of philosophy, though ethical, psychological 
and cognitive ideas are nearly always inextricable. It is not my intention to survey the 
concept of hatred in all ancient sources – indeed, a detailed discussion of all of them 
would take multiple books. But it will be useful to comment on at least one ancient 
source other than Hesiod, in order to understand the differences and similarities 
between ancient and modern approaches. Doing so will allow us some insight into 
hatred in the cultural context of ancient Greece. This is not to say that the conception 
of hatred from one ancient author will neatly transpose onto what we see represented 
in Hesiod, but it will allow us some insight into how contemporary theories of hatred 
might overlap or differ from ancient notions of hatred.   
 
The fullest account of hatred in ancient Greece is found in the works of Aristotle 
(384–322 BCE). Aristotle is of particular interest to us because he is, as David 
Konstan puts it, ‘the only one among the major Greek philosophers to accept the 
emotions as a natural and normal part of human life, attempting neither to abolish 
them utterly nor to reduce them to mere wraiths of living passion’.73 Instead, 
Aristotle’s emotional model highlights the correct expression of emotion as a form of 
virtue. This is not the same as a sociological model of emotion, but there is much 
overlap. A virtuous person is aware of their place within society and acts in a way that 
does not disrupt their ingroup.  
 
Hatred appears in Aristotle’s list of passions (pathē) in the Nichomachean Ethics 
(1105b21-4): desire (ἐπιθυµία, epithumia), anger (ὀργή, orgē), fear (φόβος, phobos), 
boldness (θάρσος, tharsos), envy (φθόνος, phthonos), joy (χαρά, chara), 
love/friendship (φιλία, philia), hatred (µῖσος, misos), longing (πόθος, pothos), 
emulation (ζῆλος, zēlos), and pity (ἔλεος, eleos).74 It also appears in the list of pathē 
                                                
73 Konstan (2006a: 41).  
74 These translations should not, of course, be taken as perfectly correlating with the ideas they 
represent in the Greek.  
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given in the Rhetoric, where Aristotle arranges emotions in parts of opposites: anger 
(orgē) and calmness (πρᾶότης, praotēs),75 love/friendship (philia) and hatred (misos), 
fear (phobos) and courage (tharsos),76 shame (αἰσχύνη, aischunē) and shamelessness 
(ἀναισχυντία, anaischuntia), gratitude (χάρις, charis)77 and ingratitude (ἀχαριστία, 
acharistia), pity (eleos) and indignation (τὸ νεµεσᾶν, to nemesan), 78  and envy 
(phthonos) and emulation (zēlos).  
 
Aristotle does not provide a direct definition of hatred. Instead, our understanding of 
it is gleaned from how he distinguishes it from anger, and how he frames it as the 
opposite of love (philia) and specifically directs us to understand it through these 
oppositions (Rhet. 2.4, 1382a1-2). In his own discussion, he predominantly discusses 
it in contrast with anger. Given this, we must understand how he defines anger in 
order to understand how hatred differs from it. Aristotle has a very specific definition 
of anger: 
 
῎Εστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις µετὰ λύπης τιµωρίας [φαινοµένης] διὰ φαινοµένην 
ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἤ ⟨τι⟩ τῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν µὴ προσήκοντος. εἰ δὴ 
τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ ὀργή, ἀνάγκη τὸν ὀργιζόµενον ὀργίζεσθαι ἀεὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστόν 
τινι, οἷον Κλέωνι ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅτι αὑτὸν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τί πεποίηκεν 
ἢ ἤµελλεν, καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἕπεσθαί τινα ἡδονήν, τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ 
τιµωρήσασθαι· ἡδὺ µὲν γὰρ τὸ οἴεσθαι τεύξεσθαι ὧν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν 
φαινοµένων ἀδυνάτων ἐφίεται αὑτῷ, ὁ δὲ ὀργιζόµενος ἐφίεται δυνατῶν αὑτῷ. 
(Rhetoric 2.2, 1378a30 - 1378b4) 
 
Let us define anger as a longing, accompanied by pain, for a real or perceived 
revenge for a real or perceived slight against a man himself or one of his 
friends, when such a slight is undeserved. If this definition is correct, the 
angry man must always be angry with a particular individual (for instance, 
with Cleon, but not with men generally) because this individual has done, or 
was about to do, something against him or one of his friends. Lastly, anger is 
always accompanied by a certain pleasure, due to the hope of revenge to 
come. For it is pleasant to think that one will obtain what one aims at; now, no 
one aims at what is obviously impossible of attainment by him, and the angry 
man aims at what is possible for himself.79 
                                                
75 ‘Calmness’ is the most frequently used translation of praotēs, but Konstan (2006a: 77-90) suggests 
that it might more usefully be translated as ‘satisfaction’. 
76 Frequently translated as ‘confidence’.  
77 This has commonly been translated as ‘kindness’, but I am convinced by Konstan’s argument that 
‘gratitude’ is a better fit (2006a: 156-68). I have therefore translated its opposite as ingratitude.  
78 Literally, ‘to be indignant’, but it is commonly translated as a noun by scholars of Aristotle. 
79 All translations of the Rhetoric adapted from Freese’s translation. Freese’s translation sticks closely 
to Aristotle’s clumsy style. I see no reason to inflict this upon the reader and have thus opted to make 




Here, anger, orgē, involves a longing for revenge, accompanied by a feeling of pain 
(λύπη, lupē) in response to an undeserved ‘slight’ (ὀλιγωρία, oligōria).80 Compare 
this to Davitz’s study, where both anger and hatred were associated with a desire for 
revenge, but hatred more so than anger (54% for hate, 40% for anger), and the mere 
2% of participants in Fitness and Fletcher’s study who reported the urge to take 
revenge in the case of anger, compared to 15% in the case of hatred.81  
 
The slight which causes Aristotle’s anger can be in the past or present, targeted at 
either oneself or one’s friend, and must be undeserved; a deserved slight does not 
provoke anger. Anger can only be directed towards an individual. Recall that in 
Halperin’s studies of intractable conflict, anger was indeed associated with an offence 
(or slight) that the subjects felt was undeserved. Of course, the very important 
difference here is that Halperin’s subjects very much felt angry at a whole group of 
people, rather than an individual.82  
 
Aristotle’s anger contains an element of pleasure in anticipating the fulfilment of that 
revenge; for this desire to be pleasurable the revenge must be obtainable and thus 
anger is only felt in situations where revenge is possible. This is similar to the results 
obtained by Fitness’s workplace study, and Fitness and Fletcher’s study of close 
relationships where anger gave way to hatred in situations where anger could not be 
expressed, or the subject felt ‘less control in the situation’.83 It also, to a certain 
extent, matches the results obtained by Halperin, where anger was associated with a 
desire to do something about the situation, whereas hatred appeared in situations 
where the subjects felt despair at being able to change the situation.84 Of course, there 
is another very notable difference here between Aristotle and Halperin, in that in 
Halperin’s studies, anger was not necessarily focused on revenge, but could also 
include a more positive desire to try and diffuse a situation.  
 
                                                
80 Konstan argues that the lupē that accompanies anger ‘may not’ be the same as the pain that the slight 
itself might. The painful slight might cause anger, but anger itself is also accompanied by a pain that is 
an intrinsic quality of the pathos. (2006a: 278 n6). 
81 Davitz (1969: 35-36, 64-65); Fitness & Fletcher (1993: 946). 
82 Halperin (2008: 723-24).  
83 Fitness & Fletcher (1993: 948); Fitness (2000: 157). 
84 Halperin (2008: 729). 
 
44 
Later in the Rhetoric Aristotle tells us that ‘anger is curable by time’ (2.4, 1382a7-8). 
In the Nichomachean Ethics he states more specifically that anger ends when revenge 
has been achieved (1126a) – something which may take more or less time depending 
on how the individual in question reacts to anger. The irascible person shows their 
anger immediately, and thus their anger ends quickly, but the bitter person keeps their 
anger in, and thus remains angry for a longer time.   
 
As to the ‘slights’ which cause anger, Aristotle defines oligōria as ‘the manifestation 
of an opinion that something appears to be worthless’ (ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ὀλιγωρία ἐστὶν 
ἐνέργεια δόξης περὶ τὸ µηδενὸς ἄξιον φαινόµενον [Rhet. 2.2, 1378b10-12]),85 and 
initially lists three types of oligōria: καταφρόνησις (kataphronēsis, ‘contempt’), 
ἐπηρεασµός (epēreasmos, ‘spite’) and ὕβρις (hubris ‘insult’).  
 
Contempt is a slight because it is a judgement that something has no value (1378b15-
17). This encompasses a wide range of social situations: we might be angry at 
someone who speaks contemptuously of something we hold worthwhile (especially if 
we are insecure about whether we ourselves actually possess the quality we value 
[1379a30 - 1379b1]), or at someone who feigns ignorance or employs sarcasm when 
we ourselves are being sincere, because this implies that they think the topic at hand 
has no value (1379b30-32).  
 
In the case of spite, a person who is spiteful places obstacles in the way of another, 
not for any personal gain, but simply to prevent the other person gaining anything. 
Such behaviour demonstrates that the spiteful person neither fears nor seeks the 
friendship of the person they spite which, again, would suggest that they think the 
person they spite is worthless. Hubris is to do or say things that bring shame to the 
target, not in order to exact revenge, as would be the case in anger, but because they 
think doing so shows their superiority (1379b5-6).  
 
In contrast to anger, Aristotle defines enmity (ἔχθρας, echthras) and hatred (µισεῖν, 
misein), thus: 
 
                                                
85 Based on this definition we might find it unsurprising that the Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English 
Lexicon (LSJ) gives ‘contempt’ as a meaning of the word. 
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ποιητικὰ δὲ ἔχθρας ὀργή, ἐπηρεασµός, διαβολή. ὀργὴ µὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν 
πρὸς αὑτόν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτόν· ἂν γὰρ ὑπολαµβάνωµεν εἶναι 
τοιόνδε, µισοῦµεν. καὶ ἡ µὲν ὀργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλλίᾳ ἢ 
Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ µῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην µισεῖ καὶ τὸν 
συκοφάντην ἅπας. καὶ τὸ µὲν ἰατὸν χρόνῳ, τὸ δ᾽ ἀνίατον. καὶ τὸ µὲν λύπης 
ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ κακοῦ· αἴσθεσθαι γὰρ βούλεται ὁ ὀργιζόµενος, τῷ δ᾽ οὐδὲν 
διαφέρει. ἔστι δὲ τὰ µὲν λυπηρὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα, τὰ δὲ µάλιστα κακὰ ἥκιστα 
αἰσθητά, ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη· οὐδὲν γὰρ λυπεῖ ἡ παρουσία τῆς κακίας. καὶ 
τὸ µὲν µετὰ λύπης, τὸ δ᾽ οὐ µετὰ λύπης· ὁ µὲν γὰρ ὀργιζόµενος λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ 
µισῶν οὔ. καὶ ὁ µὲν πολλῶν ἂν γενοµένων ἐλεήσειεν, ὁ δ᾽ οὐδενός· ὁ µὲν γὰρ 
ἀντιπαθεῖν βούλεται ᾧ ὀργίζεται, ὁ δὲ µὴ εἶναι.  
(2.4, 1382a2-15) 
 
The causes of enmity are anger, spitefulness, and slander. Anger arises from 
acts committed against us, enmity even from those that are not. For if we 
imagine a man to be of a certain character, we hate him. Anger always has an 
individual as its object – Callias or Socrates, for instance. On the other hand, 
hatred can also apply to classes; for example, everyone hates a thief or 
informer. Anger is curable by time, but hatred is not. The aim of anger is pain, 
whilst hatred aims at evil; for the angry man wishes to see what happens, but 
to one who hates it does not matter. All the things that cause pain are 
perceptible, while things that are especially evil – such as injustice or folly – 
are the least perceptible, because the presence of evil does not cause pain. 
Anger is accompanied by pain, but hatred is not; for he who is angry suffers 
pain, but he who hates does not. One who is angry might feel compassion in 
many cases, but one who hates never does; for the former wishes that the 
object of his anger should suffer in his turn, the latter, that he should cease to 
exist.  
 
The action that produces hatred need not be directed against us. We can hate people 
simply for belonging to a certain class of people – a thief need not have stolen from us 
personally for us to hate them, we can hate them simply on the grounds that they are a 
thief. In other words, we can hate them for actions they have committed against 
others, if those actions show that they belong to a certain class of people. Although, as 
I have already noted, Aumer-Ryan and Hatfield’s study of hatred steered away from 
groups such as ‘racists’, which may have impacted their results in this regard, they did 
ask subjects about groups of people they hated, such as pickpockets. Only 5% of their 
participants reported such ‘group’ hatred.86 However, Halperin’s studies are all 
consummate proof that hatred can very much be felt against a whole class of people. 
Halperin’s studies also suggested that hatred developed when there had been a 
deliberate slight and the actions of the member(s) of the outgroup were considered to 
                                                
86 Aumer-Ryan & Hatfield (2007: 154). 
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be indicative of a ‘generalized evil character’.87  
 
There are two key differences between Aristotle’s definition of hatred and what has 
been demonstrated by contemporary research. Firstly, whilst Aristotle thinks that 
hatred is not curable by time, recent studies show that it can indeed end, especially in 
the case of interpersonal relationships. Further, in such situations hatred might also 
last a very short time, though it may indeed last longer than anger, and of the two, is 
more likely to have a longer duration. However, when hatred is present in the case of 
intractable conflicts, it is far from certain how we might go about ending it. Thus, 
whilst Aristotle does not distinguish between hatred directed at individuals or at 
groups, his observations regarding duration are far more applicable to hatred directed 
towards groups than hatred directed towards individuals. Secondly, that whilst 
Aristotle provides injustice as a key example of a painless evil that would provoke 
hatred, contemporary research suggests that injustice is far more likely to provoke 
anger, whilst humiliation might be a more important cause of hatred.88 
 
What this discussion has shown is that whilst Aristotle may disagree about the 
specifics, he shares very similar concerns with contemporary researchers as to the 
causes, duration, targets and goals of hatred. And whilst contemporary research shows 
that hatred can indeed end without the destruction of the hated target, there remains a 
concern, especially in intractable conflict, that hatred has far more destructive goals 
than anger. Thus, Aristotle and contemporary approaches to the study of hatred can 
aid our understanding of hatred in Hesiod.   
 
 
Studying Hesiod’s Hatred 
‘Hatred’ is, of course, not mentioned at all by Hesiod, who instead uses στυγέω 
(stugeō) and the related adjectives στυγερός (stugeros), and στυγερώπης (stugerōpēs), 
as well as ἐχθρός (echthros), ἔχθω (echthō) and ὀδύσσοµαι (odussomai).89 These are 
all words that by common consensus of scholarship we have taken to be meaningfully 
translatable as ‘hate’. The lack of precise semantic overlap between two words that 
                                                
87 Halperin (2008: 723-24). 
88 Fitness & Fletcher (1993: 947); Fletcher (2000: 156). 
89 The word µισέω (miseō), which Aristotle frequently uses, is absent in Hesiod.   
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‘mean’ the same thing in different languages is a simple fact of translation, but its 
impact is crucial, nonetheless. Though I take as a starting point a group of words 
identified as being translatable as ‘hate’, the ultimate goal is to understand the 
emotional structures Hesiod has applied those words to. Thus, the reader must bear in 
mind that when I discuss Hesiod’s ‘hatred’ I mean ‘the emotion represented by the 
cluster of Greek words discussed, which have been identified as meaningfully 
translatable by the English word hatred.’  
 
Given the overlap that has been demonstrated between hatred and other emotions – 
notably contempt, disgust, and anger, we must examine these words as well. As 
Donald Lateiner and Demos Spatharas have noted, there are no surviving ancient 
sources that discuss or define disgust, but Aristotle does comment on ‘situations that 
arouse disgust’.90 They identify three main words as meaning ‘disgust’: ἀηδία (aēdia), 
βδελυρία (bdeluria), and δυσχέρεια (duschereia), but as they themselves 
acknowledge, these words ‘comprehend a wide spectrum of meanings that English 
distinguishes and expresses by “annoyance, surfeit, displeasure, distaste, disgust,” 
even “impudence”’.91 There are two other words that the Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-
English Lexicon (LSJ) relate to disgust: σικχαντός (sikchantos, ‘disgusting’, 
‘loathsome’) and µυσάττοµαι (musattomai, ‘feel disgust at’, ‘loathe’). None of these 
words identified by Lateiner and Spatharas or LSJ appears in Hesiod. Floris Overduin 
notes that ‘disgust was never a topical element of Greek didactic epic.  The 
fountainhead of the genre, Hesiod’s Works and Days, may feature some of the less 
elevated aspects of life… it does not, however, include disgust’. Even when there are 
instances when we might, as modern readers, expect to find disgust, Hesiod mentions 
them ‘in a context of miasma, of offensiveness to gods, not men’.92  
 
We find a much wider range of words that are related to contempt: ἐξουδένωµα 
(exoudenōma), καταφρόνηµα (kataphronēma), ὑπεροψία (huperopsia), ὑπερφρόνησις 
(huperphronēsis), ὀνοστός (onostos), περιφρονητικός (periphronētikos) 
εὐπεριφρόνητος (euperiphronētos), καταβάλλω (kataballō), ἀναίνοµαι (anainomai), 
and oligōria, among others. Other words meaning ‘contempt’ are more metaphorical, 
                                                
90 Lateiner & Spatharas (2017: 5). 
91 Lateiner & Spatharas (2017: 5).  
92 Overduin (2017: 143).  
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and demonstrate actions associated with contempt-scripts. For example, ὑπεροράω 
(huperoraō), ὑπερφρονέω (huperphroneō), and καταφρονέω (kataphroneō), can mean 
‘to look down upon’, καταπτύω (kataptuō) can mean ‘to spit upon’, and σκυβαλίζω 
(skubalizō) can mean ‘to look on as dung’. Despite this plethora of words, only 
oligōros appears in Hesiod. In verse 447 of the Theogony it is used refer to the ability 
of Hecate to enact a literal decrease in the numbers of livestock owned by the man, 
just as she can increase their numbers if she so chooses; it has no connotation of 
contempt.  
 
What of anger? The orgē that Aristotle uses for anger is absent in Hesiod, but several 
other words do appear. The predominant word is χόλος (cholos), but ὀχθέω (ochtheō) 
also appears once. Other words that could potentially mean anger also appear; I shall 
discuss these as they arise.  
 
Of course, a specific emotion need not be explicitly mentioned in a text in order for it 
to be understood that a certain character is feeling that certain emotion, but examining 
the instances in which a word appears is the necessary starting point. This analysis 
will be supplemented by examining both ancient and contemporary etymologies for 
key words (i.e. the names/qualities of Styx and her children). I utilise ancient 
etymologies not because they can be considered reliable indicators of the evolution 
and origins of the meanings of certain words – they emphatically cannot – but 
because they reveal conceptual connections made between words by the authors. 
Insight into how people thought words were related is as valuable in terms of insight 
as how words actually are related. 
 
Once the nature of the emotion represented by a certain word has been examined 
using these approaches, we will have an understanding of the types of relationships 
and situations that the emotion appears in, how it operates, what types of actions it 
provokes, what, if any, moral sentiments are attached to it, and how it is physically 
portrayed. Using this information we can then tentatively look elsewhere in the text to 
see if there are other instances in which the script associated with the emotion word is 
present, even when the emotion word itself is not. This line of enquiry can only be 
pursued cautiously because, without a direct statement of what the emotion in 




The subject of Chapter One will be Styx herself, her role as oath, and river, and how 
the two intertwine, both with each other, and with her identity as hatred. The second 
and third chapters tackle Styx’s children, first as individuals, and then in relation to 
Zeus and Styx, revealing both the nature of the qualities they represent and the 
function and role of those qualities in the ordering of Zeus’ universe. The final 
chapter will take the script of hatred that has been generated by understanding its 
relation to the qualities represented by Styx’s own role as oath and river, as well the 
relationship between hatred and the children of Styx, and use this in order to examine 
both characters who hate and who are hated in the Theogony and the Works and Days. 
After this we will be in a position to examine whether there are instances in the poems 
where a hate script is present despite the absence of an explicit mention of hatred. The 
conclusion will draw together everything we have learned, and point out some of the 
differences and similarities between the contemporary ideas of hatred which we have 









The focus of this chapter will be Hesiod’s Theogony, the most influential of the 
ancient Greek cosmogonies. There are many deities one might look at as figures of 
hate within the Theogony (Thanatos, the Erinyes, or Eris, for example), but Styx must 
be the primary candidate due to the very meaning of her name. Although Nikoletta 
Kanavou claims that there are no Greek personal names that attach to στυγέω (stugeō, 
‘I hate’),93 Hjalmar Frisk and Pierre Chantraine both find the attachment of Στύξ 
(Styx), to stugeō so obvious that they combine the two words in single entries under 
stugeō in their respective etymological dictionaries.94 The abundance of verses Hesiod 
bestows upon Styx in comparison to any other such deity makes her role and features 
deserving of detailed attention. Indeed, Hesiod states that Styx is the most important 
of the children of Okeanos and Tethys (361). Given some of the other daughters of 
Okeanos, this is no trivial claim. According to Hesiod, Styx is more important that 
Metis, Zeus’ first wife whom he swallows; and Eurynome, Zeus’ third wife, who 
bears him Aglaia, Euphrosune and Thalia – the three Charites, or Graces. Indeed, 
Styx’s name in mentioned five times in the Theogony (361, 383, 397, 775, 805), 
whilst Metis is named only twice (358, 886). This alone indicates the importance of 
understanding Styx in our attempts to understand the Theogony as a whole.  
 
Hesiod’s usage of deities as cosmogonical forces in the creation and ordering of the 
world means that the Theogony offers an explanation of the role of hatred in the 
forming and structuring of the cosmos; a role which has multiple aspects and 
manifestations. This idea will be at the centre of my enquiry throughout this chapter 
To begin I must first outline the most important features of the character and role of 
Styx as described in the Theogony. I shall then discuss the previous scholarship that 
has attempted to deal with these features, in order to point out the main problem with 
the approaches such scholarship has tended to take: that such readings usually ignore 
or attempt to explain away Styx’s role as personified hatred, rather than using it as a 
                                                
93 Kanavou (2013: 176). 
94 Frisk (1970: 812-13); Chantraine (1999: 1065-66). 
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tool with which to analyse her appearance and role within the text. It is the 
determined eschewing of this fact, I argue, which leaves these previous attempts to 
explain the myth unable to cope with the figure of Styx.  
 
The rest of the chapter will focus on demonstrating that a reading that embraces 
Styx’s role as hatred and uses it as a tool to analyse the text, rather than as a fact that 
needs to be explained away, provides a far more complete picture of her role within 
the Theogony and of the text as a whole. Through the lens of Styx as hatred I shall 
discuss her role as oath, as physical river, and as denizen of Tartaros. Though I list 
these as discrete items here, my analysis will reveal a complex interrelationship 
between these elements.  
 
 
Outline of Styx in the Theogony 
The goddess Styx is mentioned several times in the Theogony: first as the most 
important of the children of Okeanos and Tethys (361), then in connection with the 
Titanomachy. In the latter instance she and her children (Nike, Zelos, Kratos, and 
Bie), on the advice of her father, and in order to earn the honours Zeus promises to 
those who aid him, are the first to take the side of Zeus in the fight (their father, 
Pallas, is not mentioned as joining the fight, nor ever mentioned again). This earns her 
children the honour of being forever in Zeus’ company, and Styx herself the perhaps 
more dubious honour of becoming the oath of the gods (383-401). Later in the 
Theogony we get a detailed description of the physical river of the Styx, as well as 
where the goddess herself lives, and the punishment for breaking an oath sworn on 
her (775-806). We shall return to discuss these scenes in greater detail later.  
 
 
The Ellipsis of “Hatred” in Previous Scholarship on Styx 
Having established the very basics of the account of the Styx with which Hesiod has 
furnished us, let us now turn to examine the previous scholarship that has attempted to 
deal with this material. This does not constitute a large body of work; it is not a topic 
that has been given much scholarly consideration. In those explanations that have 
been attempted the focus has rarely been directly on Styx herself, and never on 
explaining the role of hatred in the Titanomachy, Zeus’ subsequent reign, or the 
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ordering of the universe at large. Her children, when they are mentioned, are always 
taken simply to be tools which Zeus must acquire, and though the oath of the gods is 
often discussed, it is, as far as possible, discussed without relation to Styx herself. 
When her name is mentioned it is reduced to being synonymous with the oath she 
presides over. Styx tends to be treated instead as something to be explained away, a 
piece left over after the puzzle has seemingly been completed. Whilst the works of 
these scholars may be invaluable in approaching other aspects of Hesiod’s work, I 
draw attention to them now in order to highlight the failure of their approaches to 
satisfactorily explain the presence and role of Styx in this text, and thus also to the 
necessity for new attempts to understand Styx as a figure of importance in and of 
herself. I do not believe an acceptance of the fuller significance of Styx beyond oath-
making will negate many of the interpretations these scholars make about other 
aspects of Hesiod’s works; on the contrary, such an acceptance may in fact strengthen 
or enrich these interpretations. 
 
Daniel Blickman dismisses any relationship between the character of Styx and those 
of her children, considering Styx only as ‘oath’ and rejecting any association between 
her children and her role as oath. Blickman ignores both the prior fact of her existence 
as a goddess (and a mother) before becoming this oath, and the implicit meaning of 
her name.95 Blickman’s explanation for why Styx becomes the oath of the gods is 
that, being the first to offer her assistance, and thus the first to whom Zeus must keep 
his oath, it is only fitting that she become an embodiment of that kept oath and of all 
the other oaths Zeus will keep.96 In Hesiod’s cosmogony this oath/promise that Zeus 
offers to those who aid him is the first instance of the use of something which 
resembles an oath; it is an oath made before the conditions for the trustworthiness of 
an oath have be established. Thus, the fulfilment of his first oath must in some way 
provide a reassurance that this, and all other promises, will also be fulfilled – the 
precedent must be set. In swearing and keeping an oath, Zeus creates the conditions 
for swearing and keeping all oaths, and also sets up part of the order and justice of his 
new reign – a reign established on the fulfilling of the promise to honour the other 
gods.97  
                                                
95 Blickman (1987: 349-50). 
96 Blickman (1987: 349-50). This is a common interpretation. 




This is a very pleasing explanation of some of the details of the Styx oath: it accounts 
for why the first being to whom Zeus swears an oath would be the appropriate arbiter 
for all oaths the gods make henceforth. However, it fails to account for the fact that 
Styx is a goddess whose very name means ‘hate’ and thus ignores the question of why 
that first person should be Hate as oppose to anyone else. Blickman’s argument 
regarding the relationship between Styx and her children dismisses a thematic 
connection, instead stating only that the children are essential to maintaining the reign 
of Zeus and in order to keep the children of Styx at his side he must honour his oath to 
their mother.98 But still the question remains: as the first to aid Zeus, as the oath of the 
gods, why Styx – why Hate? 
 
In Hesiod and Aeschylus, Friedrich Solmsen acknowledges that Hesiod is clearly 
fascinated with Styx, and suggests this fascination originates both in the mysterious 
and esoteric ‘Styx water’ mentioned in the Iliad and Hesiod’s own obsession with 
oaths.99 Given a pre-existing, but barely explained river whose waters act as the oath 
of the gods, how could Hesiod not expand this myth and attempt to make sense of it 
within the framework of what Solmsen asserts is Hesiod’s main objective: ‘to exalt 
the status and personality of Zeus’?100 Solmsen’s claim is that, obsessed with Styx 
and her oath, the only way Hesiod can work them into his Theogony is to have the 
personified Styx aid Zeus in his hour of greatest need, and that she does this by 
supplying the children who would become essential for maintaining his reign. The 
reward for such aid is to become the oath that binds the gods, and for her children, 
whose names Solmsen translates as ‘Power, Victory, Strength and Zeal’,101 to become 
the permanent attendants of Zeus. 
 
Solmsen denies any resemblance in character between Styx and her children and 
explains this mismatch between a seemingly negatively-attributed mother and 
                                                
98 Blickman (1987: 351). 
99 Solmsen (1949: 33). 
100 Solmsen (1949: 32). 
101 Solmsen (1949: 32). It is not immediately obvious which, out of Kratos and Bie, is ‘Power’ and 
which ‘Strength’, because Solmsen changes the order of the children from that given by the text. It can 
possibly be inferred from p. 33, when Solmsen writes ‘Kratos, Nike, and the other two…’; only a few 
lines later the order is shifted again and becomes ‘Nike, Kratos, Bia, and Zelos’, though Kratos and 
Nike still hold the first two places. Given this, the idea that Solmsen meant ‘Kratos’ to be understood 
as ‘Power’ is reasonable.  
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seemingly positively-attributed children as a result of the fact that Hesiod’s desire to 
explain the position of Styx trumps all other narrative, structural and cohesive 
considerations.102 But Solmsen never explains why Styx and her children are so 
mismatched. Solmsen creates this mismatch between Styx and her children by firstly 
assuming that hatred is a negative thing in Hesiod’s cosmos, and secondly by giving 
the children unambiguously morally positive translations, a decision which is 
necessitated by a confusion between Zeus as representing a pragmatically “better” 
order, and Zeus representing a morally “good” order.  
 
Solmsen offers one translation for the name of each of children of Styx, but all bar 
Nike can be translated in several different ways: Kratos could be ‘Force’ or ‘Strength’ 
or ‘Might’, Bie could be ‘Violence’ or ‘Force’, and Zelos might also be translated as 
‘Envy’ or ‘Rivalry’.103 To a modern reader these names fit the character of their 
mother as Hatred far better, given that such a reader is far more likely to assume that 
they are all – including ‘hate’ – more “negative” terms. As we shall discover 
throughout the following chapters, these terms were far more nuanced for Hesiod than 
Solmsen acknowledges. This has the unfortunate consequence for Solmsen of adding 
a note of ambiguity to the ethical character of Zeus. No such problem would arise if 
one also accepted a more nuanced, Machiavellian (or perhaps, Sisyphean) view of 
Zeus, in which he represents a pragmatic stability rather than absolute moral goodness 
(for both Archaic and modern readers). Even excluding the myriad myths of the 
violence of Zeus that can be found in the Iliad and elsewhere, within the Theogony 
Zeus uses violence to maintain his position, as when punishing Prometheus (521-5) 
and when the monster Typhoeus is born (820-868).104 Violence has a place in 
Hesiod’s world and is a tool for Zeus to utilise on occasion.  
 
In relation to Zelos, Solmsen acknowledges that in the Works and Days Hesiod refers 
to Zelos in a very negative light, but dismisses the idea that this is the same Zelos as 
                                                
102 Solmsen (1949: 33-34). 
103 These are not exhaustive lists, as we shall see in Chapters Two and Three.  
104 Solmsen (1982: 11-12) thinks this passage is the work of an epigone clearly attempting to out-do 
Hesiod’s Titanomachy. But as Hermann Fränkel points out, it is common within Hesiod for the same 
things to be represented multiple times, from different perspectives (1975: 105). Three is a common 
total for such repetitions. The fight against Typhoeus forms part of a list of battles Zeus must fight in 
order to assume leadership. This is as good enough a reason to count the passage genuine as Solmsen’s 
is to count the passage a later addition. For further arguments supporting the authenticity of this 
passage, see West (1966: 379-83). 
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in the Theogony. He argues that just as Hesiod posits two different figures of Eris 
(Strife) – one useful to man, one disruptive to man – there are also two individual 
figures of Zelos, one (a morally good one) unique to the Theogony and the other 
(morally dubious) one unique to the Works and Days.105 But, as we will see in 
Chapter Two, there are good reasons to associate the Zelos of the Works and Days 
with the son of Styx. Moreover, Hesiod himself does not distinguish two figures nor 
claim there is a second Zelos. If one puts aside Solmsen’s assumption that Zeus is 
morally “good” and that therefore, by association, Zelos must also be morally “good”, 
then there is no reason to avoid the ethically ambiguous translation ‘Rivalry’ for 
Zelos, or to assume that there must be two separate figures of Zelos.  
 
Martin West’s attempt to explain the phenomena of the Styx oath takes a very similar 
line to that of Solmsen. He imagines a thought process that begins with an 
unexplained tradition in which the gods swear on the Styx. He then imagines Hesiod 
attempting to explain this tradition by reasoning that, if it is the case that the gods 
swear on the Styx, then Zeus must have decreed it. This leads to the question of why 
Zeus ordained such a role for Styx, and to the conclusion that he must have done so as 
a reward for services rendered. West’s imagining of Hesiod’s reasoning continues 
with the idea that these services would in all likelihood be in connection with the 
Titanomachy, but that it would be unlikely that Styx herself would have fought. If 
Styx herself did not fight then it must have been her children who did. But how could 
her children be so important to the outcome of the war? Because they are Victory 
(Nike) and Strength (Bie) - the other two are forgotten.106 
 
There are several problems with West’s explanation of the relationship between 
Styx’s role as mother of these allegorical deities, her role as first to aid Zeus, and her 
role as the oath of the gods. Firstly, West provides no justification for the claim that it 
is unlikely that Styx herself would have fought; there is nothing in her character that 
suggests she could not, or should not, be fighting herself and there is certainly nothing 
in the Theogony which supports this claim. Indeed, in the description of the physical 
                                                
105 Solmsen (1949: 32 & 32 n. 96). 
106 West (1966: 272-73). Given that West discusses the children out of order, it is impossible to be 
certain which child’s name is being translated as ‘Strength’; indeed, in one sentence it is ‘Victory and 
Power’ who are the significant figures, but only a few lines later it is ‘Victory and Strength’ but it is 
Bie who is named as such in West’s 1988 translation; it seems reasonable to assume without evidence 
to the contrary that it is Bie who is being referred to here.    
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fighting that ensues, Hesiod explicitly mentions that both male and female gods 
fought: θήλειαί τε καὶ ἄρσενες (‘both female and male’ [667]).107 She is also possibly 
present, fighting along with her children, on the north frieze of the Pergamon 
metopes, which depicts the Titanomachy.108  
 
Secondly, both West’s and Solmsen’s explanations remove from the modern scholar 
the task of attempting to explain why such “good” children were born of such a “bad” 
mother by undermining the importance of their genealogical connection. How did 
Hate (Styx) create Victory and Strength (following West) /Might (following 
Solmsen)? Only in order to explain why Styx is the oath of the gods. Essentially, they 
are declaring the connection between Styx and her children a fudge. In doing so they 
are suggesting that a specific part of the text, which coincidentally happens to be a 
section they have found troubling in some form, is devoid of significance – a claim 
for which we have no textual evidence, or indeed, supporting evidence of any kind.  
 
Finally, both Solmsen and West make the same mistake as Blickman, in that they are 
happy to claim the Styx’s children are allegorical and simply represent qualities Zeus 
needs to strengthen his reign, but are seemingly very against applying the same type 
of reading to Styx herself. Furthermore, their analysis stops with the idea that Styx’s 
children are the personifications of the qualities they are named after, but, as Ruth 
Padel points out, though in modern society personification is often treated as an 
empty, shallow trope, for the Ancient Greeks it was a far more meaningful device.109  
That Zelos, Nike, Kratos, and Bie are personifications has implications for how we 
should attempt to understand them, and it is a topic worth investigating – we cannot 
simply state that they are personifications and consider the matter closed. To state that 
they are personifications is to begin the discussion, not to end it. We find ourselves 
left with the question of what it means for the children of Styx – and Styx herself – to 
                                                
107 Translation of inset quotes of the Theogony and Works and Days are by Lattimore. Shorter quotes 
are my own translation unless otherwise stated. Source for the Greek text of the Theogony: Solmsen, 
Merkelbach & West (1970). 
108 Picard (1940: 170-71) believes that the figure is Styx, surrounded by her children, as does Vian 
(1951: 21-23), but the attribution is not certain; because there is no defining trait which allows us to 
identify the figure beyond all doubt, their identification is based on their own theories as to what the 
overarching theme of the north frieze is (water deities, in the case of Picard, cosmological order in the 
case of Vian). Other scholars have identified the figure more commonly as Nyx (Puchstein 1910: 38-
39; Robert 1911: 238; Kähler 1948: 52-53; and Simon 1975: 12-13) or Demeter (Winnefeld 1910: 146; 
and Schefold 1959: 128). 
109 Padel (1992: 158-59). 
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be personifications of certain qualities. 
 
Susan Lye focuses on the relationship between Styx as oath and the geographical 
nature of Styx’s waters, noting how they both function as boundaries;110 this is a topic 
that I too shall explore. But just as with the others, Lye passes over in silence the 
identity of Styx – whether personification or geographical feature – as hatred.  
 
The questions and issues all these scholars avoid – the identity of Styx as Hate, why 
Hate would have such children as Hesiod gives her, why she would be first to aid 
Zeus, and why the figure of Hate would be suitable to be the witness and punishers of 
the oaths of the gods – are the precise questions whose neglect prevents a full 
understanding and comprehension of how Hesiod’s cosmogony works. Without 
addressing these issues we can never hope to fully understand what roles various 
forces and emotions have in the shaping of Hesiod’s universe, establishing the order 
of Zeus and the Olympians, and the shaping of the beginning of civil life. And it is 




To understand fully the role of Styx as oath (ὅρκος, horkos), one must have a wider 
understanding of the role and use of oaths; the Styx oath as described by Hesiod is not 
typical of the tradition of oath-taking in Greek culture and in order to discuss how the 
Styx oath deviates from the norm, it is necessary first to establish precisely what the 
norm is. In this section I shall first establish what I feel to be the best definition of an 
oath before moving on to discuss the representation of oaths in Hesiod. After this we 
shall then be in a position to turn back to Styx and the oath she presents and discuss 
how her role as hatred makes her a fitting oath goddess, and how such a goddess fits 
into the new ordered universe of Zeus.  
 
Richard Janko concisely explains an oath in the following way: ‘to take an oath is in 
effect to invoke powers greater than oneself to uphold the truth of a declaration, by 
                                                
110 Lye (2009).  
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putting a curse upon oneself if it is false’.111 Oaths can be either promissory or 
assertory in nature. Promissory oaths bind the swearer to a future pattern of 
behaviour, such as the oath Hektor and Agamemnon agree to make, binding them to 
stop warring and to allow the fate of Helen and their respective armies to be 
determined by the outcome of a duel between Alexander and Menelaos (Il. III 59-
120). Here the participants invoke a curse that if the oath should be broken, the guilty 
party shall be killed – their brains smashed out on the floor – along with their 
children, and their wives taken into slavery. They invoke Ge, Zeus, and Helios to 
witness their oath (III 276-301). Assertory oaths bind the swearer to the truth of 
statements they make regarding the past. In the Iliad, Agamemnon, at the behest of 
Odysseus, swears an assertory oath that he has not touched Briseis (XIX 241-68). 
Here he invokes Zeus, Ge, Helios, and the Erinyes as witnesses, and offers a 
conditional curse that the gods will bring him many pains if this is a false oath. Oaths 
can occasionally contain blessings, but these are the exception rather than the rule. 
Blessings never appear in oaths that lack curses, and the blessings are rarely as 
detailed as the corresponding curses.112 Both promissory and assertory oaths are 
represented by Hesiod, though the latter is more common.  
 
Recent scholarship on oaths has highlighted their importance as a tool for social 
cohesion and stability, and the great frequency with which people from varied social 
groups used them in a wide range of situations.113 But it is nonetheless the case that a 
sense of mistrust is an intrinsic element of oaths.114 Indeed, Frederick Paley states that 
‘an oath presupposes some kind of contention. Oaths would be wholly needless if 
men lived in perfect amity. The Greeks especially were so prone to deceit, that 
nothing short of very strong inculcations of the sanctity of an oath would ensure it 
being kept.’115  
 
Writing in the 2nd-3rd centuries CE, Clement of Alexandria confirms this general 
concept by stating the exception: the faithful man is pious and lives in accordance 
                                                
111 Janko (1992: 194). 
112 Fletcher (2012: 8).  
113 See Kitts (2005); Sommerstein & Fletcher (2007); Fletcher (2012); Sommerstein & Bayliss, (2013). 
114 Burkert notes this (1985: 253), and Sommerstein does acknowledge that oaths require an element of 
distrust to be present, and that this can be present even amongst friends, if the stakes are high enough 
(Sommerstein and Fletcher 2007: 3).    
115 Paley (1883: 199). 
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with the truth, and therefore needs no oath to bolster his word, because it would be 
impossible for him to lie (Stromata VII. 8). The ensuing discussion will show, 
however, that Hesiod placed significant emphasis on the double-edged nature of the 
oath, underlining that it was a tool that could be misused and which could backfire. 
As useful as it was, there was cause enough to also fear it – perhaps even resent it, if 
we take the attitude of hatred from the Theogony’s Olympian gods towards Styx as 
evidence of a wider attitude towards oaths.  
 
Our discussion will begin with the other figure of oath in the Hesiodic poems – 
Horkos. There are several notable mentions of Horkos in the Theogony and the Works 
and Days. In the Theogony this god of oaths is one of the many children of Eris 
(herself described here as στυγερή, stugerē ‘hateful’ [226]), for whom no father is 
given, and whose names read as a list of things that both arise from strife and which 
cause strife (226-32): Toil (Ponos),116 Forgetfulness (Lethe),117 Famine (Limos), Pain 
(Algea), Battles (Hysminai), Combats (Makhai), Murder (Phonoi), Slaughter 
(Androktasiai), Quarrels (Neikea), Lies (Pseudea), Arguments (Logoi), Disputes 
(Amphilogiai), Lawlessness (Dysnomia), Folly (Ate), and Oath (Horkos).118 Coming 
at the end of this list of children of Eris (the same position in which we find Styx 
when the daughters of Tethys and Ouranos are listed [337-61] – that position oft 
reserved for the most important child), Horkos is described as ὃς δὴ πλεῖστον 
ἐπιχθονίους ἀνθρώπους / πηµαίνει, ὅτε κέν τις ἑκὼν ἐπίορκον ὀµόσσῃ – ‘he who most 
ruins (πηµαίνει, pēmainei) men on earth when anyone intentionally swears falsely’ 
(231-32). 
 
It should be noted that this pēmainei shares a common root with the ‘misery’ (πῆµα, 
pēma) that describes the Styx oath later in the poem (µέγα πῆµα θεοῖσιν ‘a great 
misery to the gods’ [792]). This association of oaths and misery is repeated in the 
Works and Days, where Horkos is described as the child Eris bore to bring ‘misery to 
                                                
116 Although ponos can refer to the toil of work and labour, it is also frequently used to refer to the toil 
of suffering and distress (e.g. Il. XIX 227). 
117 Note that in verse 55 lēthē is seen as a good thing – the muses, daughter of Mnemosyne (Memory), 
bring forgetfulness of troubles’ – an odd claim, given that Hesiod invokes them to help him recount a 
series of troubles and struggles. 
118 This is not to claim that these things must always cause strife, or be caused by strife, or that we must 
consider them all to be negative forces, although the list of the children of Eris is perhaps the closest 
Hesiod gets to a catalogue of offspring who seem clearly all “positive” or all “negative”.   
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perjurers’ (τέκε πῆµ᾽ ἐπιόρκοις, [804]). Although this line in the Works and Days 
suggests a misery specific to the perjurer, verses 231-2 of the Theogony are not so 
specific in suggesting to whom Horkos will bring misery. The trigger is still the event 
of someone knowingly swearing falsely, but the ensuing misery is not described as 
being specific to the perjurer, but more generally ‘to men on earth’. Likewise, when 
Styx is described as bringing misery (pēma) to the gods (792), it is not as bringing 
misery to those gods who have (hypothetically) perjured themselves, but to all the 
gods. In this way Hesiod emphasises the maleficent aspect of oaths. 
 
This theme of the negative aspect of Horkos is continued if we examine the verses in 
which he is mentioned in the Works and Days more closely: 
 
Πέµπτας δ᾽ ἐξαλέασθαι, ἐπεὶ χαλεπαί τε καὶ αἰναί·  
ἐν πέµπτῃ γάρ φασιν Ἐρινύας ἀµφιπολεύειν  
Ὅρκον γεινόµενον, τὸν Ἔρις τέκε πῆµ᾽ ἐπιόρκοις.    
         (802-4) 
 
      Beware of all of the fifth days; they are harsh 
   and angry; it was on 
the fifth, they say, that the Erinyes 
   assisted at the bearing 
of Oath, whom Strife bore, to be a plague 
   on those who take false oath. 
 
Here Hesiod also tells us that Horkos was born on a fifth and that the Erinyes were 
present at his birth. This fact is given as an explanation for the advice Hesiod gives 
here against attempting to do anything on the fifths. Given that Horkos is here 
described as bringing pēma (misery) to perjurers, which is surely a good thing, we 
may question why Hesiod then considers the fifths such dark days. We cannot argue 
that it is simply because of the presence of the Erinyes, for their presence is 
inextricable from Horkos’: they are there for him. We can, however, make sense of it 
if all mortals have reason to fear that Horkos may bring them misery. And why should 
they worry about the misery Horkos brings? For the same reason they fear the 
Erinyes. The Erinyes are generally malevolent goddesses, born from Ge and the 
spilled blood of Ouranos when Kronos castrates him (Th. 183-87), an act for which 
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they require vengeance (472-73).119 The Erinyes only appear when a blood crime has 
been committed; Hesiod does not portray them as watching over families or 
bestowing good fortune upon those who respect blood-ties, only as punishing those 
who break them. Associating Horkos with such figures reaffirms the idea that Horkos’ 
oath function is purely retaliatory, concerned only with those who break oaths.120 He 
does not reward those who keep their oaths, nor can he be prayed to in order to help 
one keep a difficult oath, he can only act as a deterrent through being the punishment 
that awaits those who break their oaths. But even the innocent fear punishment – this 
is the nature of a deterrent. Thus, it makes sense that the day on which Horkos was 
born would be avoided by all as an ill day.121  
 
Adding to this emerging picture of the negative aspects of Horkos is his lineage. As 
noted above, Horkos is a child of Eris and comes at the end of a list of children who 
appear to be named after things that arise from, and from which arises, strife. The 
very fact that Horkos is a child of Eris, therefore, indicates that oaths arise out of 
strife. This certainly makes sense: if there is no disagreement, no situation to resolve, 
no issue of mistrust, then there is no reason to swear curse-containing oaths to 
demonstrate one’s sincerity or reliability. Oaths are required only when people need 
reassurance that someone they do not trust will speak the truth, or behave as they said 
                                                
119 Other deities too, are born from this event: the Giants and the Melian nymphs also come from Ge 
and the blood of Ouranos, and Aphrodite is created here, too, but from the genitals falling into the 
ocean, rather than the drops of blood that fall to the earth. The Erinyes, however, are very clearly a 
direct response to the act of violence. 
120 Apostolos Athanassakis notes the same point regarding the connection between Horkos and the 
Erinyes, i.e., that it shows that Horkos is associated with punishment and revenge. (1983: 93). 
121 If we look beyond Hesiod for evidence of how oaths were considered in archaic Greece we find a 
story in Herodotus’ Histories (6.86) recounted by Leotychides involving Glaucos, a Spartan, making an 
oath to safeguard some property and return it only to those who showed the agreed upon tokens. 
However, when this happens, Glaucos feigns ignorance of the oath. He then asks the Delphic oracle 
whether he should keep his oath. The oracle replies that though it may be more profitable in the present 
for Glaucos to perjure himself, Oath (Horkos) has a nameless son who pursues and utterly destroys the 
perjurer, and his house. The children of him who keeps his oath, however, will be happier in the future. 
Glaucos begs the oracle’s forgiveness but is told that the thought is as bad as the deed. Leotychides 
ends the story by saying that there is in Sparta that day not a single living relative left of Glaucos.  
In the Iliad we find characters skilled in manipulating oaths to their own advantage. 
Agamemnon relates how Hera tricked Zeus into swearing an oath that was detrimental to his son 
Herakles by first making him swear that his next born son will receive great power, and then ensuring 
that this son was not Herakles (XIX 85-130). Zeus’ folly here is to swear an oath regarding a future he 
is more certain of than he should be. Hera also manages to use the language of the oaths to swear to 
Zeus that she was not involved in Poseidon’s attack on the Trojans even though she played a large part 
in making it possible. Thus she manages to avoid any retribution for her actions (XV 35-46). In these 
examples we see Hera mastering the language of oaths in order to benefit herself and harm others. 
Oaths are dangerous tools, and the inexperienced can often be tricked into swearing detrimental oaths 
and extracting useless oaths. 
 
62 
they would. Thus, even though they are used as tools to attempt to resolve strife, they 
are still created by those situations they are designed to defuse. Indeed, in one of his 
Olympian odes, Pindar suggests that to swear an oath is to involve oneself in the 
strife: 
 
οὔτε δύσηρις ἐὼν οὔτ᾽ ὦν φιλόνικος ἄγαν,  
καὶ µέγαν ὅρκον ὀµόσσαις τοῦτό γέ οἱ σαφέως  
µαρτυρήσω… 
 
I, who am not prone to quarrel, nor too fond of victory, 
having sworn a great oath, will clearly  
bear witness for him… 
      (6.19-21) 
 
He, Pindar tells us, is not a quarrelsome person, but in the event of a quarrel, he will 
join in by providing oath-sworn testimony. To swear an oath can itself be part of an 
act of strife.  
 
The other children of Eris can also be said to cause strife, not just to be caused by 
strife – can the same be said of Horkos? Certainly this is true in the case of broken 
oaths. The clearest example of this is the oath broken by the Trojans in the Iliad, 
which causes the resumption of the war (IV 85-126). But can an oath that is not 
broken also cause strife? Evidence for such an idea is found in a fragment of the 
Hesiodic Catalogue of Women (Fr. 155 73-84 = OCT Fr. 204), in which the famed 
oath of Tyndareos is described. This is the oath, of course, which binds the suitors of 
Helen to wage war with any man who steals her from the chosen suitor. The fragment 
ends with the detail that Zeus is planning to stir up war among humans, to wipe out 
most of the race. There is no reason to doubt, despite the lacunas in the text, that the 
war being referred to is the Trojan War. Here, then, we have a source of strife whose 
cause is inextricably linked to the oath the suitors swore in an attempt to avoid strife: 
instead, it becomes part of the cause of the strife. The Catalogue, is, of course, 
generally no longer considered to be by Hesiod, but Janko, analysing the style and 
language of the work, argues that it can be dated to around the same time as 
Hesiod. 122  An awareness of this story could certainly help explain Hesiod’s 
suggestions that oaths bring misery to all men, rather than just those who break oaths. 
                                                
122 Janko (1982: 85-87). 
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It also points to the idea that, like the other children of Eris, oaths can be said to cause 
strife – even when they are not broken.  
 
In turning back to Theogony we find Horkos is associated specifically with broken 
oaths, compounding his negative image. His role is to punish those who break their 
oaths, and in doing so, to ensure that oaths can continue to function in a way that is 
beneficial to society. But at the same time his presence serves as a constant reminder 
that oaths can be broken. He highlights the failings of the oath.  
 
Stephanie Nelson observes that the list of the children and grandchildren of Nyx 
(herself born from Chaos) is contrasted with many of the children of Zeus listed later 
in the poem. The children of Zeus provide the other side of the coin, as it were, to the 
powers of the progeny of Nyx: ‘thus Zeus’ children, Peace, Good Order, and Justice, 
are born to complement the children of Strife, Battles, Disorder, and Oath, the 
avenger of perjury’.123 It is easy to see the opposition between Good Order and 
Disorder, and Battles and Peace, but the opposition between Dike and Horkos is not 
quite so straightforward;124 they are not clearly contrasted pairs as the others are. In 
fact in Works and Days 217-37 Horkos and Dike are described together: τρέχει 
Ὅρκος ἅµα σκολιῇσι δίκῃσιν (‘Horkos keeps pace with crooked judgements’ [219]) 
and Dike follows, weeping, those who have dishonestly seized her, and brings ill to 
those who do not deal with her honestly (223-24). Here, then, we see Horkos and 
Dike in very similar roles, and that justice too, can bring calamity to those who 
attempt to underhandedly misdirect and avoid it. We also see that Hesiod closely 
associated justice and “straight-judgements” with truth-telling and oath-keeping. But 
whereas those who give honest judgements to friends and strangers and behave in a 
just manner receive myriad benefits for doing so (225-37), there is no benefit 
associated with Horkos. Again we see that he is there to punish you should you 
perjure yourself, but unlike Dike he does not provide any blessing. Whilst the other 
descendants of Nyx work in opposition to the children of Zeus – one brings war, their 
                                                
123 Nelson (1998: 45). The only (other) discrepancies in the overall list are Philotes and the Hesperides, 
who, if following a model of ‘good = child of Zeus’ and ‘bad = descendant of Nyx’, one might 
reasonably assign to Zeus, whereas they are in fact also children of Nyx.  
124 This argument assumes the utilization of a simple binary opposition by Hesiod, but Hesiod 
challenges these simple binary oppositions frequently – as is the case with Dike and Horkos above. We 




counterpart peace, etc. – Horkos and Dike work in harmony, to punish or reward 
those who use oaths. This difference suggests the fundamental importance of oaths to 
Hesiod’s conception of Zeus’ universe. Oaths, though often negatively inflected, 
cannot be replaced by justice, but rather they supplement each other.  
 
We have now established several points regarding oaths: the definition, nature and 
format that oaths took. We have also observed that, with regards to the figure of 
Horkos, Hesiod tends to focus more on the negative aspects and perceptions of oaths 
rather than on their usefulness or benefits. Now let us turn back to the Styx oath and 
the Theogony and examine how this too fits into, and is best explained with reference 
to, the larger trend within Hesiod’s work of highlighting the dangerous and 
intimidating aspect of oaths. We will then be in a position to understand why, 
therefore, Styx is a fitting goddess for this role, and also how and why such a force 
has a place in Zeus’ universe.  
 
Before all else, it is worth noting that within the Theogony as a whole, there are only 
three figures described as στυγερός (stugeros, ‘hated, loathed, abhorred’): the Moirai 
(211), Eris (226), and Styx (775), and Styx is only described with this adjective in 
relation to her role as oath: she is not described as such when she is mentioned in the 
list of the Okeanids, nor when we are told whom she joins with and who her children 
are, nor even when she is first made the oath of the gods as her reward. Only when 
she is firmly established and fulfilling her function as oath is she described as 
stugeros. The oath of the gods is explicitly a hated thing.  
 
To understand why she is so hated as oath, it will prove illuminating to examine those 
verses in which the punishment awaiting those who break an oath they have sworn on 
the Styx is outlined:  
 
ὅς κεν τῆς ἐπίορκον ἀπολλείψας ἐποµόσσῃ  
ἀθανάτων, οἳ ἔχουσι κάρη νιφόεντος Ὀλύµπου,  
κεῖται νήυτµος τετελεσµένον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν·    [795] 
οὐδέ ποτ᾽ ἀµβροσίης καὶ νέκταρος ἔρχεται ἆσσον  
βρώσιος, ἀλλά τε κεῖται ἀνάπνευστος καὶ ἄναυδος  
στρωτοῖς ἐν λεχέεσσι, κακὸν δ᾽ ἐπὶ κῶµα καλύπτει.  
αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν νοῦσον τελέσει µέγαν εἰς ἐνιαυτόν,  
ἄλλος δ᾽ ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται χαλεπώτερος ἄεθλος·   [800] 
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εἰνάετες δὲ θεῶν ἀπαµείρεται αἰὲν ἐόντων,  
οὐδέ ποτ᾽ ἐς βουλὴν ἐπιµίσγεται οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ δαῖτας  
ἐννέα πάντ᾽ ἔτεα· δεκάτῳ δ᾽ ἐπιµίσγεται αὖτις  
εἶρας ἐς ἀθανάτων οἳ Ὀλύµπια δώµατ᾽ ἔχουσιν. 
        (793-804) 
    
And whoever of the gods,  
   who keeps the summits of snowy 
Olympos, pours of this water, 
   and swears on it, and is foresworn, 
is laid flat, and does not breathe, 
   until a year is completed; 
nor is this god let come near ambrosia 
   and nectar 
to eat, but with no voice in him, 
   and no breath, he is laid out 
flat, on a made bed, and the evil coma 
   covers him. 
But when, in the course of a great year, 
   he is over his sickness, 
there follows on in succession another trial,  
  yet harsher: 
for nine years he is cut off 
   from all part of the everlasting 
gods, nor has anything to do  
   with their counsels, their festivals 
for nine years entire, but in the tenth 
   he once more mingles 
in the assemblies of the gods 
   who have their homes on Olympos. 
  
The observant reader may have already noticed the deviation of the Styx oath from 
the description of an oath given above: when a deity swears an oath on the Styx, they 
add no explicit conditional curse. There is a specific curse already implied when one 
swears on the Styx; she is both the witness and the punisher. Though Hesiod is our 
only extant source who describes a punishment for breaking a Styx oath, no Styx oath 
in any other source carries an additional conditional curse with it, suggesting that the 
idea of Styx as witness, judge and executioner – as avenger – for the oath was more 
widely held. The great detail that Hesiod gives regarding the punishment for breaking 
a Styx oath achieves the same effect as the constant association of Horkos with 
broken oaths – it is a reminder of the precarious position in which the swearer places 
themselves, and the precarious nature of a society or ordered universe founded on 
such a contract. To make an oath is to raise the spectre of the punishment should one 
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break it. It is putting oneself in a position of potential danger – of being threatened. 
These facts begin to explain why Styx is more explicitly hated by the gods than 
Horkos is by mortals – the same figure represents both the oath itself and the 
punishment for breaking it. The difference between an oath and the conditional curse 
has been confounded, meaning that the oath itself shares the fear and hate directed 
towards the potential punishment and the consequences of that punishment.  
 
But this is not the only reason why Styx is a fitting goddess of this role. Though the 
gods are deathless, breaking an oath on the Styx clearly brings them as close to death 
as such a figure can be brought – the curse mimics many of the ‘symptoms’ of death – 
no breath,125 no movement, no engaging in the eating and drinking necessary for 
(mortal) life. Both ancient and contemporary etymologies for ‘Styx’ reinforce this 
association with death-like qualities. As far as ancient etymological sources are 
concerned, the Epimerismi Homerici (late 9th century CE) gives Styx as the word 
from which στυγέῃ, ‘hate, abhor’ derives, and also as the source of the meaning of the 
word (186, b).126 The Etymologicum Magnum (compiled from earlier sources circa 
1150 CE) comments that ‘some say that stugnos derives from Styx’, giving the 
explanation that the ancient Greeks named unpleasant things after cold things, and 
pleasant things after warm things (Kallierges 731: 15-18).127 Hatred is conceived of as 
something frigid, something that disrupts life, affects breathing, action, and the ability 
to consume food: it is something that prevents. 
  
Turning to contemporary etymologists, Frisk and Chantraine, though admitting that 
the etymology is not certain, draw comparison to the Russian stýgnuti/stugnuti, 
meaning ‘cold’ or ‘frozen’; Robert Beekes mentions the comparison, but is more 
sceptical of its veracity.128 Stuart Mann’s An Indo-European Comparative Dictionary 
suggests that both ‘sthug-’ and its variant ‘sthugeros’ are the root of the Greek stugeō 
and stugeros and, in middle high German and low German respectively, of stücken 
(eradicate; stiffen; attack) and stukkern (stop dead; solidify).129 It is notable that the 
                                                
125 ψυχή (psuchē), of course, has meanings of both ‘breath’ and ‘life’. The ideas are intimately 
connected.  
126 Following Dyck’s system from Epimerismi Homerici: line of Iliad I, followed by the source of the 
gloss (1995).  
127 Following Gaisford’s paginations from Etymologicum Magnum (1848). 
128 Frisk (1970: 812-13); Chantraine (1977: 1065-66); Beekes (2010: 1416-17). 
129 Mann (1984: 1328). 
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qualities suggested by these etymologies are all qualities associated with death, and 
with the effects of the waters of Styx.  
 
Further details also reinforce the association with death. Padel comments on the usage 
of language associated with water to describe the actions of death, sleep, and mist, 
which are described as being ‘poured’ (from χέω, cheō, ‘pour’) over the eyes of 
humans and, in the case of sleep, gods too.130 The waters of Styx, ‘pouring down’ 
(καταλείβεται, kataleibetai [786]) from the high rocks and ‘poured’ (ἀπολλείψας, 
apoleipsas [793]) in libation, pour sleep upon the forsworn god.131 The language of 
liquids and waters is also associated with innards and emotions. Styx’s waters flow 
around the dark underworld, like the inner liquids which cause passions in the human 
body.132 The similarity of the imagery of inner liquids and chthonic waters leads 
Padel to wonder if ‘passion itself is not felt to be a kind of loss of consciousness’.133 
The passion of hatred could induce a type of κῶµα (kōma, ‘coma’ [798]) inflicted 
upon the foresworn god – those who, having fallen victim of the threatened 
punishment, have most cause to hate her as a direct source of the harm that has come 
to them. The overlap in terminology that describes the inner workings of the body, 
how it experiences emotion, and how it experiences disease and turmoil reinforce the 
dangerous nature of emotions, and especially of the emotion of hatred represented by 
Styx and her waters. But kōma is not the inevitable result of swearing on the Styx. 
Only those who fail to keep their oaths – those who fail to use oaths properly – 
experience a loss of consciousness. Though they cascade into the underworld, Styx’s 
waters start in the world above. Hatred, like oath, has a usage, and rules which govern 
improper and proper usage of it. It need not be experienced as a loss of consciousness 
if experienced properly. 
 
Regarding the length of the punishment inflicted by the Styx curse, Richard Caldwell 
notes that the number ten is often chosen to represent long durations (cf. the anvil 
                                                
130 Padel (1994: 78); Padel points to Il. XIV 165 (Zeus falls asleep), 696 (Sarpedon’s [temporary] 
death), XIII 544 (the death of Aphareus), and XX 321 (Poseidon pours mist over the eyes of Achilles). 
131 Recall those words associated with contempt that can mean ‘to look down upon’ (huperoraō, 
huperphroneō, and kataphroneō) and ‘to spit upon’ (kataptuō).  
132 See Padel (1994: 81-88) for a full discussion of the use of liquid imagery to describe the emotional 
physiology of people in a variety of sources, and its overlap and shared sources with the terminology of 
disease.  
133 Padel (1994: 79).  
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which would fall for nine days and would reach Tartaros on the tenth [722-25], and 
the duration in years of the Titanomachy itself), and that such length and division 
(nine and one) corresponds to the Greek notions of pregnancy and childbirth, where 
the child is born in the tenth month.134 We could then interpret the Styx oath as a 
cycle of death and renewal for the punished god.135 The first year represents death, in 
which the god lies breathless and unmoving, with the nine years spent in isolation 
afterwards corresponding to a pregnancy at the end of which the perjured god is 
reborn into the company of the other gods.136  
 
Hesiod states that the second part of Styx’ punishment is more arduous than the first 
(799-800). If the first year of punishment represents death, then the next nine years 
can be read as representing time spent in the underworld – outside of, and exiled 
from, the newly ordered universe of Zeus. It is a period in which a god is deprived of 
their due honours137 – a punishment enforced by a goddess who was once herself 
deprived of honours, and who was then given as her honours the role of enforcing 
obedience to Zeus’ reign by being able to deprive others of what she herself was once 
deprived of. It is not difficult to understand therefore why she is hated by the other 
gods or why she is a particularly appropriate figure for this role: she deprives the 
offending god of what it is to be a god, bringing them as close to death as they can be 
brought. She inflicts upon them the same lack of acknowledgement of their power and 
divinity which she herself was subject to before the reign of Zeus. They become as 
she still is – ostracised from Olympos. It follows from this that the punishment for 
breaking the Styx oath is to cast out the offending god not just literally from the 
company of the other gods, but to cast them temporarily – and temporally – back 
outside Zeus’ newly ordered and more just universe, returning them to the time before 
their new hierarchy and order was established: they are cast out, suddenly finding 
themselves on the wrong side of the fence, but still subject to its power.  
 
                                                
134 Caldwell (2009: 51 n. 84).  
135 This would fit with one of the conceptual themes that Johnson notes many of the inhabitants of 
Tartaros represent: ‘the cyclical phenomena of night, day, sleep, and death.’ (1999: 12).  
136 For modern readers, a comparison to baptism appears obvious, as of course, is the comparison to the 
later myth of Achilles being dipped in the Styx by Thetis to bestow invulnerability upon him, but there 
is no evidence for this story in the archaic period. For a discussion of the development of the story of 
Achilles’ invulnerability and his being dipped in the Styx, and the potential relation to baptism, see 
Burgess (1995).          
137 Compare also Empedocles (fr. 8b = DK 31 B115).  
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Finally, in establishing Styx as the oath of the gods as a reward for helping Zeus, 
there is an inevitable implication that before this point, there was no oath to which the 
gods were bound. Styx represents a new limitation on their powers, a new 
consequence for an action that previously had no (significant) consequence for them. 
Thus we might suppose that some of the hatred can be accounted for simply by the 
fact that she represents a new rule, a new consequence, a new threat, a new limit to 
what they can and cannot do. In this way we can see Styx as bringing misery to all the 
gods (µέγα πῆµα θεοῖσιν [792]) just as Horkos might bring misery to all humans, 
regardless of whether or not they ever break (or even take) an oath.  
 
The two roles of Styx, then, as hatred and as oath, are well matched and closely 
interwoven. But Styx is an appropriate figure for another reason also: by making Styx 
the oath of the gods and the insurance that he will keep his oath to honour all, 
Hesiod’s Zeus makes Styx the solution to future conflict amongst the gods. Like Eris, 
mother of Horkos, Styx represents a quality that helps necessitate the need for oaths in 
the first place. By making Styx the oath of the gods, Zeus not only reins in the 
Olympian deities and prevents their rebelling, but also limits the powers of the 
chthonic deities, and negates the threat they pose by bending their conflict-causing 
natures to conflict resolution instead. In essence, Zeus cunningly makes part of the 
problem the solution to the problem.  
 
We should remember, too, Blickman’s analysis of Styx as oath, in which Zeus, by 
keeping his oath to Styx in such a way as to make her the guarantor of all future oaths, 
makes her and oaths a fundamental part of the stability, order and justice of his newly 
established reign – ‘the foundation of civilised society’.138 Once again, in this analysis 
it is appropriate that the guarantor of oaths, who must, for the sake of stability, be the 
first person Zeus kept his oath to, be a figure who was given no honour or recognition 
in the previous order – a figure previously held in contempt by the old order. In 
keeping his promise to those who received no honours before, Zeus is strengthening 
                                                
138 Blickman (1987: 350). Of course, we must question what is meant by such a loaded term as 
‘civilized society’. Lamberton pointedly remarks of the existence of Styx as oath, and of her 
subsequent ability to limit the actions of the gods, that she ‘is a function of the cynicism and realism of 
Hesiod’s conception of power. That these fundamentally lawless superhuman entities should take into 
consideration any factor beyond their own immediate gratification in the exercise of their vast powers 
is something that requires explanation. It is the Styx, privileged to serve as their oath, that keeps them 
honest’ (1988: 88).  
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the power of his oath – he will keep his promises to those that were previously 
shunned. Thus, if we claim that Zeus’ keeping his promise to Styx, and his making 
her the oath of the gods is part of the foundation of a new, stable, and just world 
order, we must acknowledge that this new order is stable and just because it has room 
for a figure such as Styx. If Zeus’ universe is more balanced and stable, it is because it 
has a place for hatred.  
 
Contrary then, to the opinions of previous scholarship, the role of Styx as guarantor of 
oaths and her characterisation as both hate and as hateful are entirely intelligible. The 
causal connection between hate and oath may not be obvious or direct, but within the 
context of the Theogony and the establishing of the new, just, reign of Zeus, it is a 
highly important connection. The identity of Styx not just as an un-honoured and 
hated figure, but as the personification of hatred itself – which Zeus is willing to make 
one of the strongest foundations of his new reign – makes a powerful statement about 
the composition of this new universe: there is room in it for all who choose to accept 
his leadership. Perhaps more fundamentally, the choice of Styx represents a nuanced 
view of the societal value of oaths – they are useful, but are in their own way a 
necessary evil, needed only when strife, distrust, and hatred appear. In short, Hate was 
an appropriate figure to become oath; it is appropriate to hate the oath provided one 
abides by it, and it is being forced to abide by it that makes the oath hated.  
 
 
The Topology of Styx 
There has been much debate about the authenticity of parts, or all, of the Tartaros 
passage, in which we find the detailed description of Styx’s abode and the courses her 
waters take. Paul Mazon rejects the entire passage as a later interpolation, as Solmsen 
also came to do, arguing that the passage relating to Styx ‘moves with a smooth 
elegance quite alien to the genuine Hesiod.’139 West and David Johnson argue for the 
authenticity of much, or all, of the passage. West’s argument for the authenticity of 
verses relating to Styx is a subtle textual one: when Styx is presented as a solution to 
strife amongst the gods, the order of the appearance of certain key words therein (ἔρις, 
strife [782]; νεῖκος, quarrel [782]; ψεύδηται, speak falsely [783]; ὅρκον, oath [784]; 
                                                
139 Mazon (1928: 14-15); Solmsen (1982: 14-18, 16). Solmsen was initially more sympathetic to the 
authenticity of the passage (1949: 60-62, 60 n. 197).  
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πῆµα, misery [792]; and ἐπίορκον…ἐποµόσσῃ, swear falsely [793]) matches precisely 
the order in which these same words appear in the list and description of the children 
of Eris in verses 226-32. This correspondence is so subtle, and ‘so clearly 
subconscious’ that it must show the repeated thought process of a single author.140 In 
the same vein, Peter Walcot and Richard Hamilton have both pointed to a correlation, 
albeit imperfect, between the order of the genealogies of the gods and that of the gods 
in Tartaros: first come (the sources of) Gaia, Tartaros, Ouranos and Pontos, then (the 
house of) Nyx and Hemera, (the houses of) Hypnos and Thanatos,141 then (the house 
of) Hades, Kerberos (as guard), and then Styx.142 
 
Johnson’s argument too, relies on the unity of the text, noting that ‘the passage is 
unified by ring-composition and the sort of juxtaposition which typifies Hesiod’s 
method of composition’.143 Johnson further notes that the Styx passage itself fits into 
this composition well, pointing to the similarity of her punishment to mortal death to 
explain the thematic connect which links Styx to the figure of Hades, whose 
description hers follows on from.144 At the very limits of Tartaros, she is as far away 
from the Titans as she can be, and presents a suitable counterpoint. She acts as a 
barrier to stop such strife as that which led to the imprisonment of the Titans from 
occurring again, as we see in verses 782-793.145 Regarding the rest of the Tartaros 
passage, I follow Johnson’s interpretation, whose detailed analysis, though too long to 
discuss here, produces a reading of great clarity, and the coherent picture of Tartaros 
that in itself makes good case for the authenticity of the passage. For the reader who 
remains unconvinced by these arguments, I can only hope that my own analysis of the 
passage and of its integral role in the whole poem will sway their mind. 
 
It is undeniable that the topology of Styx (Th. 775-92), and of Tartaros in general, 
does not lend itself to straightforward interpretation. Any attempt to create an idea of 
the physical geography of the underworld based on this passage would quickly 
                                                
140 West (1966: 357). It should be noted that West rejects at least 734-35 and 740-45 as later 
interpolations, but admits that ‘unsubstantiated suspicion is all that one has to go on’ (p. 50). 
141 These two are reversed – in verse 212 Thanatos is mentioned first.   
142 Walcot (1966: 46); Hamilton (1989: 22-23). The discrepancy Hamilton notes is that in the 
description of Tartaros Hades should come after Styx, rather than before, but Nyx and Hemera (124) 
should also come before Ouranos (127) and Pontos (132). 
143 Johnson (1999: 8). 
144 Johnson (1999: 9).  
145 Johnson (1999: 10).   
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become lost in contradictions and physical impossibilities; the topology of Tartaros is 
neither stable nor neat. A topographical interpretation of the description, as many 
scholars have discovered, leads to a confusing mess for the cartographer. As Johnson 
notes, ‘If we insist on looking for some sort of topographical sense in the description 
of Tartarus, then, we must conclude either that Hesiod has done a very poor job of it 
or that his text is irredeemably corrupt.’146 But the meaning of this topology becomes 
apparent if we follow Johnson and Hermann Fränkel in reading narrative proximity as 
indicative of thematic or conceptual similarity rather than fixed physical contiguity.147 
When multiple, conflicting descriptions of the same place, figure or object are given, 
it is not with the intention of confounding the reader but, as Fränkel states, ‘to inspect 
it ever afresh from changing viewpoints’.148 It is through this lens that I intend to 
analyse Hesiod’s description of Styx, investigating what the physical descriptions 
reveal about Styx’s role in Zeus’ new ordered world, and in Hesiod’s own 
cosmogonical thinking.   
 
Styx’s abode is described immediately after the house of Hades and Persephone (767-
776). Positioning Styx next to Hades is appropriate given their shared qualities of 
being hated by the gods, and of being immovable objects. In the Iliad, Agamemnon 
describes how Hades is hated by all because he cannot be reasoned or bargained with: 
 
  Ἀΐδης τοι ἀµείλιχος ἠδ᾽ ἀδάµαστος, 
τοὔνεκα καί τε βροτοῖσι θεῶν ἔχθιστος ἁπάντων: 
        (IX 158) 
 
Lord Death [i.e., Hades] indeed is deaf to appeal, implacable; 
of all gods therefore he is the most abhorrent 
to mortal men.149  
 
Within the description of the underworld in the Theogony, Thanatos, the 
personification of death, is also described as ‘hated’ (the word is echthros, rather than 
stugeros). Death is as inevitable as Styx oaths are unbreakable. And as already 
discussed, the curse for breaking a Styx oath – to lie breathless and cold, without 
eating or drinking – is as close to death as it is possible for an immortal to come.   
                                                
146 Johnson (1999: 10).   
147 Johnson (1999: 10-13); Fränkel (1975).  
148 Fränkel (1975: 105).  




Styx’s house itself appears to be a waterfall that reaches the sky:150 
 
Ἔνθα δὲ ναιετάει στυγερὴ θεὸς ἀθανάτοισι,  
δεινὴ Στύξ, θυγάτηρ ἀψορρόου Ὠκεανοῖο  
πρεσβυτάτη. νόσφιν δὲ θεῶν κλυτὰ δώµατα ναίει,  
µακρῇσιν πέτρῃσι κατηρεφέ᾽· ἀµφὶ δὲ πάντη  
κίοσιν ἀργυρέοισι πρὸς οὐρανὸν ἐστήρικται. 
       (775-79) 
      And there is housed a goddess 
   loathed even by the immortals: 
dreaded Styx, eldest daughter of Ocean, 
   who flows back 
on himself, and apart from the other gods 
   she lives in her famous palace 
which is overroofed with towering rocks, 
   and the whole circuit 
is undergirded with silver columns,  
   and pushes heaven. 
 
James Frazer, who identifies Hesiod’s mythic river with the physical Arcadian river 
of the same name, explains this description as relating to icicles that form on the river 
in winter, making the ‘silver columns’, and suggests that low clouds covering the top 
of a waterfall could give the impression that the water was descending from heaven 
itself.151 The conjecture that the ‘silver columns’ which ‘push heaven’ (779) allude to 
a waterfall is corroborated by the description of Styx water at 785-87:  
 
      …ὕδωρ  
ψυχρόν, ὅ τ᾽ ἐκ πέτρης καταλείβεται ἠλιβάτοιο  
ὑψηλῆς· 
 
that cold water that pours down 
   from a steep sky-climbing 
cliffside…152 
                                                
150 Compare the Ganges, which according to Vālmīki was drawn down from the Milky Way and after 
flowing through mortal realms, flowed into the netherworld (Rāmāyana, Bālakāṇḍa Sarga 43). It too, 
was a river on which oaths were made (Steven Darian, 1978: 153). There is also the Leiptr from 
Scandinavian mythology. Texts referencing this river are not abundant, but it appears twice in the 
Poetic Edda. In the Lay of Grimnir it appears as a river, which, having flowed through mortal lands, 
then gushed down to Hel (v.28), and there is a single recorded instance, in the Second Lay of Helgi, of 
Dag swearing an oath on this river (v.31). This connection was drawn to my attention by Scharfe’s 
1972 article ‘The Sacred Water of the Ganges and the Styx-Water’, the analysis and conclusions of 
which I disagree with entirely.  
151 Frazer (1898: 253).  




Johnson too, reads the silver columns as icicles, making them part of the river 
itself.153 Whether or not the Arcadian Styx is among the sources of Styx mythology, 
we should also read this imagery symbolically. Such images as frozen columns make 
sense, given the effect of the Styx upon the perjuring God and the previously 
discussed etymology of the name. Coldness, stiffness, and lifelessness are represented 
here physically by the frozen waters.  
 
Indeed, the complexities of the physical description of Styx are what allows her to 
fulfil her physical and topographical function: once again in these verses we are faced 
with a physically confusing but conceptually revealing description – how can Styx’s 
house be both next to the house of Hades and also attached to the heavens? Hesiod’s 
description here seems to suggest that the waterfall of the Styx falls over the edge of 
the world, into Tartaros below, where it there becomes a chthonic river:154  
 
      …ὕδωρ  
ψυχρόν, ὅ τ᾽ ἐκ πέτρης καταλείβεται ἠλιβάτοιο  
ὑψηλῆς· πολλὸν δὲ ὑπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης 
ἐξ ἱεροῦ ποταµοῖο ῥέει διὰ νύκτα µέλαιναν, 
Ὠκεανοῖο κέρας, δεκάτη δ᾽ ἐπὶ µοῖρα δέδασται·  
ἐννέα µὲν περὶ γῆν τε καὶ εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης   [790] 
δίνῃς ἀργυρέῃς εἱλιγµένος εἰς ἅλα πίπτει,  
ἣ δὲ µί᾽ ἐκ πέτρης προρέει, µέγα πῆµα θεοῖσιν.   
        (785-92)  
  
that cold water that pours down 
   from a steep sky-climbing 
cliffside and it is one horn 
   of the Ocean stream, and travels 
off that holy river a great course 
   through night’s blackness 
under the wide-wayed earth, 
                                                                                                                                      
There is no reason to do so. I have changed this throughout.   
153 Johnson (1999: 24). 
154 Pocock (1962) makes a rather pedantic argument that scholars have misunderstood Styx, and that 
she is not a river at all. This argument is based on the fact that ποταµός (potamos, ‘river’) – a 
masculine word – is not used of Styx – which always appears in the feminine. However, Pocock cites 
two cases where potamos does occur ‘in connexion’ with Styx. One of these is the above passage in 
Hesiod. Pocock argues that in this instance, potamos refers to Okeanos, not Styx. Given that Styx is 
described here as being one tenth of Okeanos it is unclear how we are supposed to conceive of 
Okeanos as a river without also conceiving of Styx as such. Regardless of the occurrence of potamos, 
Styx is indisputably described as flowing (786; 792). If the water behaves as a river we may as well 
call it a river.  
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   and this water is a tenth part 
of all, for in nine loops 
   of silver-swirling waters, around 
the earth and the sea’s wide ridges 
   he tumbles into salt water, 
but this tenth part, a great misery for the gods, 
   flows out from a rock.155 
 
West, in passing, suggests that the description might simply mean that Hesiod 
conceives of Tartaros, despite being under the world, as also having its own sky. 
However, this is unlikely given that, as West also points out, when we are given a 
description of Iris being sent to fetch the water of the Styx, she crosses the ocean to 
do so (ἐπ᾽ εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης [781]).156 This suggests that Styx’s abode may be at 
the very edge of the world, but does not suggest it is underneath it. Furthermore, one 
cannot help but think that a separate sky for Tartaros would be a significant detail in 
Hesiod’s cosmogony, and would be granted more than a single, implied reference; 
Ge/Gaia (earth), Pontos (sea), Ouranos (heaven), and Tartaros are all fundamental 
deities created at the very beginning of Hesiod’s universe (116-32) – the world must 
be created before it can be populated.157 There is no mention in these first verses 
before the birth of Kronos of any deity who might be thought to provide a heaven for 
Tartaros. The interpretation of the structure of Hesiod’s world followed by Solmsen 
and Johnson makes more sense of the passage: heaven, earth, sea, and Tartaros all 
meet at the horizon.158 It is not clear in what sense these planes meet, given that Styx 
must still have space to cascade down into Tartaros, but to spend time pondering this 
would be to fall into the trap of trying to read a conceptual topology as a physical one.  
The important point for our current purposes is to note that in being anchored to the 
heavens, Styx crosses the boundary between Tartaros and the world above.159  
 
In commenting on the more general topology of Tartaros given to us in this section, 
                                                
155 Adapted from Lattimore to maintain the translation of pēma as ‘misery’, and to maintain a more 
literal translation of ‘ἐκ πέτρης προρέει’ as ‘flows out from a rock.’ 
156 West (1966: 372).  
157 However, as Lye rightly notes, ‘Styx, no less than these three gods, should be considered a physical 
entity, one whose form reflects her moral dimensions. Although Gaia, Ouranos, and Tartarus become 
the basic physical frame for the world, the world does not gain final stability and order until Styx 
appears.’ (2009: 7-8). This is not when Styx first appears narratively or chronologically, nor even when 
it is first mentioned that Zeus made her the oath of the gods, but when her physicality is first described 
in Tartaros – after the end of the Titanomachy and the fall of Typhoeus.  
158 Solmsen (1950: 243); Johnson (1999: 16). 
159 In doing so she also traverses Gaia, thus having presence in all three sections of the cosmos, as 
highlighted by Lye (2009: 25).  
 
76 
Pietro Pucci suggests that the confusing physical imagery is deliberate: Zeus’ victory 
in the Titanomachy has brought order to the parts of the cosmos which are now under 
Zeus’ control. This does not include Tartaros, hence it continues as an unordered 
chaos.160 On this reading we can interpret Styx as a physical barrier, poised at the 
edges of these two worlds, both separating and joining them. Indeed, Johnson reads 
the ἀµφὶ δὲ πάντη of verse 778 as indicating that ‘Styx approaches or touches the sky 
all around the horizon’,161 tallying with the idea that, as one tenth of the world-
encircling Okeanos (790-791), Styx too might encircle the world. The fact that Styx 
appears here as a literal fence suggests that a conceptual connection, supplemented by 
the phonic similarity, may have existed between horkos (oath) and ἕρκος, (herkos, 
fence). Indeed, etymologists have long flirted with this connection – Frisk raises the 
possibility that horkos is derived from herkos and Beekes states that they are 
‘formally…connected’; Chantraine is very dubious about the veracity.162 But it is also 
an etymology found in some ancient etymologies. The earliest etymology is given by 
Aelius Herodian (2nd century CE), who derives horkos from ὅρος (horos, ‘boundary, 
limit’) (Περὶ παθῶν 3.2.387 19-26).163 Several centuries later, Orion (5th century) 
gives Herodian’s etymology, but also supplies his own, deriving horkos from 
ἐπαρκεῖν (eparkein ‘to assist’) (Omicron, p. 111: 1). 164  With the 9th century 
grammarian Georgios Choiroboscos (Epimerismi in Psalmos v.3 p. 192),165 and the 
12th century grammarian Johannes Tzetzes (Exegesis in Homeri Iliadem, Il. I 233 Sch. 
58), we finally reach a derivation from herkos. Later still, Pseudo-Zonaras (13th 
century) gives the derivation from εἴργειν, (eirgein, ‘to shut in’) (Omicron, p. 
1461).166 Thus we see that even in those earlier etymologies, with the exception of 
Orion (who still documents Herodian’s etymology), even when the derivation is not 
from herkos, the semantic connection is still being made to a fence-like force: 
something which contains, constrains, and limits. Given the fact that this connection 
has been noticed by so many scholars over the centuries, and given the overlap 
between Styx circling Tartaros (just as the fence which holds in the Titans does), it 
                                                
160 Pucci (2009: 64-65). See also Lye (2009).  
161 Johnson (1999: 24).  
162 Frisk (1970; 2418-19); Beekes (2010: 1103-104); Chantraine (1999: 820-21). Note that both 
Horkios and Herkeios are epithets of Zeus.  
163 Following Lentz’s notations from the collected volume Grammatici Graeci (1870). 
164 Following Sturz’s paginations from Orionis Thebani etymologicon (1820). 
165 Following Gaisford’s paginations from Georgii Choerobosci epimerismi in Psalmos (1842).  




seems reasonable to conclude that this connection would also have been visible to 
Hesiod and his audience. Styx then becomes one of the many fences that keep the 
Titans in place.167 But just as the oath is a reminder that people can be untrustworthy, 
a fence is a reminder that something must be kept in/out; it separates off something 
that is otherwise connected. In serving its function as a fence, it also reminds one of 
how close the fenced-off things actually are. As Lye notes, ‘The fact that the oath is 
something which limits is inherent in Styx’s nature as a river, a geographical feature 
which separates sections of a physical landscape but also links them through a 
common boundary’.168 But her importance is not just as a physical barrier, but also as 
representative of the new justice of Zeus, and as part of the foundation for the order 
Zeus has established in the upper world. Beyond the physical boundary of the Styx 
there is no rule that can impose order, making her also a marker, symbolically and 
physically, of the limit of Zeus’ power.  
 
As mentioned previously, the Styx oath also represents an order imposed on the 
Olympians, an order which restricts their powers. As a representative of this order, 
Styx is hated by them. She holds them in to the new ordered system, just as Tartaros 
holds those who fell. As Hatred, and as someone with a hated role, Styx belongs in 
Tartaros; as oath and therefore as a foundational pillar of the order of Zeus, she 
belongs properly in the world above. Thus her home shares the confusing topology of 
the underworld, and bridges the upper and lower worlds at the horizon, and her 
presence in each is marginalised, very literally – she is pushed to the edges of both 
worlds, fencing them apart. Positioned at such an isolated place in the upper world, it 
becomes necessary for gods who wish to swear an oath on the waters of the Styx to 
send Iris to fetch some of the Styx’s waters in a golden jug, and perhaps also – contra 
Homer – Styx herself.169 Here, Styx appears also as a necessary evil, a feared weapon, 
which one needs to keep but does not want too close to one’s home, for fear that it 
                                                
167 This would bring the number of fences to three: the first is the herkos mentioned in 726, the second 
is the τεῖχος (teichos) of 733 – the wall in which Poseidon’s door is located, the third is Styx. The 
fences are another instance of Hesiod’s fondness for groupings of three (remember the three Cyclopes, 
the three Hekatoncheires, and lonely Styx, all as the essential component to Zeus’ victory); Johnson’s 
reading of Tartaros posits three separate functions for Tartaros as a whole. Of course, on a metatextual 
level we can detect a fourth fence in the ring composition of the Tartaros passage itself.  
168 Lye (2009: 12). See also Beaulieu’s chapter ‘Hygra keleutha: The Paths of the Sea’ (2016). 
169 West (1966: 343) suggests that despite the fact that verses 784-85 have Iris depart with a golden jug, 
which would suggest she is going only to collect water, the ἀγγελίη (angeliē) of verse 781 indicates a 
formal summons to the goddess. In turn, I think, such a summons could be suggestive of an active role 
for the goddess Styx in judging whether the swearer has perjured themselves or not.   
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will ultimately hurt oneself. As a river she represents the hated death with her ice cold 
waters, and ringing the exiled Titans – just as a god who breaks her oath will be 
exiled. Thus the topology of Styx emphasises the same quality as her role as the oath 




In examining Styx as oath, we have seen the impact that hate can have on the hated 
target – it disrupts life and ostracises the target. She is the coldness we have seen 
frequently associated with hatred. It threatens death. She inflicts the humiliation of 
being deprived of honours for an act of breaking one’s oath – an act of betrayal 
through lying or failing to do as a one said they would. As a hated object, Styx is 
herself ostracised and pushed to the edges of the world. As oath and its punishment 
she is a threat that looms, making her an object of hatred. But being a necessary force, 
she is pushed to the edges of the ingroup’s domain, marking the boundary beyond 
which members must be expulsed. The duration of the punishment inflicted by hated 
is long, but not eternal. It might represent a desire to kill, but in lieu of that, it causes 
expulsion from society – the ingroup – and a loss of rights and power. This is a 
punishment agreed upon by all who accepted Zeus’ offer of a place in his society.  
 
Hatred is provoked by breach of a social norm fundamental to the stability of Zeus’ 
universe. It might be a single action by a single individual, but the breaking of an oath 
is dangerous enough that it doing so would make one hated, and it places one in a 
hated category of oath-breakers. It reminds us that the state of the universe might not 
be permanent, and that it endures as it is because disruptive members can be 









Having examined the connection between hatred highlighted by Styx’s role as oath, 
her geographic physicality and her identity as Hate, we now turn to examine the much 
overlooked connection between Styx and her children in order to understand the 
relationship between hatred and the qualities represented by those children. In this 
chapter I shall first examine the four as a whole, discussing their placement in the 
Theogony, and how Hesiod may have perceived them and their relationship to their 
mother as a figure both hated and representing hatred. I shall then move on to discuss 
first Zelos and then Nike. The discussion of Nike will necessitate a discussion of 
Hekate: a figure who, we are told, can dispense nikē to mortals. The understanding of 
Hekate which will be revealed has great significance for how we comprehend the 
nature and role of Styx, and thus this chapter will end with an analysis of how what 
we have learned enhances our understanding of her. Kratos and Bie will then be 
discussed in Chapter Three. Through the individual analysis of the children across 
both this and the following chapter, it will quickly become apparent that the qualities 
they represent are as closely interlinked with each other as they are with hatred, and 
this interrelationship will be the topic of Chapter Four.  
 
We have already touched briefly upon some of the qualities of the children of Styx 
and the various ways of translating and understanding their names. We have seen that 
the common approach is to understand these deities and their qualities in relation to 
their place at Zeus’ side, and that the fact of their mother being Styx (and Hate) is 
treated as nothing more than an unfortunate coincidence. My own approach is instead 
to examine these deities and their qualities in relation to their genealogical connection 
to their mother Styx. I take as my starting point the idea that if Hesiod has made these 
deities the children of Styx it is because he had good cause to do so. I therefore argue 
that the qualities represented by her children, and the qualities of Styx herself, were 
seen by Hesiod as somehow connected, and my intent is to examine and explore the 





The Four Children 
The children of Styx are first introduced in the Theogony shortly after their parents, 
and are only briefly described before Hesiod moves on to describe their relationship 
to Zeus and their permanent place in his company after the Titanomachy. The 
children are all named and described within two verses: 
 
Στὺξ δ᾽ ἔτεκ᾽ Ὠκεανοῦ θυγάτηρ Πάλλαντι µιγεῖσα  
Ζῆλον καὶ Νίκην καλλίσφυρον ἐν µεγάροισιν,  
καὶ Κράτος ἠδὲ Βίην ἀριδείκετα γείνατο τέκνα. 
      (383-85) 
 
      And Styx, daughter of Okeanos, 
   lying in love with Pallas, 
bore in their halls Rivalry 
   and sweet-stepping Victory, 
and also Power and Force, 
   who are her conspicuous children, 
…  
 
In these verses we have two main pieces of information with which to decide what to 
make of the children of Styx as a whole: the first is their names, the second is the 
single adjective used to describe them. Beyond these verses we are told that they 
followed their mother when, on the advice of her father, she sided with Zeus in the 
Titanomachy (397-98); and that, because of this, her children are now forever by the 
side of Zeus (401-2).170 The dearth of information suggests that her children are 
primarily allegorical in nature – their main function is as representations of the 
qualities they are named after, but as I have already suggested, Padel is right in 
pointing out that we must treat archaic Greek personification and allegory seriously, 
rather than as the throw-away-representations they are often treated as in 
contemporary literature.171 Marcel Detienne and Jean-Paul Vernant, though they still 
comment on Hesiod’s ‘tendency to make pure abstractions into gods’, argue in 
relation to Metis that it would be a mistake to attribute her personification to ‘the 
poet’s own imagination’ and to dismiss her as one of these ‘abstractions’.172 I would 
                                                
170 Hamilton (1989: 21) suggests that the ‘father’ whose ‘advice’ she follows is Zeus, rather than her 
biological father Okeanos, and that the advice being referred to is Zeus’ claim that he will honour those 
who were unhonoured before.  
171 Padel (1992: 158-59). 
172 Detienne & Vernant (1991: 57). 
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argue it would be equally mistaken to do this in the case of the children of Styx – 
indeed, the text gives us no reason to consider them simply as abstractions. As 
Detienne and Vernant go on to point out, to do so would be to overlook an ‘essential 
element of religious thought — the need to name, classify and order the forces of the 
beyond.’ They conclude, like Padel, that these figures cannot be dismissed simply as 
metaphor, as abstract concepts given physical form but not autonomy. Instead, ‘they 
are true religious “powers” which preside over clearly defined types of activity and 
which operate within specific sectors of reality.’173 The children of Styx are agents 
with the ability to act and influence the universe and we must seek to understand how 
Hesiod conceived of them operating.  
 
To understand the children of Styx fully we must begin by investigating the sole 
adjective describing them – ἀριδείκετα (arideiketa). We must explore what it reveals 
about how the children are considered. One might assume that arideiketa is simply a 
positive term, lending weight to any argument that promotes the children of Styx as 
unambiguously good figures, but I believe the truth of the matter is more complex 
than this.  
 
With a few exceptions, the consensus of scholarship is to take the arideiketa of verse 
385 as applying to all four children, though there is a certain ambiguity in the verses 
which is often maintained in translations and which has led to some scholars applying 
the word only to Kratos and Bie. Let us examine the word itself. Arideiketos is not a 
common word. Richard Cunliffe’s A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect gives 
‘distinguished’, ‘renowned’, ‘conspicuous’ and ‘exalted’ as reasonable meanings of 
arideiketos based on its usage in the Odyssey and the Iliad.174 Marcel Hofinger’s 
Lexicon Hesiodeum gives for arideiketos the unsure meaning ‘très remarquable? 
accueilli avec beaucoup d’honneurs, très salue?’ (Very outstanding? Received with 
many honours, much celebrated?’). 175 The arideiketa of verse 385 is variously 
translated as ‘illustrious’, 176  ‘wonderful’, 177  ‘glorious’, 178  ‘outstanding’, 179 
                                                
173 Detienne & Vernant (1991: 57). 
174 Cunliffe (2012: 54).  
175 Hofinger (1975-78: 80). 
176 Athanassakis (1983: 22). Note that Athanassakis applies it only to Kratos and Bie. 
177 Evelyn-White (1914: 107). 
178 Mair (1908: 45); Frazer (1983: 51); Hine; (2005: 67) 
179 West (1988: 14).  
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‘famous’,180 and ‘eminent’181 – all meanings with positive connotations. In contrast to 
these, Richard Lattimore has opted for the more neutral ‘conspicuous’. But is this 
translation justified? Should we understand Hesiod as meaning the same by the word 
as Homer does, or is Hofinger’s hesitation indicative of a more ambiguous meaning? 
In order to ascertain this we must consider how Hesiod uses the word in other 
contexts. In the extant works he uses arideiketa only four times in total. Of these, one 
is found in fragment 196.2 = 154a;182 not enough of the text survives to allow us to 
understand anything from this occurrence. The other three instances are all within the 
Theogony: once in verse 385 above, and twice more rather close together – in verses 
532 and 543. We must examine these latter two instances to help determine how we 
should understand the arideiketa of verse 385. 
 
The first of these other two instances is in reference to Herakles, who is described as 
Zeus’ ἀριδείκετον υἱόν (arideiketon huion) – his arideiketon son [532]). Hesiod has 
just narrated how Herakles killed, with the consent of Zeus, the eagle that had been 
tormenting Prometheus. It is noteworthy that Herakles is also frequently associated 
with the quality of βίη (biē) – that which is represented by Styx’s child of the same 
name. Indeed, of all the figures in the Theogony, Herakles is most frequently 
associated with biē. He is mentioned seven separate times within the Theogony, and is 
described as possessing biē in four of them (289, 315, 332, 943), and is also 
represented killing five various monsters – Geryones (287-89), the Lernaean Hydra 
(318) the Nemean Lion (332), Orthos (293), and the aforementioned eagle (526-7). 
There is a significant overlap between the instances in which Herakles appears killing 
a monster, and those in which he is described in relation to his possession of biē.183 
This overlap reveals an obvious association of the word biē with violence, killing, and 
death. It is significant, then, that we find arideiketa used to describe both Styx’s 
daughter Bie and a man so frequently described as possessing biē. However we 
choose to translate the word, there is a clear association with violence.  
 
The second instance of arideiketa occurs only eleven lines after the Heraklean 
                                                
180 Nelson (2009: 37). Note Nelson also applies the word only to Kratos and Bie. 
181 Most (2007a: 35).  
182 196.2 = Solmsen et al.’s (1970) numbering, 154a = Most’s (2007a) numbering.  
183 The exceptions to this are a lack of reference to biē in the instance of his killing the eagle 
tormenting Prometheus (526-27), and a reference to it when at 943 Hesiod gives us the brief catalogue 
of mortal women who have produced sons by Zeus. 
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example, in relation to Prometheus himself.184 The scene is that in which Prometheus 
presents two offerings to Zeus, one of which has the appearance of being wholesome 
but is actually inedible, the other of which is disguised as inedible or unappetising, 
but which is actually the higher quality portion. Zeus addresses Prometheus thusly: 
 
“Ἰαπετιονίδη, πάντων ἀριδείκετ᾽ ἀνάκτων,  
ὦ πέπον, ὡς ἑτεροζήλως διεδάσσαο µοίρας.” 
        (543-44) 
 
 “Son of Iapetos, conspicuous among all Kings, 
old friend, oh how prejudicially  
   you divided the portions.”  
       
 
To fully understand the meaning of arideiketa in this context we must first look at 
other aspects of Zeus’ address to Prometheus. To begin with, let us inspect the word 
that Lattimore has here translated as ‘prejudicially’; ἑτεροζήλως (heterozēlōs) is a 
compound of ἕτερος (heteros) and ζῆλος (zēlos). Heteros means ‘one or the other of a 
pair’ and zēlos of course, is the quality represented by the child of Styx bearing the 
same name.185 As mentioned in Chapter One (and as we shall discuss in more detail 
below), this word (zēlos) can be translated as ‘emulation’, but also as ‘envy’ or 
‘rivalry’, amongst others. The pair of offerings that Prometheus has presented for 
Zeus to choose from are not equally enviable, not equal in rivalry. 
 
This comment by Zeus is laced with something akin to Socratic irony – he who is 
playing the fool is actually the one who knows more, and reveals himself as such, if 
only one has the wit to understand his true meaning. Prometheus has divided the 
portions unfairly, but, unbeknownst to Prometheus, Zeus is aware of which portion is 
truly the greater one; thus, when he acknowledges the unfair imbalance between the 
portions, he is relying on the ambiguity of his claim to declare that he knows the 
portion Prometheus is presenting him with is actually the lesser portion, whilst on the 
surface appearing to fall for Prometheus’ deception of believing that he has been 
given the greater portion.  
 
                                                
184 Note that Prometheus is actually a cousin of the children of Styx. His mother Klymene is also a 
daughter of Okeanos.  
185 Hofinger gives ‘avec partialité’ (‘with partiality’) for heterozēlōs; Cunliffe does not know the word.  
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The ὦ πέπον (ō pepon) of line 544 could be read as following the same deceptive 
rhetorical cunning, in that it can be taken as a term of endearment as meaning 
something like ‘kind’ or ‘gentle’, or as an insult, meaning ‘weak’, ‘coward’ (the word 
only appears twice in the Theogony, [544, 560] both times used by Zeus of 
Prometheus).186 Zeus’ cunning here is to utilise the positive meanings of these words 
to disguise the true, negative content of what he is saying. Just as Prometheus has 
dressed up one portion of the offerings to look appetising despite its unappetising 
content, so Zeus disguises his insults as friendship. 
 
This cunning rhetoric is important because cunning and wit are the spheres in which 
Prometheus, the trickster, and Zeus, who swallowed Metis (‘wisdom’, ‘craft’), are 
rivals, struggling to emulate (and then outdo) each other. Consequently, when Zeus 
reveals himself as understanding the true nature of the inequality of the two portions, 
whilst simultaneously concealing this fact from Prometheus, and when he secretly 
insults Prometheus to his face, he demonstrates the equal applicability of 
‘heterozēlōs’ to the rivalry between himself and Prometheus, and reveals the true 
nature of the imbalanced in it. He is proving that his is the greater portion of cunning, 
and that his will be the glory. Heterozēlōs, then, highlights the uneven rivalry between 
these two figures.  
 
Given that heterozēlōs and pepon are both used in this ambiguous, Socratically 
double-edged sense, it is reasonable to assume that arideiketos should be understood 
in the same way. Whilst his greeting appears reverential, and his understanding of the 
inequality of the offerings incorrect, Zeus is also, unbeknownst to Prometheus, telling 
him that his arideiketos reputation shall be one of infamy, rather than fame. 
Arideiketos, then, is being used here in a negative sense, whilst simultaneously 
acknowledging the positive sense.  
 
Both the fact that the word can be used in the same instance, relying on the 
understanding of both positive and negative meanings, and the fact that it is used to 
describe both Zeus’ beloved son, and Zeus’ hated rival, highlight the inherent 
ambiguity of the term for Hesiod. Therefore, when used to describe the children of 
                                                
186 It also appears twice in the Shield of Herakles, in verses 350 and 357. Both are part of Herakles’ 
address to Cycnus, first in a positive sense, then in a negative sense.  
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Styx, it reinforces the ambiguity of their position: they have the potential to be friend, 
but equally to be foe; and they have the potential to be either superior or inferior to 
him. They are associated with, and born from Hate – an infamous and dangerous 
figure – and still gain a ‘glorious’ renown when they become the allies and attendants 
of Zeus.  
 
Indeed such a nuanced position would be quite typical of Hesiod; as Kenneth McKay 
points out, Hesiod frequently depicts gods and monsters as both good and bad 
depending on the situation, highlighting Eris, Philotes, Horkos, and Nemesis as key 
examples.187 To this list I would add the children of Styx, Styx herself, and even Zeus 
himself. Lattimore’s morally neutral translation reflects the spirit of Hesiod’s text far 
better than the morally positive translations of other scholars. Ultimately, Hesiod’s 
poems suggest that the children of Styx have no fixed moral alignment: they could be 
good or bad, helpful or dangerous. For Hesiod, those qualities associated with hatred 
are neither always a bad thing, nor always a good thing: hatred might produce 
something dangerous; equally, it might produce something helpful.  
 
Using this understanding of arideiketos as an indication of the ambiguous nature of 
the children of Styx, I now turn to consider each child individually, using the text to 
probe how we should understand the children of Styx. I will examine in further detail 
first their names, and then the contexts in which they appear either as personifications 
or as qualities. This will allow us to form a far more nuanced and complete picture of 
what the children represent and thus their nature as personifications. Having built up 
this fuller picture of the children we will then be in a position to consider how the 
qualities represented by these deities relate to that of their mother Styx. Are her 
children manifestations of hate? Are they things which hate causes – manifestations 
of the results of hate? Or are they perhaps things which hate seeks – does the hateful 
person seek out zēlos, nikē, kratos, and biē? We could also ask whether they 
themselves are things that cause hate. It can be argued that this final understanding is 
unlikely because it would insert a causal anachronism into Hesiod’s genealogy. But it 
may not be possible to fully extricate a unidirectional causal relationship between 
Styx and her children. Nor indeed is this necessarily desirable: a vicious circle might 
                                                
187 McKay (1959: 385-86). 
 
86 
be both unavoidable and appropriate, and the precedent for such a bidirectional 
causality has already been set with the children of Eris. Ultimately, understanding the 





Within the Theogony the quality represented by Zelos is the least mentioned of the 
children of Styx. The sole mention of zēlos occurs in the passage naming him as a 
child of Styx (348), and outside of this instance, there are no zēlos-related words that 
reference the quality he represents. But Zelos also appears in the Works and Days 
(195): 
 
ζῆλος δ᾽ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀιζυροῖσιν ἅπασι  
δυσκέλαδος κακόχαρτος ὁµαρτήσει στυγερώπης. 
     (195-96) 
 
The spirit of Envy, with grim face  
   and screaming voice, who delights 
in evil, will be the constant companion 
   of wretched humanity… 
    
This appearance yields a notably more detailed description than the single mention, 
with its single adjective, that we are given in the Theogony. It also makes Zelos the 
only child of Styx given a distinct, personified form. Further, two instances of a verb 
form, ζηλόω (zēloō), appear in that poem.  
 
It is unsurprising, given the scarcity of the word zēlos in Hesiod’s works, that the 
relevant entry in Hofinger’s Hesiodic lexicon gives just two meanings: ‘envie’ and 
‘jalousie’ (envy, jealousy).188 Cunliffe does not have the word, but has an adjectival 
form, ζηλήµων, and also gives ‘jealous, envious’. 189  Modern translators have 
provided a far broader range of meanings. In verse 384 of the Theogony Lattimore 
gives the translation of ‘Zelos’ as ‘Rivalry’, as do Paley, Apostolos Athanassakis, and 
                                                
188 Note that the French ‘envie’ and the English ‘envy’ are not semantically equivalent, and envie is 
commonly used to express any desire or wish, and can also be used to mean ‘I feel like (doing)...’ or ‘I 
want to (do)…’ 
189 Cunliffe (2012: 176). 
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Glenn Most.190 This meaning contains a ‘negative’ implication – it represents a 
potential threat. In the same vein, Nelson chooses ‘Envy’.191  On the other hand West 
and Christopher Rowe choose to translate the name as the more ‘positive’ qualities of 
‘Glory’ and ‘Aspiration’. 192  Mazon gives ‘Zèle’ (Zeal). 193  Hugh Evelyn-White 
translates the word as ‘Emulation’, Solmsen as ‘Zeal’, and Daryl Hine as ‘emulous 
Zelos’.194 Frazer opts for the delightfully succinct ‘spirit of Zeal in the Vindication of 
one’s rights’.195 I list so many translations for two reasons. Firstly, to demonstrate the 
breadth of ideas, with both functional and dysfunctional qualities, that translators have 
seen in the figure of Zelos in the Theogony: note that West alone gives two different 
translations, with different meanings: ‘Glory’ itself, and ‘Aspiration’ – the pursuit of a 
glory not yet possessed. Secondly, to underline the significance of the fact that when 
it comes to the appearance of Zelos in the Works and Days, where he is depicted with 
a grimness usually associated with the Furies (195), nearly all of them converge on 
the translation of ‘Envy’, and take it to be a proper noun,196 thus interpreting the verse 
as referring to Zelos.197  
 
Some scholars have found troubling the idea that a single figure of Zelos could be 
associated with both the good Eris and Zeus, and also with the bad Eris. Commenting 
on the Zelos of the Theogony, Solmsen takes it as beyond obvious that the Zelos of 
the Works and Days cannot be the same figure; the reasoning being that since there 
are two Erides, there must be a both a good and a bad Zelos to respectively 
accompany each of them. The Zelos accompanying Zeus could only be that which 
accompanies the good Eris, an idea apparently so self evident that Solmsen feels no 
need to state it explicitly. But this is a weak argument: Hesiod does indeed split the 
figure of Eris in two, but Eris is the exception, not the rule; there are many examples 
within both texts of deities who appear negative and positive depending on the 
                                                
190 Paley (1883: 215); Athanassakis (1983: 46); Most (2007a: 35).  
191 Nelson (2009: 37). In an earlier work Nelson gives ‘Striving’ (1998: 103).  
192 West (1966: 272); Rowe (1978: 130-31). 
193 Mazon (1928: 46).  
194 Evelyn-White (1914: 107); Solmsen (1949: 32); Hine (2005: 67). 
195 Frazer (1983: 52).  
196 Evelyn-White (1914: 17); West (1978: 203), (1988: 42); Hine (2005: 30); Most (2006: 103); Nelson 
(2009: 14). The exceptions are Paley, who gives ‘jealousy’ (1883: 31), and Mazon, who gives 
‘jalousie’ (1928: 93). 
197 In the text itself West’s edition gives ‘ζῆλος’, but in the commentary, ‘Ζῆλος’ (1978: 104, 203). 
Similarly, Evelyn-White has ‘ζῆλος’ in the Greek, but translates it as ‘Envy’ (1914: 16, 17). 
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circumstances.198 Hesiod spends several verses explaining how there are two Erides, 
but does not claim anywhere that there are two Zeloi. Rowe and West too, assume 
they must be two separate figures, but neither provide any evidence to justify their 
interpretations.199 
 
Thomas Sinclair deems the word to be zēlos, not Zelos; Mazon also adopts this 
approach, and Athanassakis’ translation follows suit, giving ‘envy’ rather than 
‘Envy’.200 But this is not a defensible textual interpretation. The word in question has 
three different adjectives attached to it, vividly personifying it (we shall discuss these 
in detail shortly).201 Regardless of capitalisations, the word is literally given flesh: it is 
Zelos. Zelos is zēlos.  
 
Given the negative context in which it appears, the translation of zēlos as ‘Envy’ 
suggests that envy is a negative thing. But this is at odds with the understanding of 
zēlos presented by modern scholarship, which argues that zēlos is a positive 
quality/emotion. They posit a difference between ‘jealousy’ and ‘envy’ and argue that 
the negative ‘jealousy’ is represented by a separate word – φθόνος (phthonos).202 In 
order to understand the semantic remit of Hesiod’s Zelos then, we must understand 
not only his usage of zēlos, but that of phthonos as well. If Hesiod appears to use the 
two words to represent different things, then we must understand the appearance of 
Zelos in the Works and Days to be representing something positive. If the two words 
are used interchangeably then we can understand both the Zelos of the Works and 
Days and of the Theogony in a negative light.  
 
Establishing this will be the first step in completing our picture of the nature of Zelos. 
As a second step we must examine the role of Zelos in the Works and Days, and what 
this can tell us about him. The final step is to consider both ancient and contemporary 
etymologies of the word. Having gathered the evidence we will then be in a position 
                                                
198 It is worth noting that even the negative Eris must be honoured by mortals according to Hesiod 
(Works and Days 15-16). Just like Styx, the ‘evil’ Strife too, by necessity (ἀνάγκη), must be given her 
due honours, through the will/plans (βουλή) of the gods. One assumes that her honours are received by 
the literal act of engaging in war. In which case, war too, is not simply inevitable, but necessary. 
199 Solmsen (1949: 32); Rowe (1978: 130-31); West (1978: 203).  
200 Sinclair (1932: 24); Mazon (1963: 58); Athanassakis (1983: 72).  
201 Canevaro (2015: 184) makes the same point.  
202 Remember that this is the translation Paley gives for zēlos. 
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to begin building an understanding of the nature of Zelos and his role in Zeus’ 
universe. This information will, in turn, develop our understanding of the nature of 
relationship between zēlos/Zelos and Zeus, and between zēlos/Zelos and hate/Styx, 
and the implications this has for the concept of Hesiod’s ‘hate’. 
 
 
Zēlos and Phthonos  
As mentioned above, it is understood by scholars of ancient Greek that zēlos and 
phthonos represent ideas that were, and still are, closely interlinked, yet still distinct. 
They take Aristotle’s definitions of the two words as a starting point. Aristotle 
describes phthonos as: 
 
… A kind of pain at the sight of good fortune in regard to the goods already 
mentioned; in the case of those like themselves; and not for the sake of a man 
getting anything, but because of others possessing it.  
       (Rh. 2.9-10, 1387b23-25) 
 
Phthonos is, as Konstan puts it, of all the emotions Aristotle discusses in the Rhetoric 
‘the only one that he treats as unqualifiedly negative.’203 It is a pain felt because 
someone else has something one does not, regardless of how useful that thing would 
be to oneself. In the Eudemian Ethics, he states it even more bluntly – phthonos is a 
pain felt at the deserved success of other people (3.7.1 = 1233b18-19). Whether their 
successes or goods are ones which are already possessed by the person feeling 
phthonos is irrelevant. Zēlos, on the other hand, is good in Aristotle’s eyes, though the 
fact that he feels it necessary to carefully distinguish the two and explain how they are 
different perhaps suggests that to others, the difference was not as obvious as 
Aristotle makes it appear: 
 
… Zēlos is a feeling of pain at the revealed presence of highly valued goods, 
which are possible for us to obtain, in the possession of someone who naturally 
resembles us – pain not due to the fact that another possesses them but to the 
fact that we ourselves do not. Zēlos therefore is virtuous and characteristic of 
virtuous men, whereas bearing phthonos is base and characteristic of base men; 
for one, owing to zēlos, fits himself to obtain such goods, while the object of the 
other, owing to phthonos, is to prevent his neighbour from possessing them. 
      (Rh. 2.11, 1388a31-38)  
                                                




As illuminating as this is for the understanding of zēlos and phthonos in the Classical 
era, it cannot be assumed that these Aristotelian distinctions are retrospectively 
applicable to the Archaic period. Whilst phthonos does not appear at all in Hesiod, a 
verb form, φθονέω (phthoneō), does appear, the meaning(s) of which Hofinger gives 
as ‘jalouser, envier’ (to be jealous of, to desire or envy). Remember that for zēlos the 
meanings given are: ‘envie’ and ‘jalousie’ (envy, jealousy). Hofinger’s definitions 
suggest no difference between zēlos and phthonos in Hesiod’s usage, supporting the 
notion that Aristotle’s distinctions between these two words are not present in Hesiod. 
Cunliffe’s Homeric lexicon, too, lacks phthonos but has phthoneō, and gives it as 
meaning ‘to dislike the idea of something, be dissatisfied at the prospect of it, 
begrudge the doing of it’. Although vague, this idea of dissatisfaction at an event or 
action is more in line with Aristotle’s definition of phthonos as a pain felt by the sight 
of the good fortune of others.  
 
In order to establish whether Hesiod perceived a difference between zēlos and 
phthonos (and thus what this might reveal about further semantic associations of 
zēlos), we must investigate the usage of the words in his texts. In what circumstances 
and situations does Zelos appear or have influence? Does Hesiod use phthonos in a 
way in which a sense of ‘jealousy’ is clear? Does he use it in a way in which ‘envy’ is 
to be understood? What about zēlos? Is it understood as either, or both of, the senses 
‘jealousy’ and ‘envy’? Given the various contexts in which Hesiod uses the words, 
which we shall discuss momentarily, the most likely scenario is that the words are 
used indiscriminately to represent both of the concepts Aristotle discusses: the desire 
to obtain for oneself the goods another possesses, and the desire to deprive the another 
of the goods they possess. 
 
As previously mentioned, within the Theogony there is no instance of zēlos or zēlos-
related words outside the naming of the child. But not only does Zelos also appear in 
the Works and Days (195), but, two instances of a verb form, ζηλόω (zēloō), appear in 
that poem (23, 312). In the case of phthonos we find it in neither text, but in the 
Works and Days a verb form, φθονέω (phthoneō) appears once (26).  
 
The two instances in which zēloō appears both occur with a positive economic or 
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productive sense, describing how competition, vying with each other, will spur all on 
to labour and make their lot greater (23) or make one the envy of one’s neighbours 
(312). However, the single use of phthoneō occurs in this same positive context (26). 
Here, the feelings of zēloō and phthoneō are associated with the positive Strife who 
encourages men to better themselves through a competitive desire to have more than 
one’s neighbour: 
 
εἰς ἕτερον γάρ τίς τε ἴδεν ἔργοιο χατίζων  
πλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει µὲν ἀρόµεναι ἠδὲ φυτεύειν  
οἶκόν τ᾽ εὖ θέσθαι· ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων  
εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ᾽· ἀγαθὴ δ᾽ Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν.  
καὶ κεραµεὺς κεραµεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων,   [25] 
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ. 
       (21-26) 
 
A man looks at his neighbour who is rich: 
   then he too 
wants to work; for the rich man presses on with 
   his ploughing and planting 
and the ordering of his state. 
   So the neighbour envies the neighbour 
who presses on toward wealth. Such strife  
   is a good friend to mortals.  
Then potter bears grudge against potter,  
   and craftsman against craftsman, 
tramp is jealous of tramp, 
   and singer of singer.204 
 
This Strife is a non-violent conflict or rivalry based on man’s envy of his neighbour, 
though it is notable that according to Hesiod this strife still the bearing of a ‘grudge’ 
(κοτέω, koteō [25]) between competitors.  
 
Whilst it is accepted that zēloō is appropriate for the good Eris, the appearance of 
phthoneō and koteō in verses 25-26 has provoked some debate amongst 
commentators. They are widely understood to be a pre-existing proverb.205 Paley 
notes that other scholars have, based on a claim that the verses ‘contain a sentiment 
scarcely consistent with the preceding’, argued them to be a later interpolation.206 
                                                
204 Adapted from Lattimore, who translates the single instance of κοτέει twice – first as ‘is… enemy’, 
then as ‘is… rival’, distorting the similarity between koteei and the phthoneei of the subsequent verse.  
205 Sinclair (1932: 5); Rowe (1978: 106); West (1978: 147). 
206 Paley (1883: 9). 
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Phthoneō and koteō are simply not appropriate for the good Eris. However, Paley is 
not convinced and thinks that while the awkwardness of verse 24 is suggestive of 
interpolation, it would have been added to clarify that the phthoneō and koteō of 
verses 25-26 do indeed belong to the good Eris.  
 
Solmsen et al. express no sentiment that it might be an interpolation, nor does West. 
West does take koteō and phthoneō to be at odds with the ‘spirit of the good Eris’, but 
thinks that ‘the idea of rivalry makes these lines relevant enough to Hesiod.’207 West 
also agrees that the lines likely refer to a pre-existing proverb, based on the usage of 
the uncontracted -eei or -eein, but does not conclude that this must indicate the lines 
are foreign. Instead, West suggests that it is the very pattern of the ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα 
γείτων of verse 24 that ‘put into his mind’ the pre-existing proverbs.208  
 
Rowe suggests that the fact that Hesiod is employing pre-existing proverbs means that 
their meanings ‘fit the context in some respect, but not in others.’209 This conclusion 
is unjustifiable. The fact that Hesiod chose to employ a pre-existing proverb does 
indeed tell us that he found at least something in the verses to be highly relevant, but 
we have no grounds on which to assume that he did not consider all of it relevant. If 
Hesiod uses these two proverbs it only strengthens the idea that the concepts of zēlos 
and phthonos were seen as interchangeable by Hesiod. Further, given that this is the 
sole use of phthoneō, and that both it and zēloō are being used to indicate the same 
emotion felt towards those more prosperous, we can take this as an indicator Hesiod 
understood the two words to be able to function as very near synonyms.  
 
Konstan points out that phthonos is simply a rarer word in archaic literature – the 
noun does not appear at all, and the verb only very rarely.210 The word appears a 
handful of times between the Iliad and the Odyssey. Konstan discusses these instances 
and reasonably suggests that the evident meaning in the Iliad is ‘refuse’ or ‘begrudge’ 
and that in the Odyssey the sense is generally something as light as ‘deny’, but at least 
in one instance (18.15-18) appears to have a stronger meaning of ‘begrudge’ or 
                                                
207 West (1978: 147). 
208 West (1978: 147). 
209 Rowe (1978: 106). 
210 Konstan (2006a: 118-19). 
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‘resent’.211 The sharp distinctions that others scholars have wished to make between 
phthoneō and zēloō are not appropriate to the archaic period: phthoneō need not be 
understood as wholly negative.  
 
So: at Works and Days 23-26 both phthoneō and zēlos appear within a positive 
context.212 It is in this same context that zēloō appears again in verse 312, as Hesiod 
describes how other people will envy his brother Perses if he works and grows rich: 
 
ἐξ ἔργων δ᾽ ἄνδρες πολύµηλοί τ᾽ ἀφνειοί τε,  
καί τ᾽ ἐργαζόµενος πολὺ φίλτερος ἀθανάτοισιν 
[ἔσσεαι ἠδὲ βροτοῖς· µάλα γὰρ στυγέουσιν ἀεργούς]. [310] 
ἔργον δ᾽ οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ᾽ ὄνειδος.  
εἰ δέ κεν ἐργάζῃ, τάχα σε ζηλώσει ἀεργὸς 
πλουτεῦντα· πλούτῳ δ᾽ ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ. 
     (308-13) 
 
 It is from work that men grow rich and own flocks 
   and herds; 
by work, too, they become much better friends 
   of the immortals. 
[and to men too, for they hate the people  
   who do not labor]. 
Work is no disgrace; the disgrace is not working; 
and if you do work, the lazy man will soon begin 
   to be envious 
as you grow rich, for with riches go nobility 
   and honour 
 
 
The reader may notice that στυγέουσιν (stugeousin) appears here, in verse 310. 
However, verse 310 is of dubious authenticity. It is absent from all of the ancient 
papyrological testimonia (but is attested by three of the four best manuscripts). I am, 
for once, convinced that the line is inauthentic. But even without verse 310, a word 
for hatred still occurs within the passage: 
 
Πέρση, δῖον γένος, ὄφρα σε Λιµὸς  
ἐχθαίρῃ, φιλέῃ δέ σ᾽ ἐυστέφανος Δηµήτηρ  
αἰδοίη, βιότου δὲ τεὴν πιµπλῇσι καλιήν: 
                                                
211 Ibid. 
212 Sanders discusses this passage in his book Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens, but claims that 
verses 25-26 refer to the bad Eris (2004: 40). I can see no justification for this reading, and know of no 
other scholar who supports it.  
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λιµὸς γάρ τοι πάµπαν ἀεργῷ σύµφορος ἀνδρί. 
       (299-302) 
 
Work, O Perses, illustrious-born, work on, 
   so that Famine  
will hate you, and august and garlanded Demeter 
will be your friend, and fill your barn 
   with substance of living; 
Famine is the unworking man’s most constant 
   companion.213 
 
Famine hates (ἐχθαίρῃ echthairēi) the man who works. Lattimore here takes λιµός 
(limos) to be the personification of Famine. Limos is personified in the Theogony as 
one of the children of Eris (226-27). For the man who works, Famine is opposed and 
counteracted by the benevolent Demeter. She loves (φιλέῃ, phileēi), and just as 
Famine’s hatred means he stays away from such a man, Demeter’s love means that 
she has a presence in his house – she fills his barn with grain. If both Famine and 
Demeter are physical gods, and Demeter’s love indicates a physical presence in the 
industrious man’s house, then it is reasonable to interpret the hatred of Famine as 
meaning that he stays away from the man and his house. Such a reading is further 
supported by the fact that earlier in the Works and Days, the same idea of physical 
presence also appears: 
 
οὐδέ ποτ᾽ ἰθυδίκῃσι µετ᾽ ἀνδράσι λιµὸς ὀπηδεῖ  
οὐδ᾽ ἄτη, θαλίῃς δὲ µεµηλότα ἔργα νέµονται. 
         (230-31) 
 
Those men who give right judgment,  
   famine does not accompany them, 
nor folly, they do their work 
   as if work were a holiday. 
 
Famine, along with ἄτη (atē, ‘folly’ – another child of Eris), does not accompany 
(ὀπηδεῖ, opēdei) the just man. We can then read verses 299-302 as an expansion of 
230-31: Famine does not accompany the good man, and the reason is that he hates 
him. The argument for understanding the meaning of echthairēi in verse 300 as ‘stays 
away from’, then, is strong.  
                                                




What has this to do with Zelos? Hesiod does not just tell us who Famine hates and 
avoids – he also tells us who Famine accompanies (and therefore loves): ‘Famine is 
the unworking (ἀεργῷ, aergōi) man’s most constant // companion’ (302). And it is 
this same unworking man (ἀεργίη, aergiē [311])214 who acts upon zēlos (zēloō, [312]. 
Famine then, loves the unworking man who experiences zēlos, and Famine’s hatred is 
directed towards the same target as the unworking man’s envy.  
 
What does this mean for verse 312, and the fact that the industrious man becomes 
enviable? 215  Demeter loves the enviable man because of his productivity. She 
provides aid to him. But being enviable is inseparable from being a target of envy, as 
we see at the end of the final age of man. What does it mean for Demeter to stay with 
the target of envy? She loves him not because she envies him but because he has 
made himself enviable to others – and he has done so in the correct way, by 
channelling his efforts into his work: a form of rivalry acceptable between those who 
could, and should, be equals. In one situation then, we see the same figure can be an 
object both of hatred and of love because they are enviable. The ability to toil, to 
work to better oneself, is caused by the ability to experience zēlos positively. But it 
also simultaneously generates a negative zēlos in those who lack the fortitude of 
character to experience the positive zēlos in response to the productivity of the good 
man.  
 
Thus, when Hesiod encourages Perses to become enviable in verse 310 he is advising 
something good, yet dangerous. Being enviable ensures the blessing of the gods, but 
also runs the risk of making oneself a potential victim of the lazy man who does not 
work himself. Zēlos makes the gods love you, and it might make another emulate you, 
act as you have done, and thus achieve for themselves what you also have, or it may 
make them jealous of what you possess and encourage them to take it, to deprive you 
of it as well as possessing it themself.   
 
Despite the current age of man using zēlos as a tool to aid him in his productivity, 
                                                
214 One is the adjective form, the other the noun form of the same word. 
215 West thinks that this verse is devoid of the idea of spurring the idle man to work – the goal here is 
only to become enviable. (West: 1978: 234) But, as we have seen, zēlos spurs action. It must either 
cause the enviable man to be attacked by the envious person, or spur the envious person to work.  
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Hesiod’s world starts with the gold age of man which is lacking in envy, in which the 
world gives up its fruit ἄφθονον (aphthonon) – without envy (Works and Days 118). 
This ease of survival means that work – the good Eris – is also unnecessary. The good 
Eris, like envy, only became necessary when labour also became necessary for 
survival and growth. If envy is useful to men now, it is because they live in a hostile 
world where the earth guards its fruits more jealously, where labour (the good Eris) is 
necessary, and so, therefore, is Zelos, as a motivation for that labour. 
 
If we take linguistic usage to reflect conceptual categories, then, we must reach the 
same conclusion as Hofinger: Hesiod does not use differentiating terms for positive 
and negative envy. Hesiod’s envy, indifferently designated as zēlos or phthonos, is 
something which spurs one to try to acquire goods for oneself when allied to the good 
Eris (21-26), and to deprive others of those goods when allied to the bad Eris (189-
96). Indeed, why these two elements of zēlos should be distinguished from each other 
is not necessarily obvious: when resources are scarce it is frequently the case that in 
seeking to obtain something for yourself you also, intentionally or unintentionally, 
deprive someone else of it. When wanting to have a thing for oneself requires 
depriving someone else of it, desiring something for oneself and desiring to deprive 
someone else of it become indistinguishable. Thus, I argue, Hesiod portrays zēlos as 
something that can be both good – a motivator to work and action – or bad – as a 
source of conflict. It is a motivator to increase one’s own lot, but also to decrease the 
lot of others. The upshot of this is that the Zelos of the Works and Days can represent 
both a positive figure, and a negative figure and thus, so too can the Zelos of the 
Theogony: he is a figure of ambiguous moral alignment, of function and dysfunction.   
 
 
Zelos in the Works and Days 
We now turn to look at the two instances of the personified Zelos between the two 
poems and what the details of the Zelos of the Works and Days can tell us about the 
Zelos of the Theogony. The unarguably unflattering context in which Zelos is 
presented in verses 189-96, in a detailed description of how the fifth age of men will 
end, is very much at odds with the hitherto seen positive image of zēlos as motivation 




As mentioned earlier, Solmsen argues that the passages in the Works and Days 
concern a different Zelos, and West and Paley also assume this to be the case. But not 
only is Solmsen’s argument from the existence of the two Erides weak, the poem 
itself supports a reading of this Zelos as the same one who appears in the Theogony: 
 
  ἕτερος δ᾽ ἑτέρου πόλιν ἐξαλαπάξει.  
  οὐδέ τις εὐόρκου χάρις ἔσσεται οὔτε δικαίου    [190] 
οὔτ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ, µᾶλλον δὲ κακῶν ῥεκτῆρα καὶ ὕβριν  
ἀνέρες αἰνήσουσι: δίκη δ᾽ ἐν χερσί, καὶ αἰδὼς  
οὐκ ἔσται: βλάψει δ᾽ ὁ κακὸς τὸν ἀρείονα φῶτα  
µύθοισιν σκολιοῖς ἐνέπων, ἐπὶ δ᾽ ὅρκον ὀµεῖται. 
Ζῆλος δ᾽ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀιζυροῖσιν ἅπασι    [195] 
δυσκέλαδος κακόχαρτος ὁµαρτήσει, στυγερώπης. 
       (Works and Day 189-96) 
 
Strong of hand, one man shall seek  
   the city of another. 
There will be no favour for the man 
   who keeps his oath, for the righteous 
and the good man, rather men shall give their praise 
   to violence 
and the doer of evil. Right will be in the arm. 
   Shame will  
not be. The vile man will crowd his better out, 
   and attack him 
with twisted accusations and swear an oath 
   to his story.  
The spirit of Envy, with grim face 
   and screaming voice, who delights 
in evil, will be the constant companion 
   of wretched humanity.216  
 
Note that this ‘Envy’ confounds Aristotle’s separate categorisations for zēlos, which 
desires to obtain such goods for itself, and phthonos, which desires to prevent a 
neighbour from possessing them. Zelos/zēlos no longer encourages men to work their 
own land and produce their own goods. Instead, being associated now with the bad 
Eris, Zelos encourages them to sack each other’s cities (‘one man shall sack the city 
of the other’, [189]) – to improve their own lot by simultaneously lessening the lot of 
                                                
216 Note that within these eight lines Hesiod makes two references to the state of oaths – first that those 
who honour oaths (εὐόρκου, euorkou) will not be rewarded, and secondly that men will tell crooked 
stories and swear oaths to their veracity (µύθοισιν σκολιοῖς ἐνέπων, ἐπὶ δ᾽ ὅρκον ὀµεῖται.) This does 
suggest that in previous times men were rewarded for keeping oaths, but given the fact that Hesiod 
does not mention so explicitly when talking about Horkos, and explicitly mentions the lack of reward 
here, the theme of focusing on the negative aspects of oaths is continued.  
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others. Men will swear false oaths, using crooked words to harm those better than 
them (193-94), and they will delight in evil (κακόχαρτος, kakochartos). The fact that 
Zelos is here represented as something with both elements of Aristotle’s zēlos and 
phthonos further undermines the idea that his distinctions are applicable to Hesiod.   
 
Zēlos can be both good – as in verses 21-26 and 311-13 – or it can be morally bad, as 
in verses 189-96. And verses 189-96 vividly illustrate that dangerous and morally bad 
side of Zelos: a figure that delights in the misfortunes of others, taking pleasure in 
depriving others of the possessions or qualities that aroused the envy in the first place. 
 
But this passage does more than reveal the morally ambiguous nature of Zelos by 
revealing a clearly negative meaning; other elements of it enforce the connection of 
this Zelos to Styx. Zelos is described as a ‘screaming’ (δυσκέλαδος, duskelados) spirit 
who ‘delights in evil’ (kakochartos) and with ‘grim face’ (στυγερώπης, 
stugerōpēs).217 This final word, which Lattimore has here translated as ‘grim face’, 
would be more literally translated as ‘hateful look’. The στυγ- root of this epithet for 
Zelos is a clear reminder that his mother is Styx. The kakochartos of verse 196 also 
links Zelos with the bad, war-causing Eris, who shares this same description in verse 
28, strengthening the idea that Zelos can be aligned with both the good and the bad 
Eris, and making it harder to extricate a separate, wholly negative Zelos from a 
wholly positive one.218  
 
Thus as a whole the passage displays the connection between Zelos and Styx, and also 
between Zelos and Eris. Whether it is the strife of competing to be richer than one’s 
neighbour by working harder, or the violent strife of war, Zelos is there (we should 
not forget that one of Zelos’ siblings, Bie, is Violence). This wholly demonstrates that 
it is unreasonable to try and claim that this Zelos is not the Zelos of the Theogony, the 
son of Styx, who takes his place at the side of Zeus. It also reveals some of the 
qualities associated with Zelos which we must take account of when considering what 
it means for this nuanced figure to be both the son of Styx, associated with strife and 
hatred, and also to be in permanent attendance on Zeus in the Theogony. Of these two 
                                                
217 The idea of delighting in the misfortune of others is an indication of enmity (or a slight) in Aristotle 
(Rhet. 2.4 1379b20), and an aspect of hatred also noted by Halperin (2008: 718). 
218 West (1978: 203). 
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relationships, we will examine that between Zelos and Zeus first; but before doing 
this, it will be pertinent to address the etymological evidence which may inform our 
understanding of the range of concepts associated with zēlos.  
 
 
Etymology of Zēlos 
Although the word is scarce in ancient etymologies, the proposed roots of zēlos 
favour a nuanced interpretation of the word, as do those of contemporary 
etymologists. Of the ancient etymologists we find it first in the work of the 9th century 
CE grammarian, Theognostus Protospatharius. He derives the word from ζέω (zeō 
‘boil’) because zēlos must grow ‘exceedingly’ (λίαν, lian, ‘excess’), hot (470: 1-6).219 
Pseudo-Zonaras follows the derivation from zeō. He also gives a second derivation 
from ζέειν (zeein ‘to boil’) because ‘it causes the soul to be inflamed and makes it 
burn’ (ὁ φλεγµαίνειν καὶ ἐκκαίεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐµποιῶν) (Zeta 956:5-16).220 We may 
at first instance recall the comment from the etymology of stugnos, explaining that the 
Greeks name unpleasant things after cold things, and pleasant things after warm 
things (Kallierges 731: 15-18). But as Padel points out, fire is ‘the violent-end of the 
heat-spectrum. More moderate hope, and joy, “warm” innards in a comforting flow 
like that produced by wine.’221 Zeō/zeein is not a gentle warmth; it is a burning force, 
here represented in the divine or daemonic figure of Zelos. In this light we see zēlos 
sharing the qualities of fire. It is ‘divine violence, fast, asymmetrical in movement, a 
multiple blast, destructively creative.’222 Destruction and creation. This is zēlos as a 
force that can inspire, but can also lead to ruin. It can urge a man to work to obtain 
lawfully what others have, and can urge him to deprive others of what they lawfully 
have.223  
 
The ideas of being ‘inflamed’ with a passion, and of hot temperatures being part of 
                                                
219 Following John Cramer’s paginations from Anecdota Graeca e codd. manuscriptis bibliothecarum 
Oxoniensium (1835).  
220 Following Tittmann’s paginations from Iohannis Zonarae lexicon ex tribus codicibus manuscriptis 
(1808). It also appears in Byzantine scholia on Oppian’s (2nd century CE) Halieutica. Zeō and zeein are 
different forms of the same word. Ancient etymologies frequently provide derivations from a specific 
form of a word, and can give different etymological connections for different forms of the same word. 
221 Padel (1994: 117).  
222 Padel (1994: 117). 
223 Padel also draws attention to the fiery nature of Zeus’ lightning-bolt weapons, and the theft of fire 
by Prometheus, which proves just as much a bane for mankind as it does a boon. (1994: 117 n.12).  
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the bodily experience of a strong emotion is one common to us today, and was 
equally present in antiquity (compare: hot-headed, flushed with anger, cheeks burning 
with embarrassment or shame, burning with desire). Zelos, too, is experienced as heat.  
 
The language of boiling and burning is also very closely linked to language associated 
with disease – the swelling of the soul described by φλεγµαίνειν (phlegmainein) 
evokes images of fever, abnormal swelling, and ill-health.224 It is something that 
disturbs the natural functioning of the body, and those who experience it in turn 
become threats to the established functioning of hierarchy and the ordered world. 
True, it is the opposite of the coldness suggested by the potential etymologies of 
Styx’s name, but destruction lies at both extremes of the spectrum. If these ideas of 
temperature can in some sense suggest the potential bodily experience of hatred and 
zēlos, then it is a violent transition, disruptive to the body, and perhaps also to society 
as well.  
 
It should also be noted that Pseudo-Zonaras gives the meaning of the related 
Ζηλήµονες (zēlēmones), as φθονεροί (phthoneroi) (Zeta 956: 3). And in the Et. Mag. 
the meaning of the word is given as phthonos. This suggests that, even as phthonos 
and zēlos became more distinct from each other in their meaning and usage, 
significant semantic overlap still remained.  
 
When we turn to contemporary etymologies, we find that Frisk and Chantraine link 
zēlos with δίζηµαι (dizēmai, ‘to seek’) and ζητέω (zēteō, ‘to search, inquire, 
investigate’), and more tentatively ζηµία (zēmia, ‘damage, penalty’). 225  Beekes 
follows José García-Ramón in grouping both zēlos with zēteō and Ζητήρ (Zētēr – an 
epithet of Zeus in Cyprus, according to the 5th-6th century CE grammarian Hesychius 
[ζ 48 = Latte 1966: 261]).226 García-Ramón gives ‘avenger’ as the meaning of Zētēr, 
based on shared etymology with the Ṛg-Vedic yātár-, which is used as an epithet of 
Indra to mean ‘avenger’ (I 32, 14ab),227 as well as the fact that words such as 
                                                
224 See, for example, Hippocrates Aphorismi. 5.58. 
225 Frisk (1960: 612-13); Chantraine (1999: 400).  
226 Beekes (2010: 501); García-Ramón (1999: 90) 
227 The Vedic Indra is himself a figure comparable to Zeus – god of the heavens, king of the other gods, 
and one whose domain includes lightning and thunder. 
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‘punisher’, ‘executioner’, ‘avenger’, etc. are common epithets of Zeus.228 Grouping 
zēlos and zēteō with Ζητήρ not only enforces a connection between zēlos and Zeus, 
but also connects the ideas of ‘searching’ and ‘damage’ with that of an ‘avenger’: one 
who seeks retribution – who seeks to damage their target.229  
 
This collection of associated words and ideas suggests a search for retribution, a 
desire to right a perceived wrong or injustice through inflicting some sort of harm – a 
punishment – or causing some sort of loss. It allows us to see a way in which a 
rivalry, even a ‘friendly’ rivalry, or one based in emulation, is an attempt to ‘punish’ 
the other by out-doing them. Beating the rival, becoming better than the person one 
seeks to emulate, becomes a form of revenge just as much as actively seeking to 
deprive the other of their goods is. To be better than the other is a punishment for the 
other having been better in the first place, just as the other being better was 
experienced as a pain or a punishment. Being inferior was an unpleasant situation that 
was bad enough to spur the person experiencing it to remedial action, and in the same 
way, their being superior is a punishment for the other. Armed with this extra 
knowledge, let us now turn to examine the relationship between Zelos and Zeus.  
 
 
Zelos and Zeus 
What does it mean for Zeus to possess Zelos? It is pertinent to remember García-
Ramón’s observation that there are many epithets for Zeus based around the idea of 
vengeance or revenge, and the association drawn between Zētēr and zēlos. The fact 
that Zelos ultimately ends up in the Theogony as an attendant of Zeus – the god who 
overthrew his father Kronos and the Titans – is therefore, etymologically speaking, 
unsurprising.  
 
Given what we now understand of the meanings of the word, we can see that Zelos’ 
allyship to Zeus is testament to the fact that Zeus wanted something for himself and 
resented another possessing it – he resented his father’s possession of authority, and 
wanted it for himself. Possessing Zelos gave him the spur to do this. But Zeus did not 
                                                
228 García-Ramón (1999: 80-81).  
229 García-Ramón also more tentatively groups zēmia and ζηµιόω (zēmioō, ‘cause loss, punish’) with 
zēlos, zēteō and Zētēr based on the semantic overlap between this cluster of words, and traces them to a 
common root of  *ieh2-, ‘search, enquire’ (1999: 79-81). 
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just gain power for himself; by gaining Zelos as an ally in the Titanomachy, he also 
deprived the Titans of it. He was in an unenviable position of inferiority, and gained 
an enviable position of superiority.  
 
What then, do we make of Zeus’ possession of Zelos? What does it mean for Zeus to 
have Envy? Does it mean that he alone experiences envy? Or is it precisely the 
opposite - will it make others envy him, or attempt to rival him, or emulate him? 
 
If Zeus is experiencing envy himself, then who is it that he could envy? If we take the 
meaning of zēlos as excluding phthonos, the question is absurd. However, 
incorporating phthonos allows us to understand Zeus’ envy as him guarding 
something ‘jealously’, begrudging anyone else the possession of it. Compare the 
phthonos theōn – ‘the envy of the gods’, in which a god can ‘envy’ a mortal due to 
‘the possible loss of what the god already possesses and is reluctant to share with 
others of lower status, since the very act of sharing itself represents a reduction in 
privilege’.230 In this instance, envy is ‘a wish to retain exclusively to themselves 
something which the mortal who threatens to rival the gods stands to acquire and not 
to lose’.231 It is obvious, then, why Zeus experiences envy – his envy is in jealously 
guarding those qualities he has acquired which sustain his rulership and position of 
power.  
 
But is Zeus also envious in another sense? Are there things which others possess that 
he desires for himself? After his victory in the Titanomachy, Zeus could be said to be 
envious of many figures, such as his first wives, Metis (whose potential to produce 
offspring greater than Zeus makes her a threat), or Themis (who bears him daughters 
essential to the ordering of his universe, such as Dike and the Fates), amongst others. 
Although he has defeated his father, he must still go about consolidating his power, 
acquiring the qualities which he needs to cement his position, including Styx and her 
children. But Hesiod’s zēlos also contains the concept of wanting to deprive others of 
something. In having Zelos, Zeus deprives others of access to the envy needed to spur 
them to rival him. This is certainly a practical step for a dictatorship, but not a 
particularly benevolent one.  
                                                
230 Walcot (1978: 22).  




Thus we can see Zeus’ possession of envy as simultaneously his desire to deprive 
others of something, and the very thing he must deprive them of. Rather than being 
passively experienced, zēlos is a motivation for action. Zelos is an external force, 
inflicting zēlos upon whom he visits. To control Zelos is to control who can 
experience it.  
 
But zēlos is also intrinsically the quality of being enviable – if one is to experience 
zēlos, there must be something for it to be experienced towards: something superior, 
better, worth possessing. To possess Zelos is to be the most enviable – the most 
powerful (for if someone else were the most powerful, they would also be the most 
enviable). To be enviable is to invite a rivalry between oneself and others who would 
now seek that power. Zeus is the one towards whom others will now direct their envy; 
he is the one they will attempt to overthrow. Zelos is the dangerous consequence of 
being successful – others will want to own what their rival has for themselves, and to 
deprive the rival of it. It is unsurprising then, that after Zeus awards himself such 
honours, he should immediately have to defend himself from a new threat: he has 
made himself enviable, and is subsequently attacked by Typhoeus, and finds himself 
in rivalry with Prometheus.  
 
There is a seemingly obvious contradiction between the two readings above: surely 
the possession of Zelos cannot simultaneously make others envy Zeus, and prevent 
them from envying him, and evoke envy in Zeus himself? This contradictory 
ambiguity is not unique to the case of Zelos – we have only to think of the problems 
Pandora’s sealing of elpis (hope) in the jar has caused modern interpreters; or the 
confusion caused by the description of Tartaros; or the stories of the races of men and 
of Prometheus, which both seek to explain the same phenomena – namely, the change 
in the relationship between gods and men. We can instead then, return to the advice 
Johnson gives for attempting to interpret the Tartaros passage, and treat these two 
ideas – of zēlos causing envy and zēlos preventing envy as ‘multiple representations 
of the same underlying reality’.232 Perhaps these contradictions simply underline the 
dual nature of this emotion: its ability to be both useful and dangerous, the possession 
                                                
232 Johnson (1999: 11).  
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of it always fraught with difficulties to which no simple solution can be applied. 
 
Like his mother, then, we see Zelos as an intrinsically dangerous and useful tool. He 
is a quality that Zeus must possess in order to be truly supreme, and which no one else 
can possess, but doing so invites the rivalry of others, raising dangerous opponents 
who threaten that supremacy. But to prevent others having access to zēlos it is to lose 
that enviable quality which indicates supremacy.  
 
It should be noted that this ‘conundrum’ applies even if one is committed to a solely 
positive reading of zēlos as ‘emulation’. If Zeus possesses emulation in order to make 
himself one whom others should emulate, then he invites other people to aspire to his 
position – a troublesome invitation when you are the leader, and have achieved that 
position through defeating your father in physical combat, and locking him and his 
allies in Tartaros. But if Zeus possesses emulation in order to prevent others 
experiencing it and to experience it only himself, this would mean that Zeus has 
deprived everyone of that which Hesiod represents as key motivation to better 
themselves. Zelos is dangerous, but necessary. 
 
 
Zelos and Styx 
Having examined the connection between Zeus and Zelos, we must also examine the 
connection between Zelos and the figure in whose company Zelos previously dwelt: 
Styx. The concepts of punishment and vengeance implicit in the etymology of zēlos 
also highlight a conceptual connection between envy and hatred in terms of Styx’s 
role as oath: the broken oath must be avenged; the foreswearer must be punished (and 
halted). But this is not simply vengeance on the part of the oath that was broken. If we 
return to the idea of zēlos as meaning both wanting something for oneself, and 
wanting to deprive the other of it, and couple this with the fact that it shares its 
etymological root with zēmioō (‘cause loss, punish’), then it is easy to understand how 
for Hesiod zēlos could be a desire to punish others because they have something you 
do not – to make them more like you; or a desire to obtain for yourself what someone 
else has – to make yourself more like them; or both, at the same time. Being the most 
enviable is intrinsic to being victorious, and thus victory can also be seen as both an 




Through this we can also read the punishment of the Styx oath as being an 
opportunity for Styx to both deprive a god of what she herself was deprived of, and to 
claim the honours for herself by actively fulfilling her role in the newly ordered 
hierarchy of Zeus. Thus the punishment inflicted by Styx is simultaneously a 
punishment for breaking an oath, and an act of revenge for depriving her of honours 
in the past, an act of pulling herself up to their honoured positions, and an act of 
dragging the offending god down to her previous position. Thus the punishment for 
breaking the Great Oath, an action that makes one the target of hate, is an enaction by 
Styx of her envy and emulation, of zēlos. Her punishment is one of confinement.  
 
We can also apply to Styx the reading in which the possession of Zelos makes one a 
target of envy: when Zeus grants Styx and her children ‘honours’ by removing the 
children from the halls of their mother and placing them eternally by his side, this is 
an act of envy. Styx possessed Zelos, and thus, despite her lack of honours, was 
intrinsically enviable (we shall discuss further why this should be so after we have 
examined Nike). Zeus, in ‘rewarding’ her for her support, acted on a feeling of envy, 
took this quality from her and claimed it for himself. His honouring of Styx’s children 
is done in such a way as to further his own ends, increase his own honours, and make 
himself more enviable. In doing so he deprives Styx of the possession of zēlos – the 
thing which made her a threat.   
 
Finally, we must now consider the relationship between Styx and Zelos in terms of 
cause and effect. Does it appear that zēlos is a manifestation of hate – an effect of it, 
or something which causes hate? Does envying someone make you hate them, or does 
hating someone mean you desire to deprive them of things and punish them? Just as 
our examination of Horkos revealed that an oath can be both something which causes 
strife, and something which is caused by strife, this bi-directional model is equally 
applicable to Zelos and Styx: Hate gave birth to Envy – it causes envy, but envy also 
causes hatred. If Zeus physically took Zelos from Styx because he coveted the child, 
then that envy was ultimately caused by Styx. Hatred is the driving force behind the 
enaction of envy, and envy is one of the ways in which hatred can manifest. But Zeus’ 
possession of Zelos will cause him to be simultaneously envied and hated. It is Envy 
who specifies the targets of hatred, and Zelos will now cause that hatred to be directed 
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towards Zeus.  
 
Indeed, Typhoeus’ assault, coming immediately after the Titanomachy and Zeus’ 
ownership of Zelos, demonstrates the dangerous nature of possessing Zelos, and the 
inextricable connection between hatred and envy. Envy directs Typhoeus’ hatred 
towards Zeus. The enacting of envious desires – to gain, and to deprive, is produced 
by hatred.  
 
In the Works and Days, the stugerōpēs, ‘hateful staring’ Zelos in the final age of man 
presents an example where envy manifests hatred as a physical quality. Zelos 
provides a physical form, created by Styx herself, through which hatred can see. Zelos 
literally directs the gaze of hatred towards the envied targets. Thomas Rakoczy 
suggests that Zelos’ stare is the first clear indication in literature of the ‘Evil Eye’ – 
the concept that a malicious stare from another can cause actual harm to the victim.233 
Padel notes that, as well as being receptacles for information about the world around 
us, ‘eyes are an outward-flowing channel for what is inside: soul, mind, feelings. 
Emotion stream from them.’234 Zelos’ hateful gaze does not just make visible the 
hatred he is experiencing, witnessing his hatred can in and of itself be harmful to the 
viewer.   
 
Approaches, then, that focus only on the mono-directionality of genealogical ancestry 
as a model for causation ignore the complexities of Hesiod’s familial relationships. 
Hatred and envy can cause each other, be caused by each other, and affect the 
manifestation of each other. Envy provides a conduit for the manifestation of hatred – 
a conduit which is created by hatred in order to be able to manifest.  
 
To our script of hatred we can therefore add that it can cause zēlos and be caused by 
zēlos. This manifestation of hatred is one which both seeks to possess, and seeks to 
deprive. It is a desire to hold on to something so that others may not have it. It 
restricts others’ access to resources, and power. 
 
                                                
233 Rakoczy (1996: 53-54). 





Despite the fact that Nike is, in contemporary times, undoubtedly the most well 
known deity of the four that Hesiod names as the children of Styx, her presence in our 
surviving literary sources is surprisingly scarce. She is absent, for instance, from the 
Iliad (as are all the children of Styx). She does not, as her siblings Kratos and Bie do, 
appear in any extant tragedies. She is most well known through her Athenocentric 
form of Athena Nike, and through artistic representations of her on vases, friezes and 
in sculpture. Although much has been written concerning the archaeology, 
iconography, artistic representations, and priestesses of the temple of Athena Nike in 
Athens,235 little has been written about the goddess Nike from a literary, theoretical, 
or mythic perspective. Indeed, Lloyd Daly states that ‘Nike has no myth and no cult, 
and so is not a god in the technical sense at least.’ Daly further says of her appearance 
in Hesiod that, ‘Such Hesiodic systematization cannot pass for myth.’236 In the 
absence of a detailed discussion of what exactly would constitute myth, and why this 
distinction should matter, such comments are unhelpful; regardless of whether her 
presence in the Theogony passes as myth, her presence and function must still be 
accounted for and examined in detail.   
 
The investigation of Nike/nikē shall first examine the description of her given in verse 
384 before turning to look for potential clues in the etymology of the word and in 
related words. Following this, I will examine the instances of nikē occurring in the 
text of the Theogony. This will necessitate a lengthy discussion of one instance in 
particular, when nikē is associated with Hekate. Understanding this connection will be 
highly fruitful, not just in allowing us to fully understand the nature of nikē, but also 




Of the four children of Styx, Nike is the only one for whom we are given any physical 
detail – a single word: καλλίσφυρος (kallisphuros) – ‘beautiful ankled’. Since the 
details of the children of Styx are so sparse, we must pay scrupulous attention to 
                                                
235 See Mark (1993); Knell (1997); Lougovaya-Ast (2006); & Stewart (2016).  
236 Daly (1953: 1124). 
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every scrap we are given and what they might tell us about the objects of our study. 
Thus, I turn now to Nike’s ankles, in the hope that they might provide some 
synecdochical clues. 
 
Nike is not the only figure within the Theogony to whom the adjective kallisphuros is 
applied: kallisphuros is also used twice of Alkmene (526, 951) and once of Klymene 
(507) – a sister of Styx named earlier in the catalogue of Okeanos’ daughters. The 
daughters of Okeanos are also collectively described as τανύσφυρος (tanusphoros) – 
‘with long taper ankles’ [364]. As well as kallisphuros and tanusphoros, εὔσφυρος 
(eusphoros), ‘beautiful ankles’, also occurs: it is used of Medea, the daughter of 
Aeetes and Idyia – another of Styx’s sisters (961).  
 
Mentions of ankles are not uncommon in Greek literature and myth. In the case of 
men, ankles are often mentioned in reference to some sort of weakness or anomaly in 
the lower limb (cf. Hephaistos, Oedipus, Talos, Philoktetes), which itself is often 
linked to the idea of abnormality surrounding procreation.237 In the case of women, 
mentions of beautiful or thin ankles are often used, along with such descriptors as 
‘white armed’, as general indicators of beauty.238 More particularly, in relation to 
epic, Daniel Levine suggests that ‘most epic references to beautiful-ankled females 
involve their sexual connections with men.’239 For Levine, this sexual connection 
need not be that of the literal sexual act – it is enough for the daughter resulting from 
the union to be described as having beautiful ankles. Nike’s ankles, then, could be 
mentioned, not to describe herself, but because she is the result of the union of Styx 
and Pallas, just as, Levine argues, Medea’s ankles are mentioned because they relate 
to the description of how her mother, Idyia, was subdued by golden Aphrodite and 
bore Medea through copulation with Aeetes (961-62).240 But in the case of Medea, the 
word order is such that Medea and her beautiful ankles are placed directly next to the 
act of copulation (Μήδειαν ἐύσφυρον ἐν φιλότητι [961]), whereas in the case of Nike, 
                                                
237 Note that deformed children in general were often associated with sterility. See Ogden (1997), esp. 
16-17, 32, and 35-36 for a discussion of the link between deformity of the lower limbs and procreation. 
The most (in)famous discussion of this is, of course, that which is found in Lévi-Strauss’ 
Anthropologie structurale (1958). 
238 Besides those ankle-related adjectives already discussed above, see also: χλιδανόσφυρος ‘with 
delicate ankles’, and ἁβρόσφυρος ‘with delicate ankles’, which appear in other ancient authors. Note 
too that Hesiod describes Aphrodite’s ‘slender feet’ (ποσσὶν ῥαδινοῖσιν [Th. 195]).  
239 Levine (2005: 56).  
240 Levine (2005: 56). 
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Zelos is placed between her and the intermingling of her parents (Στὺξ δ᾽ ἔτεκ᾽ 
Ὠκεανοῦ θυγάτηρ Πάλλαντι µιγεῖσα | Ζῆλον καὶ Νίκην καλλίσφυρον). The 
connection is weaker in this instance, therefore, and does not make a satisfactory 
explanation.241 
 
Peter Wilson, though occasionally misinterpreting the ancient sources, suggests an 
interesting possibility that the reference to Nike’s beautiful ankles is part of a wider 
tradition relating to the establishing of a victory song and dance. The victory song and 
dance become a sign of closure – a clean and definite end to a conflict – and Nike’s 
role, ‘put simply, is to bring a vision of beauty and transcendence to those areas of 
mortal life – and there are many in the Greek world – where her brothers [Wilson 
mistakes Bie as male] are active: Violence, Supremacy, and ‘Spur to Emulation’.’242 
Whilst the proposition is an interesting one, it holds more weight when considered as 
part of a wider tradition. There is no suggestion in Hesiod of Nike dancing or being 
involved with songs, despite the fact that there is ample opportunity for Hesiod to 
have mentioned this had he chosen to. Her ankles alone cannot be enough to imply 
this, given that she is not the only female whose ankles are mentioned.  
 
Wilson’s also commits a conceptual slip in treating Nike as somehow categorically 
separate from her siblings: rivalry, force, and violence, are taken as the by-products of 
hatred, or manifestations of hatred that lend themselves to the pursuit of a goal, with 
victory being that goal – the thing which hatred seeks, that which resolves the rivalry 
and ends the use of force and violence, and terminates the initial hatred. Indeed, to a 
contemporary reader this is the obvious interpretation, but this is to put the cart before 
the horse. If we wish to interpret Nike this way, we must look to provide evidence for 
it. The fact that Hesiod lists Nike as the second child of Styx, rather than the last, does 
not bode favourably for such an interpretation. Without any textual justification to 
treat them differently, the more natural approach is to consider them under the same 
light: either we should consider all of the children of Styx as things which hatred 
produces, all as things which hatred seeks, or, as we have seen with Zelos, consider 
them all as things which both causes and are caused by hatred. This does not mean we 
                                                
241 Levine does make clear that they are not claiming that all ankles imply a sexual element, and even 
gives the listing of the Okeanids as an example of this. (2005: 57). 
242 Wilson (2007: 258-59).  
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cannot investigate causal relationships between the children themselves, but without 
good textual reason to consider nikē only as the end result, we must also accept that 
nikē could potentially also be a cause of zēlos, kratos, and biē. Indeed, the idea that a 
victor becomes the subject of the zēlos of others ties in precisely with what we have 
seen of Zelos, and Zeus’ victory in the Titanomachy is a necessary pre-requisite of his 
subsequent violent clash with Typhoeus. 
 
What then, do we make of Nike’s ankles? I suggest that it may be of significance that 
with the exception of Alkmene, for whom no parentage is given, all the figures whose 
ankles are described are among the daughters and granddaughters of Okeanos. In the 
case of Styx, Idyia and Klymene, their connection to Okeanos is emphasised each 
time a mention of ankles occurs: they are reiterated as daughters of Okeanos just as 
their copulative mate and pretty-ankled offspring are listed. And, as previously 
mentioned, all of the daughters of Okeanos – even those who remain unnamed – are 
described as tanusphoros. I would suggest, then, that Nike’s ankles are mentioned not 
in relation to her mother’s identity as oath, or hatred, but in relation to her mother’s 
identity as a daughter of Okeanos. Why this should be is certainly an intriguing 
question, but beyond the scope of this current exploration.  
 
Etymology of Nikē  
Nike’s relation to Styx as hatred or oath thus far remains enigmatic. Could the 
etymology of her name reveal anything of use to us? It is unlikely. The etymology of 
her name remains uncertain. It is scarce in ancient etymologies. The earliest 
etymological lexicon that contains an entry for nikē is the Etymologicum Gudianum, 
dated to the 10th century CE, itself a compilation of earlier lexica. What earlier 
sources the Et. Gud. may have derived its definitions for nikē from remains unknown, 
but it lists the word twice, with varying etymologies. In the first entry, νίκη is derived 
from two separate words. The first is δοτικήν (dotikēn), meaning ‘willingly giving’, 
and the second is from the dative form of εἷς (ἑνί, heni), meaning ‘one’, and ἵκω 
(hikō), ‘I come/reach/arrive’. In the second entry we again find the derivation from 
heni, but instead of hikō, we find εἴκω (eikō) – ‘give way, retire, yield’ (Nu, p. 409: 
37-42).243 
                                                




Delightfully, then, we find an opposition – a conflict – even in the ancient attempts to 
give the word an etymology. It seems logical to suppose that the derivation from ἑνί 
alludes to the idea that victory can belong to one side only, and in hikō and eikō we 
find the oppositionary ideas of advance and retreat, of reaching for something and of 
yielding something. This highlights the idea of the transference of something from 
one side to another (from Styx to Zeus, perhaps?), and between them acknowledge 
both sides of the conflict – both the winner, and the loser. An ambiguity, then, is 
maintained in the proffering of these two etymologies, underlining that victory 
requires not just a winner, but also a loser. 
 
For contemporary etymologists, the hope of an etymological connection between νίκη 
and νεῖκος (neikos ‘strife’) has been tantalising, but as alluring as these phonetic 
connections are, they have been soundly rejected by most modern etymologists, and 
no convincing alternatives have been proposed.244 
 
Despite the lack of etymological understanding, a compound form of nikē, φιλονικία, 
(philonikia, ‘love of victory’), is, in Beekes’ words, ‘frequently associated with 
neikos’. Indeed, the phenomenon of iotacism in later antiquity introduced philoneikia 
a variant spelling of philonekos, and the similarity of this form with neikos has led 
readers of ancient Greek to also treat philoneikia as a potentially separate word: ‘love 
of victory’ or, supposedly, ‘love of strife’. But as Phillip Stadter points out, ‘the 
compound adjective with neikos, strife, would be *philoneikēs and the noun 
*philoneikeia, neither of which are supported by the evidence.’ The fact that 
philon(e)ikia is so frequently associated with neikos is not proof of the viability of a 
meaning of ‘love of strife’ in contexts where philoneikia seems associated with 
neikos, but instead reveals the underlying understanding of scholars that philonikia, 
‘love of victory’ can be used in a negative sense.245  
 
Stadter contends that neikos is never associated with philon(e)ikia, but that the word 
has both positive and negative connotations regardless. This is a rather curious 
                                                
244 Frisk notes the absence of a convincing etymology, but still documents the possibility of a 
derivation from neikos (1970: 320-21), a possibility which Chantraine classifies as unlikely (1999: 754-
55). Beekes describes the connection as ‘semantically gratuitous’ (2010: 1022). 
245 Stadter (2014: 273). 
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position, given that the argument presented is based in part on the idea that Pindar and 
Thucydides, use philonikos ‘to refer to contentiousness or hostility’, despite the fact 
that they were writing before the confusion caused by the iotacism.246 This ‘negative’ 
usage closely relates nikē to the ideas of feuding and strife represented by neikos. 
Regardless, Stadter is still right to conclude that ‘they clearly saw love of victory as 
being on occasion undesirable’.247  
 
Stadter also points to clearly negative uses of the word as far back as the mid 6th – 
mid 5th century BCE with the work of Simonides (fr. 541 = P.Oxy 2432), where 
philonikia is directly contrasted with being good and living a virtuous life. Victory, or 
the love of victory, is not always a good thing. Stadter also highlights its usage in 
Pindar: 
 
οὔτε δύσηρις ἐὼν οὔτ᾽ ὦν φιλόνικος ἄγαν,  
καὶ µέγαν ὅρκον ὀµόσσαις τοῦτό γέ οἱ σαφέως  
µαρτυρήσω  
      (Olympian 6.19-21) 
 
I, who am not prone to quarrel, nor too fond of victory, 
having sworn a great oath, will clearly  
bear witness for him… 
 
Here Pindar associates the love of victory with a disposition for quarrelling (δύσηρις, 
dusēris). To disagree with someone is to assert the superiority of one’s own view or 
narrative – to trump what the other has said with one’s own account: to disagree is to 
try and claim victory over the other. To love victory is equivalent to loving the strife 
and quarrels without which victory would be impossible. It is also impossible to fully 
separate the love of victory from victory itself. If it is sometimes problematic to love 
victory, this is because victory itself is not intrinsically good. This is the same kind of 
relationship that we have seen with zēlos: acting on it can be productive and 
praiseworthy, but it can also be destructive and blameworthy.  
 
Esther Eidinow’s analysis of phthonos in Pindar highlights the importance of the 
                                                
246 Stadter (2014: 273). The ‘Hellenistic sound shift’ to which he refers is the phenomenon of iotacism, 
in which the pronunciation of certain vowels changed over time, being pronounced more and more like 
iota.    
247 Stadter (2014: 273).  
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connection between phthonos and victory, describing it as an ‘almost symbiotic 
phenomenon’, which in turn means envy ‘could be said to play a natural and even 
necessary role’ in acknowledging victory.248 Eidinow argues that ‘phthonos was part 
of the expected and accepted emotional reaction to a victorious or prosperous 
individual who vaunted his success’.249 This symbiotic relationship between envy and 
victory demonstrated in Pindar finds its equivalent in Hesiod’s representation of Envy 
and Nike as siblings. They come from, and are part of, the same thing. Where victory 
is, so is envy.   
 
It is interesting to note that in Olympian 6 Pindar also talks about swearing a ‘great 
oath’ (µέγαν ὅρκον), in relation not just to quarrel (which I have mentioned 
previously: see p. 62), but to victory. Being prepared or able to swear an oath, being 
sure enough of one’s position as to be willing to invoke a conditional curse upon 
oneself is, in this instance, a pivotal component of victory. Equally, the breaking of an 
oath results in punishment – in defeat. In this instance, then, the dubious nature of 
oaths and the dubious nature of victory mirror each other – victory should not always 
be sought, oaths should not always be sworn. Victory sought by the swearing of false 
oaths will ultimately result in defeat.250 
 
The penalty for breaking a Styx-oath can also be seen both as the physical punishment 
that a god must undergo (zēlos), and also as a defeat (nikē). All are acts of 
deprivation. Like the defeated Titans punished by confinement within Tartaros, the 
perjuring god is entrapped by their oath, forced to spend a year lying on a bed, 
covered by a deep sleep (κῶµα καλύπτει, kōma kaluptei [798]), forced into a position 
of helplessness and submission, defeated, and punished by the power of oath.  
 
This ties in with what we have already seen in relation to hatred, oath, and zēlos. Like 
the punishment for breaking an oath, and the desire to deprive (zēlos), nikē is a 
                                                
248 Eidinow (2015: 105). 
249 Eidinow (2015: 124).  
250 Eidinow (2015: 103-24) notes some further details of Pindar’s poetry in relation to envy (phthonos, 
in Pindar), and victory which are pertinent. Pindar is concerned with attempting to negotiate the 
negative effect that victory might have, through the phthonos of others, on the victor. Eidinow sees 
phthonos in Pindar as playing ‘a natural, and even necessary role’ Pindar’s goal is to encourage the 
victor to behave appropriately so as to gain ‘unbegrudging praise’ (p. 105) rather than being the target 




manifestation of hatred. Further, the inseparability of victory from defeat and 
punishment reveals that the punishment of the perjurer is a form of victory - a victory 
claimed through the maintenance of the ordered universe Zeus has created. But the 
inseparability of victory and defeat makes nikē a cause of hatred. It risks achieving 
nothing more than inverting the subject and target of zēlos, perpetuating a dangerous 
cycle of hatred. Thus far then, we have seen that outside of Hesiod, victory has an 
ambiguous quality. This quality fits well with what we have seen of the nature of Styx 
and Zelos, and what was suggested by arideiketa.  
 
 
Nike in the Works and Days 
Nikē is mentioned twice in the Works and Days, once in verse 211, and once in verse 
657. In verse 211 it appears in the fable of the hawk and the nightingale. We shall 
discuss this instance later, when we examine the fable of the hawk and the nightingale 
in greater depth in relation to biē. In verse 657 Hesiod refers to his own victory: 
 
ἔνθα δ᾽ ἐγὼν ἐπ᾽ ἄεθλα δαΐφρονος Ἀµφιδάµαντος  
Χαλκίδα τ᾽ εἲς ἐπέρησα: τὰ δὲ προπεφραδµένα πολλὰ  [655] 
ἄεθλ᾽ ἔθεσαν παῖδες µεγαλήτορος: ἔνθα µέ φηµι  
ὕµνῳ νικήσαντα φέρειν τρίποδ᾽ ὠτώεντα.  
τὸν µὲν ἐγὼ Μούσῃς Ἑλικωνιάδεσσ᾽ ἀνέθηκα,  
ἔνθα µε τὸ πρῶτον λιγυρῆς ἐπέβησαν ἀοιδῆς. 
τόσσον τοι νηῶν γε πεπείρηµαι πολυγόµφων:    [660] 
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὣς ἐρέω Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο:  
Μοῦσαι γάρ µ᾽ ἐδίδαξαν ἀθέσφατον ὕµνον ἀείδειν. 
       (654-62) 
There I crossed over to Chalkis 
   for the games held in honour 
of gallant Amphidamas, for the  
   sons of this great-hearted 
man had set out many chosen prizes. There, 
   I can claim,  
I won the contest with a song 
   and took off an eared tripod; 
and this I set up as an offering  
   to the Muses of Helikon, 
where they first made me a master 
   of melodious singing.  
This is all of my experience with intricately bolted 
ships, but I can still tell you the thought, 
   which is of aegis-bearing  
Zeus, for the Muses have taught me to sing 
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   immortal poetry.  
 
In the broader context of this passage, Hesiod begins to give Perses some advice on 
seafaring, but quickly turns to justifying to Perses why he should listen to him 
specifically on the issue of seafaring, despite not being skilled in seafaring. He has not 
sailed on the open sea, but he has caught two boats on a very specific journey: Hesiod 
boards ships in order to reach Chalkis, and the games of Amphidamas. There he wins 
the prize, and dedicates it to the Muses who first taught him song. This, he briefly 
tells us, is the justification for his authority on the issue of seafaring. His prize allows 
him to sing the will of Zeus. He then finally returns to giving advice on the topic.  
 
As noted by Detienne, in being trained to remember, a poet has particular access to 
the truth (alētheia) – a truth that is inextricably linked to memory. In singing the 
memories the Muse grants access to, the poet manifests them as truth. His act of 
singing is itself an act of creation.251 The Muses grant Hesiod the power of song, and 
he proves he deserves to be a speaker of truth by winning the contest. His authority is 
granted by victory, and allows him to be able to manifest the reality of Zeus’ nikē and 
his ordered universe. In singing of the ordered universe, Hesiod is reinforcing Zeus’ 
order – Hesiod has lent his victory to Zeus and in return has now becomes a conduit 
for Zeus’ will. 
 
 
Nike and Nikē in the Theogony 
We now turn to investigate the Theogony in order to see whether there is evidence to 
confirm the idea of nikē we have formed so far. Luckily, Nike/nikē (and related 
forms) occurs more often than Zelos/zēlos. There are eight instances in total of nikē, 
or words that share a stem with nikē. These instances almost all occur in close 
proximity to kratos (or kartos)252 and/or biē – seven times out of eight, if we include 
when they are named as the children of Styx. Let us go through these occurrences 
individually. 
 
                                                
251 Detienne (1991: 35-52, see esp. 44-45). 
252 For the reader not wholly familiar with ancient Greek, it should be noted that kratos is frequently 
subject to metathesis, in which the position of the rho and alpha are transposed. Thus kratos and kartos 
are the same word.  
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In verse 73 Zeus is described as ‘having conquered’ (νικήσας, nikēsas),253 his father 
through kratos (κάρτει νικήσας πατέρα Κρόνον). The connection between kratos and 
nikē is emphasised by their placement next to each other. Later in verse 496 Hesiod 
again mentions Zeus’ victory over his father; this time it is described as having been 
obtained through biē (νικηθεὶς τέχνῃσι βίηφί τε παιδὸς ἑοῖο). Νικηθεὶς is an active 
participle form, thus once again emphasising nikē as an action – as the act of 
conquering, of obtaining victory, and the tool which is required for conquering is biē. 
The lack of an English equivalent verb for ‘victory’ leads to a difference in our 
conception of the word. For Hesiod, nikē is not just something which is sought, it is 
the act of obtaining it as well.   
 
In verses 627-31 nikē is mentioned with kratos in relation to the Titanomachy, nikē in 
Ge’s explanation of how the Hekatoncheires would help Zeus obtain victory, and 
kratos in the description of the battle Zeus seeks victory in:   
 
αὐτὴ γάρ σφιν ἅπαντα διηνεκέως κατέλεξε, 
σὺν κείνοις νίκην τε καὶ ἀγλαὸν εὖχος ἀρέσθαι.  
δηρὸν γὰρ µάρναντο πόνον θυµαλγέ᾽ ἔχοντες   [629] 
ἀντίον ἀλλήλοισι διὰ κρατερὰς ὑσµίνας,    [631] 
Τιτῆνές τε θεοὶ καὶ ὅσοι Κρόνου ἐξεγένοντο,   [630] 
 
For Gaia had told the gods the whole truth, 
   from the beginning, 
that with these Three victory would be won, 
  and glorious honour.  
For a long time now, the Titan gods 
  and those who were descended  
from Kronos had fought each other, 
  with heart-hurting, mighty battles, 
ranged in opposition 
  all through the hard encounters: 
…254 
 
First we hear of the necessity of the Hekatoncheires for obtaining victory, then we 
turn back to the κρατερὰς ὑσµίνας, (krateras huminas) – the krateras battles. Verses 
635-38 continue the description of that battle. After this we turn back to the 
                                                
253 A verb form of nikē.  
254 Adapted from Lattimore. Lattimore maintains the unaltered verse ordering, which I have kept, but I 
have altered the wording to keep ‘mighty’ next to ‘battles’, as it is in the Greek, and changed the 
translations to be more consistent with the language used elsewhere.  
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Hekatoncheires as they are addressed by Zeus after being fed nectar and ambrosia:  
 
“κέκλυτέ µευ, Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀγλαὰ τέκνα,  
ὄφρ᾽ εἴπω τά µε θυµὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι κελεύει.    [645] 
ἤδη γὰρ µάλα δηρὸν ἐναντίοι ἀλλήλοισι 
νίκης καὶ κάρτεος πέρι µαρνάµεθ᾽ ἤµατα πάντα  
Τιτῆνές τε θεοὶ καὶ ὅσοι Κρόνου ἐκγενόµεσθα.  
ὑµεῖς δὲ µεγάλην τε βίην καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους 
φαίνετε Τιτήνεσσιν ἐναντίον ἐν δαῒ λυγρῇ,   [650] 
… 
       (644-50) 
 
“Hear me, O shining children 
   of Ouranos and Gaia 
while I speak out what the heart 
   in my breast commands me.  
All our days the Titan gods and we, 
   who were born 
of Kronos, have been fighting 
   a long time now, in opposed 
battle, for the sake of victory and power. 
   Now, therefore, 
show yourselves against the Titans 
    in the grim encounter, 
and show the greatness of your strength, 
   your hands irresistible; 
… 
 
Zeus tells them what he has been seeking in the battle – nikē and kratos – and asks 
them show forth their µεγάλην βίην (megalēn biēn), their great biē and their 
invincible hands. It is the demonstrating of their biē in the service of Zeus’ cause that 
will help Zeus obtain nikē (and Nike).    
 
Narratively, the final instance of nikē is again in relation to the Hekatoncheires’ 
involvement in the Titanomachy, as they enact the request of Zeus from 647-9: 
 
Οἳ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐνὶ πρώτοισι µάχην δριµεῖαν ἔγειραν,  
Κόττος τε Βριάρεώς τε Γύγης τ᾽ ἄατος πολέµοιο,   [715] 
οἵ ῥα τριηκοσίας πέτρας στιβαρέων ἀπὸ χειρῶν  
πέµπον ἐπασσυτέρας, κατὰ δ᾽ ἐσκίασαν βελέεσσι  
Τιτῆνας. καὶ τοὺς µὲν ὑπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης  
πέµψαν καὶ δεσµοῖσιν ἐν ἀργαλέοισιν ἔδησαν,  
νικήσαντες χερσὶν ὑπερθύµους περ ἐόντας,  
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τόσσον ἔνερθ᾽ ὑπὸ γῆς ὅσον οὐρανός ἐστ᾽ ἀπὸ γαίης· [720] 
       (713-20) 255 
 
      But now the Three, Kottos and Briareos 
   and Gyes, 
insatiate of battle, stirred 
   the grim fighting in the foremost, 
for from their powerful hands they volleyed 
   three hundred boulders 
one after another, and their missile flights 
   overwhelmed the Titans 
in darkness, and these they drove 
   underneath the wide-wayed 
earth, and fastened them there  
   in painful bondage, for now they  
had conquered the Titan gods with their hands,  
   for all their high hearts.  
They drove them as far underground 
   as earth is distant from heaven.256  
 
Νικήσαντες (nikēsantes) is again a participle form of the verb, as in verse 73. It refers 
to the Hekatoncheires’ conquering of the Titans. But the focus of the poem does not 
shift immediately to the prizes for the victors. First, we are told the fate of the 
conquered, launching us into the Tartography. In fact, the Tartography even includes 
mention of the Hekatoncheires, without mentioning their prize. At the end of the 
Tartography comes the description of the Styx oath; it is only after this, in verse 816, 
nearly a hundred verses later, that any type of reward for the Hekatoncheires is 
mentioned:  
 
αὐτὰρ ἐρισµαράγοιο Διὸς κλειτοὶ ἐπίκουροι 
δώµατα ναιετάουσιν ἐπ᾽ Ὠκεανοῖο θεµέθλοις,  
Κόττος τ᾽ ἠδὲ Γύης· Βριάρεών γε µὲν ἠὺν ἐόντα  
γαµβρὸν ἑὸν ποίησε βαρύκτυπος Ἐννοσίγαιος,  
δῶκε δὲ Κυµοπόλειαν ὀπυίειν, θυγατέρα ἥν. 
      (815-19) 
 
                                                
255 Note that krateras appears in verse 712, I have not counted this both because it is a dubious claim of 
‘close’ proximity, and because it is contextually separated – the section of the poem which turns its 
attention to the involvement of the Hekatoncheires in the battle begins at verse 713.  
256 Adapted from Lattimore to keep the translation of nikē related words consistent.  
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only the glorious helpers of Zeus, 
   the loud-crashing, 
and settled in houses along the foundations 
   of the Ocean: 
Kottos and Gyes, that is; 
   but of strong-grown Briareos 
the deep-stroking shaker of the Earth, 
   Poseidon, made 
a son-in-law, and married him to Kymopoleia,  
   his daughter.  
 
These verses end the sequence of the consequences of conquering: first the fate of the 
conquered is detailed, then we move through to the oath that establishes the rule of 
awarding honours, and only then can a prize be awarded, and the victory complete. 
The description of the defeat is an intrinsic part of the consequences of victory.   
 
 This is not to claim that nikē is ever used to mean ‘defeat’, but that the concept of 
nikē itself includes the understanding that there cannot be nikē without there also 
being defeat.  
 
This is the sole mention of nikē without either kratos or biē. But given that it is in 
relation to the Hekatoncheires, who, as we have just seen, are closely associated with 
kratos and biē, the connection is strongly implied. And yet, the Hekatoncheires do not 
obtain Nike for themselves. They fight under the leadership of Zeus, lending their 
kratos and biē to him. 
 
The noun form, representing the possession of nikē, appears only three times: once 
when she is named a child of Styx, and designated a permanent attendant of Zeus; 
once in verse 433 (which we will discuss momentarily); and once in verse 628, where 
Gaia tells Zeus that the Hekatoncheires are essential to him gaining victory. These 
two verses then, demonstrate the possession of Nike by both Styx and Zeus. The 
Hekatoncheires may conquer, but ultimately, only Zeus obtains the victory.  
 
It is notable in the above verses that this sequence – this prevailing over the oppressor 
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and then inflicting punishment on them – mirrors the idea of zēlos as both aspiring to 
obtain a superior position, and striving to deprive and punish. The maternal link 
enforces the conceptual link between Nike and Zelos: to act on zēlos is to strive to 
gain and deprive another of nikē; to conquer everyone is to become enviable; the 
victorious will always be a target of envy and must deal with the constant threat of 
possible rivals, and possible attempts to emulate them. Just as we have seen 
previously indicated by philonikia, nikē can be both good and bad.  
 
Given this, it is unsurprising that the above sequence with the Hekatoncheires 
matches that of Zeus, and of Styx as oath, which we have already discussed in relation 
to zēlos. The Hekatoncheires are in a position of lacking their due honours, just as 
Zeus and Styx are. Just as with Styx, their siding with Zeus allows them to prevail 
over their enemies and punish them in revenge. With the Hekatoncheires, it is the 
Titans whom they punish by binding in chains (just as they themselves were 
previously bound); with Styx, she punishes those who dishonour her by breaking their 
oath. A consequence of this is that in order to maintain Nike, Zeus must honour his 
oath to Styx. His position as ruler, as possessor of Nike, is dependent on him 
following his own laws and restrictions. Should he break them, Nike would return to 
her mother. Hatred is essential to maintaining a victorious position.  
 
Turning back to the appearance of nikē in the poem, the final two usages of nikē occur 
together, alongside both kratos and biē, in the Hymn to Hekate (chronologically after, 
but narratively before the Titanomachy). It is part of a description of the types of 
victory the goddess can bestow upon men: 
 
ἠδ᾽ ὁπότ᾽ ἐς πόλεµον φθισήνορα θωρήσσωνται 
ἀνέρες, ἔνθα θεὰ παραγίνεται οἷς κ᾽ ἐθέλῃσι 
νίκην προφρονέως ὀπάσαι καὶ κῦδος ὀρέξαι.      [433]   
ἐσθλὴ δ᾽ αὖθ᾽ ὁπότ᾽ ἄνδρες ἀεθλεύωσ᾽ ἐν ἀγῶνι,  [435] 
ἔνθα θεὰ καὶ τοῖς παραγίνεται ἠδ᾽ ὀνίνησιν,    
νικήσας δὲ βίῃ καὶ κάρτεϊ καλὸν ἄεθλον  
ῥεῖα φέρει χαίρων τε, τοκεῦσι δὲ κῦδος ὀπάζει·    
       (431-38) 
 
 
and when men put on their armour 
  to go to battle, where men 
are wasted, the goddess 
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  is readily there also to give out  
the victory and grant the glory  
   to whichever side she wishes. 
She is great, too,  
   where men contend in athletics,  
and there the goddess stands by those  
   whom she will, and assists them. 
When, conquering by force and strength, 
   he has won a fine prize,  
he lightly and gladly carries it home, 
   and brings glory to his parents.257  
 
First Hekate is described as granting victory (νίκην ὀπάσαι, nikēn opasai [433]) and 
glory (κῦδος ὀρέξαι, kudos orezai [433]) in war, and then as standing by 
(παραγίγνεται, paragignetai, [435]) and helping (ὀνίνησιν, oninēsin [435]) whom she 
will when men compete in games. In war she explicitly grants victory and glory, but 
is this the case in games? 
 
Certainly glory is explicitly granted (κῦδος ὀπάζει, kudos opazei). But most 
translations, as Lattimore’s does above, take the kudos opazei of verse 438 as 
meaning ‘he, the athlete, brings glory’. However, kudos opazei mirrors the kudos 
orexai of verse 433, where Hekate grants glory in games. It is not the athlete who 
brings glory to his parents: it is Hekate. Glory gained by one member of a family is 
shared by all, and Hekate is the one who makes this happen. If glory is granted to the 
athlete’s parents, it is because he himself has also been granted glory.  
 
Hekate, then, grants glory to the winner in both war and games, but is it also the case 
with victory? There is no explicit reference to the granting of victory. Instead, Hekate 
merely provides help. But what is the nature of this help? The qualities of the athlete 
that allow him to conquer are kratos and biē. This is the nature of Hekate’s help: 
providing kratos and biē. In providing the qualities that produce victory, Hekate also 
grants them that victory. The fact that in both instances Hekate grants glory alongside 
victory suggests that she is associated with a positive nikē alone.  
 
 
                                                
257 Adapted from Lattimore (who does not transpose any verses).  
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Nike and Hatred 
We must, of course, address what it means for Hekate to be able to dispense victory, 
but leaving this aside for the moment, several obvious points emerge from the 
catalogue of occurrences of nikē. Firstly, the frequency with which kratos and biē are 
mentioned alongside nikē implicitly reinforces the conceptual connection and 
interrelatedness of the qualities embodied in the children of Styx. Secondly, in terms 
of the personified Nike, there are two figures who physically possess her (in the sense 
that she dwells with them), one after the other: Styx, and Zeus. The possession of the 
physical manifestation of Nike underlines the importance of her connection to these 
figures. Why Zeus possesses Nike is self-evident, and we have already discussed the 
connection between victory and presiding over the Great Oath, but what is the 
connection between victory and hate? If we are not to assume that Nike should be 
treated differently to her siblings and taken as the resolution to hatred, then we must 
consider alternative interpretations of the relationship between hatred and victory.  
 
What a bidirectional genealogical reading of Styx and Nike presents us with is not the 
idea that hatred seeks victory, nor with the idea that victory is the resolution to hatred, 
but that hatred causes victory, and victory causes hatred. Just as we have seen with 
Zelos, Nike is a manifestation of hatred, and a cause of it. Hatred causes the desire to 
obtain and deprive, to triumph and to defeat. In conquering and obtaining an object 
one becomes enviable. In obtaining victory and the right to rule, one makes oneself 
the target of the hatred of those deprived of their enviable position. In triumphing and 
ruling, one makes oneself the target of the hatred of the defeated, of those who are 
now envious. 
 
Hatred is a strong force in conflict; it seeks violence and ostracism, while anger still 
allows the possibility of the cessation of violence, peaceful resolutions, and 
compromises.258 In motivating violence, hatred becomes a driving force that spurs 
people to victory. In the Iliad Achilles does not defeat Hektor until he has cause to 
hate him – until Hektor has deprived him of something by defeating Patroclus. His 
commitment to the war wavers because it is not his war; he has no reason to hate 
these men – they have never wronged him. They have never deprived him of anything 
                                                
258 Halperin (2008: 728-29). 
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(Il. I 152-56). In the Theogony, Zeus gains victory in the Titanomachy because Styx, 
hate, joins his side.  
 
One might wonder whether the difference between claiming that hatred causes victory 
and the idea that victory is the resolution to hatred is genuinely significant, but on the 
former model, there is no implication that hatred ceases once victory is achieved. 
Thus, even after defeating Hektor, Achilles’ hatred for him does not end, and instead 
causes him to abuse Hektor’s corpse for three days. In the same vein Zeus punishes 
his defeated foes perpetually – the continuous torture of Prometheus being an 
especially brutal example.  
 
 
Nike, Hekate, Styx 
Let us now turn to address the final figure associated with nikē: Hekate. While the 
connection of nikē with Styx and Zeus (and the Hekatoncheires, by association) is to 
be expected, the connection with Hekate is less obvious. Hekate is a goddess who, 
like Styx, belongs to an older order; unlike Styx, she is awarded extra honours on top 
of those she already possessed. The Hymn to Hekate follows immediately after the 
description of Styx and her children, and the honours bestowed on them. The 
proximity of the two, the similarity of their narratives, and the fact that Hekate comes 
to wield the power of one of the children of Styx, suggest that it is worth taking a 
moment to consider Hekate in more detail.  
 
There is still little consensus amongst scholars as to what to make of the ‘Hymn to 
Hekate’ (Th. 411-52), which has baffled due to its length and detail. Why should 
Hekate, unknown to other authors in the form Hesiod presents her, and otherwise a 
minor deity, be lavished with so many verses, and granted such extraordinary powers? 
Earlier scholars have argued that this passage is a later interpolation, some based on 
the unusual content of the material, others based on perceived linguistic or 
grammatical anomalies.259 The latter stance has been successfully argued against by 
West.260 Instead, West follows the arguments of Wolf Aly and Mazon who both 
                                                
259 Jacoby (1926: 158); Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1928: 131); Nilsson (1949: 204-5). 
260 West (1966: 278-79). Rudhardt adds the final nail to the coffin in posing the question ‘Si l’éloge 
D’Hecate était aussi aberrant qu’on le prétend dans le corps de la Theogonie, quel interpolateur aurait-
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suggest that the passage is indicative of a local private cult to which Hesiod 
belonged.261 The existence of such a cult would explain the broadness of the range of 
her powers and honours – as a local goddess, she must have the powers necessary to 
answer the prayers of her worshippers.262 To my mind Mark Griffith makes a succinct 
and convincing case against this reading: the lack of a statement of personal 
connection between poet and goddess and her omission from the proem, ‘which 
is specifically addressed to the glory of his patron – and local – deities’ is clearly a 
problem for the local cult argument.263  
 
In opposition to the localised approach, Gregory Nagy argues that Hekate’s presence 
is emphasised not because she is a local goddess, but because she is a Pan-Hellenic 
goddess.264 A third school of thought is that explanations should more rightly rely 
solely on interpreting the text of the Theogony itself, rather than on speculative extra-
textual history.265 My own stance is in line with those scholars who have argued that 
the passage fits in appropriately to the thematic and structural elements of the poem. 
 
Like Styx, Hekate is a goddess who is explicitly honoured by Zeus. Unlike Styx, 
Hekate is a goddess who had honours before choosing to side with Zeus in the 
Titanomachy.266 Let us remind ourselves of the exact promises in Zeus’ oath: 
 
ὣς γὰρ ἐβούλευσεν Στὺξ ἄφθιτος Ὠκεανίνη    [390] 
ἤµατι τῷ, ὅτε πάντας Ὀλύµπιος ἀστεροπητὴς  
ἀθανάτους ἐκάλεσσε θεοὺς ἐς µακρὸν Ὄλυµπον,  
εἶπε δ᾽, ὃς ἂν µετὰ εἷο θεῶν Τιτῆσι µάχοιτο,  
µή τιν᾽ ἀπορραίσειν γεράων, τιµὴν δὲ ἕκαστον  
ἑξέµεν, ἣν τὸ πάρος γε µετ᾽ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν  
τὸν δ᾽ ἔφαθ᾽, ὅστις ἄτιµος ὑπὸ Κρόνου ἠδ᾽ ἀγέραστος,  [395] 
                                                                                                                                      
il été assez stupide pour l’y insérer?’ (If the praise of Hecate in the body of the Theogony was as 
absurd as is asserted, what interpolator would have been stupid enough to insert it there?) (1993: 204). 
The current most authoritative editions of the text (Mazon 1928; West 1966; Solmsen et al. 1970) treat 
most of the verses as ‘authentic Hesiod’ with minimal bracketing (Mazon brackets only line 427; West 
brackets none, but does transpose several verses between 429 and 440; Solmsen et al. bracket 427 and 
450-52, and also transpose several lines).   
261 Aly (1913: 35 n. 3); Mazon (1928: 20-24).  
262 West (1966: 277-78). 
263 Griffith (1983: 51-52). 
264 Nagy (1982: 64). 
265 For thorough reviews of previous scholarship on the Hymn to Hekate, see Stoddard (2004: 7-14) 
and Tsagalis (2009: 135-37). 
266 Hesiod is not explicit that Hekate sides with Zeus, but it can be assumed from the fact that he 
maintains and increases her honours. 
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τιµῆς καὶ γεράων ἐπιβησέµεν, ἧ θέµις ἐστίν. 
       (390-96) 
 
For this was the will of Styx, 
   that Okeanid never-perishing, 
on the day when the Olympian flinger 
   of the lightning 
summoned all the immortal gods 
   to tall Olympos 
and said that any god who fought on his side 
   with the Titans 
should never be beaten out of his privilege,  
   but each should maintain 
the position he had before 
   among the immortals; he said, too, 
that the god who under Kronos 
   had gone without position or privilege 
should under him be raised to these, 
   according to justice.  
 
Hekate had pre-existing honours; Zeus’ promise to such figures is to maintain the 
honours they had before. But this is not what Zeus does. He goes above and beyond 
his oath and grants her more honours still: 
 
οὐδέ τί µιν Κρονίδης ἐβιήσατο οὐδέ τ᾽ ἀπηύρα  
ὅσσ᾽ ἔλαχεν Τιτῆσι µετὰ προτέροισι θεοῖσιν,  
ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς ἔπλετο δασµός·  
οὐδ᾽, ὅτι µουνογενής, ἧσσον θεὰ ἔµµορε τιµῆς,  
[καὶ γέρας ἐν γαίῃ τε καὶ οὐρανῷ ἠδὲ θαλάσσῃ,]  
ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι καὶ πολὺ µᾶλλον, ἐπεὶ Ζεὺς τίεται αὐτήν.  
      (423-8)267 
Nor did the son of Kronos use violence 
   toward her nor deprive her 
of the rights she had among the Titan gods 
   of the older generation 
but she holds her apportioned share 
   as formerly from the beginning, 
nor, because she is an only child,  
   does the goddess have the less honour, 
and a privileged place in the earth, 
   and in the sky, and the sea also; 
but as much as others and far more, 
                                                
267 Verse 427 is in all the manuscripts and in the papyrus that includes this passage. However, it is 
grammatically flawed. Some scholars have removed the verse; others transpose it to come before 426. I 
agree with Van Lennep (1843: 280) and West (1966: 285) that the most obvious solution is to amend 
the line to καὶ γεράων γαίῃ τε καὶ οὐρανῷ ἠδὲ θαλάσσῃ, rather than to transpose or discount the line.  
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   seeing that Zeus honours her.   
 
Zeus maintains Hekate’s pre-existing honours, though the exact nature of those 
honours is unclear – they are simply ‘the rights she had among the Titan gods’, and 
‘her apportioned share’. On top of this he grants her ‘a privileged place in the earth, // 
and in the sky, and the sea also’, and honours her ‘as much as others and far more.’ 
This is an extensive list of honours, and we may question why Zeus would so 
willingly grant her these – both because he does not need to, and because of the sheer 
extent of her honours, which put her in a position where she may arguably present a 
threat to Zeus.  
 
But, as we have already seen with Styx, Zeus cunningly grants honours that seem 
extensive, but which are still carefully controllable by him; he does this in a way 
which matches his approach to Styx. Just as Lye points out in the case of Styx, Hekate 
is a representative of the old order of the Titans, and thus, in persisting into Zeus’ 
reign, embodies both the continuity of the generations of gods, and the change .268 But 
in bridging the boundary between the order of Zeus and that which came before, she 
also marks that boundary. She too, can be seen as a fence, separating in a 
genealogical, generational, and temporal sense the Titans and the Olympians. 
 
Although she is not personified as physical geographic boundary as Styx is, Hekate 
still represents as a metaphorical geographic boundary: where she has honours, so 
does Zeus; where her honours end, so do his. Her honours are in earth, sea, and sky. 
The limit of this area is delineated by Styx, who, in marking the boundary of Zeus’ 
ordered universe, marks the extent of Hekate’s honours and his own rule.  
 
It is unsurprising, given the similarities between Hekate and Styx, that Zeus’ method 
of limiting her honours and neutralising her as a threat also exploits the marginality of 
Hekate’s position. Like Styx, Hekate’s place is not on Olympos. Instead Zeus follows 
the same blueprint as employed with Styx: he takes advantage of the liminality of her 
position and physically separates her from the other gods and the seat of his power. 
Styx’s oath is a covenant only enforced on the gods – mortals have Horkos. It is there 
to keep the Titans and Zeus’ subjects in their place. Styx’s power is to do with the 
                                                
268 Lye (2009: 16). 
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immortals only. But Hekate also crosses and represents another boundary.  
 
The nature of this boundary is revealed by what else Hesiod tells us about the remit of 
Hekate. The first clue we are given about the remit of her honours is in verses 416-18:  
 
καὶ γὰρ νῦν, ὅτε πού τις ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων  
ἔρδων ἱερὰ καλὰ κατὰ νόµον ἱλάσκηται,  
κικλῄσκει Ἑκάτην· 
 
For even now, whenever any one 
   of mortal men makes 
a handsome sacrifice in propitiation, 
   according to usage,  
he invokes Hekate… 
 
Patricia Marquardt understands these verses to mean ‘men summon Hecate when they 
want to gain favour with the gods in general (ἱλάσκονται [sic]), as though Hecate 
were an intermediary between men and gods.’269 This position is also held by Jenny 
Strauss Clay, who argues that Hekate’s role in the Theogony is based on the 
etymology of her name not as ‘the willing goddess’ but as ‘the wilful goddess, the one 
by whose will – ἕκατι  – prayers are fulfilled and success granted.’270 For Clay, 
Hekate is a selective uptake inhibitor of human supplication of the gods – the operator 
of the switchboard for petitions from mortals to gods, who can cancel or connect calls 
as she wishes. She is a figure to whom one prays because she has the power to block 
the efficacy of one’s prayer, rather than because she has any particular power (or 
inherent willingness) to grant it. Such a mediatory figure is needed, Clay points out, 
because of the damage caused by Prometheus to mortal-divine relationships.271 
Certainly such a mediatory role would fit well with her nature as boundary and 
bridge, that liminal position between the mortal and divine spheres.  
 
In this instance, her function differs somewhat from Styx’s. Whilst both have roles 
relating to the policing of boundaries, Hekate’s role is to act as a selective conduit for 
access between two spheres – she can choose which prayers to allow through and 
which to block, whereas Styx’s role is to deny access to those outside and to eject 
                                                
269 Marquardt (1981: 245). 
270 Clay (2003: 135-36). 
271 Clay (1984: 37). 
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others who break oaths (one might point out that Styx must, presumably, let them 
back in once their punishment is over, but this is never the focus of her role). This 
difference in assigned functions points back to the fundamental difference in their 
nature – ‘will’ can both allow and refuse connections, ‘hatred’ only refuses them. 
Hatred is the breaking, or blocking of a relationship.  
 
One may question, however, whether this reading is really compatible with the poem, 
in which it clearly seems that it is Hekate herself who has the power to grant victory, 
honours, and the other things for which men pray to her: 
 
ᾧ δ᾽ ἐθέλῃ, µεγάλως παραγίνεται ἠδ᾽ ὀνίνησιν·  [429] 
ἔν τε δίκῃ βασιλεῦσι παρ᾽ αἰδοίοισι καθίζει,   [434] 
ἔν τ᾽ ἀγορῇ λαοῖσι µεταπρέπει ὅν κ᾽ ἐθέλῃσιν·  [430] 
ἠδ᾽ ὁπότ᾽ ἐς πόλεµον φθισήνορα θωρήσσωνται  
ἀνέρες, ἔνθα θεὰ παραγίνεται, οἷς κ᾽ ἐθέλῃσι  
νίκην προφρονέως ὀπάσαι καὶ κῦδος ὀρέξαι.   [433] 
ἐσθλὴ δ᾽ αὖθ᾽ ὁπότ᾽ ἄνδρες ἀεθλεύως’ ἐν ἀγῶνι,  [435] 
ἔνθα θεὰ καὶ τοῖς παραγίνεται ἠδ᾽ ὀνίνησιν,  
νικήσας δὲ βίῃ καὶ κάρτεϊ καλὸν ἄεθλον  
ῥεῖα φέρει χαίρων τε, τοκεῦσι δὲ κῦδος ὀπάζει· 
ἐσθλὴ δ᾽ ἱππήεσσι παρεστάµεν οἷς κ᾽ ἐθέλῃσιν,  
καὶ τοῖς οἳ γλαυκὴν δυσπέµφελον ἐργάζονται,  [440] 
εὔχονται δ᾽ Ἑκάτῃ καὶ ἐρικτύπῳ Ἐννοσιγαίῳ,  
ῥηιδίως ἄγρην κυδρὴ θεὸς ὤπασε πολλήν,  
ῥεῖα δ᾽ ἀφείλετο φαινοµένην, ἐθέλουσά γε θυµῷ·  
ἐσθλὴ δ᾽ ἐν σταθµοῖσι σὺν Ἑρµῇ ληίδ᾽ ἀέξειν,  
βουκολίας [τ᾽] ἀγέλας τε καὶ αἰπόλια πλατέ᾽ αἰγῶν [445] 
ποίµνας τ᾽ εἰροπόκων ὀίων, θυµῷ γ᾽ ἐθέλουσα,  
ἐξ ὀλίγων βριάει καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν µείονα θῆκεν. 
       (429-47) 
 
She greatly assists and advantages any man, 
   as she pleases, and in 
the assembly of the people a man shines 
   when she wishes it, 
and when men put on their armor 
   to go to battle, where men 
are wasted, the goddess 
   is readily there also to give out  
the victory and the glory  
   to whichever side she wishes. 
And she sits besides solemn kings when they give 
   their judgement.  
She is great, too, 
   where men contend in athletics, 
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and there the goddess stands by those 
   whom she will, and assists them. 
When, conquering by force and strength, 
   he has won a fine prize, 
he lightly and gladly carries it home, 
   and she brings glory to his parents. 
She is great also in standing by the riders 
   as she wishes, 
and those who on the gray-green, 
   the hard-wracking sea, make a living, 
and they pray to Hekate 
   and to the deep-thunderous Earthshaker, 
and lightly the high goddess 
   grants a great haul of fish, and lightly 
too she takes it away when it has shown, 
   if such is her pleasure. 
She is great in the farms also 
   to help Hermes swell the produce, 
and the driven herds of cattle 
   and the wide-ranging goat flocks 
and the flocks of deep-fleeced sheep, 
   all these also at her own pleasure 
she weightens to many out of few, 
   or makes few out of many.272   
 
Clay’s argument as to Hekate’s switchboard-operator role relies on the two instances 
in which Hekate is mentioned alongside another god who is more traditionally 
associated with the sphere in which help is being sought: fishermen pray to Hekate 
and Poseidon (440-43), and she is also described as helping Hermes in matters 
relating to farming (444-47). But these two instances are ranged against six instances 
between 429-439 in which she is described as helping (or hindering) mortals with no 
mention of other deities who might be appropriately invoked. As we can see in verses 
431-34 above, neither Athena nor Ares is mentioned when Hekate is described as 
giving victory and glory in war. Is it not clearly the case that it is Hekate herself who 
is answering prayers?  
 
I submit that the answer is ‘no’, and that the meaning of these verses can be clarified 
by attention to Zeus’ actions. As Marilyn Arthur explains, one of the themes of the 
Theogony is the attempt by Zeus to subsume the power of the female goddesses, and 
the ability of goddesses to bear children – to function as generative forces, 
                                                
272 Adapted from Lattimore in order to retain the word order of verse 437, where νικήσας (nikēsas), βίῃ 
(biēi and κάρτεϊ (kartei) all appear together.  
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independent of himself, in his universe.273   
 
Styx surrenders her children to his permanent company, allowing him to take on the 
maternal role of caring for the children.274 Hekate becomes akin to those kindlier 
daughters of Zeus, and like those other daughters, virginal – forever to be his 
daughter, never a wife or mother.275 Her power becomes his. Just as the other virginal 
and kindly daughters of Zeus represent his justice (dikē) and his lawfulness 
(eunomia), Hekate represents the will of her surrogate father. Zeus has brought the 
generative force of Hekate under his control: it is by his will that her honours are 
reaffirmed, and by his will that she is granted so much power in relation to mortal 
activities. It is his will that she represents: her will and his are synonymous. 
 
In support of this it should be noted that the ἕκατι (hekati) from which Clay derives 
the etymology of Hekate’s name appears only once between both the Theogony and 
the Works and Days: it is used in verse 4 of the Works and Days to describe the will of 
Zeus – ‘Διὸς µεγάλοιο ἕκητι’.  
 
All of this allows us finally to understand Hekate’s ability to dispense victory: she 
does not do so because she independently wills it so herself or because she possesses 
nikē, but because she is now the embodiment of the will of Zeus. Thus, Hekate has the 




Hekate and Styx 
Arthur’s model of the containment of generative forces allows us further insight into 
the nature of Styx, her treatment by Zeus, and her role in his universe. It is thus 
appropriate to pause briefly from our discussion of Styx’s children to examine what 
this new model, of the subsuming of female generative power by Zeus, can tell us.  
 
Arthur comments of Styx that she is ‘representative of female fecundity in its most 
                                                
273 Arthur (1982). 
274 Arthur (1982: 77).  
275 Arthur (1982: 69). 
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threatening form – the capacity to generate powerful and fearsome children’.276 Styx 
is feared by Zeus not because she is oath, but because she is a mother, and has 
produced a specific group of children. Her generative power produces threats. The 
questions we must answer, given this reason for fearing her, are: how does Zeus 
defuse the threat she represents? Is she subsumed in the same way Hekate is, and 
which her own children are? Does Styx represent the hatred of Zeus as Hekate 
represents his will?  
 
The answer to the question of whether Styx represents the hatred of Zeus in the same 
way that Hekate comes to present his will is ‘no’. Hekate is subsumed as the will of 
Zeus because she takes on the role of one of his virginal daughters. Styx, on the other 
hand, takes on the role of wife. By adopting Styx’s children Zeus forms a 
metaphorical relationship with her of both co-parents and couple. It is Styx’s children 
who become Zeus’ children – the manifestations of his nikē, his zēlos, his kratos, and 
his biē – rather than Styx herself.  
 
In opposition to this, we may point to the case of Metis: Zeus gains mētis as a quality 
even though Metis is his wife, rather than adoptive daughter; Metis still becomes his 
mētis. But Zeus does not gain mētis from taking Metis as a wife; he gains it from 
literally consuming her. Styx, on the other hand, is incorporated into his hierarchy, but 
not into Zeus himself, either physically or subordinated as his adoptive daughter. 
 
On the above model, Styx does not, as Zeus’ daughters do, and as her own children 
come to do, represent a property of Zeus himself. She is Hate, not Zeus’s hate. Her 
role in the ordering of Zeus’ universe is one of being fundamental for the continued 
existence of the physical universe, rather than of being a fundamental quality of Zeus’ 
in order for him to rule. Her role as oath marks her as something external to Zeus – 
her hatred could be directed towards him, should he break his oath. Should he do so, 
Styx, as mother, would reclaim her children from him, just as she first brought them 
to him. Zeus, in attempting to control and subsume the generative power of the 
goddesses, is forced to make concessions – he must switch, as Arthur notes, to a 
model of reciprocity, in which timē is given in response to receiving the aid of Styx 
                                                
276 Arthur (1982: 70).  
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and her children.277 Controlling the generative power of Styx involves acknowledging 
her power, and respecting it. The rules that govern how hatred can be functional, 
rather than dysfunctional, are established. 
 
 
Styx as Generative Force 
To continue to explore the consequences of this model, we must dedicate ourselves to 
understanding what it means for Hate to be considered a generative force. Styx is not 
a generative force in the primal sense – she does not, as a figure like Gaia does, create 
the physical elements of the universe. Rather, she is a more conceptual generative 
power.278 Her children are potent and necessary forces operating within the physical 
universe, stabilising it, and shaping the lives of those within it.   
 
Each child represents qualities of different but overlapping natures: zēlos is an 
emotion (that causes a bodily response), a (rivalrous) relationship to others, a 
motivation for action, and a status. Nikē is also a relationship: a determinant of social 
status, of victory and defeat. It is also the action of striving towards a goal and status. 
Kratos – as we shall discuss shortly – is both a bodily quality, closely linked to 
intellectual qualities, a status, and an action. Biē is an action.  
 
Hatred can generate emotions, goals, relationships, statuses, physical and intellectual 
qualities, and action. For a generative hatred to be such a danger to Zeus, the things 
which it produces must be dangerous. Metis’ generative force is dangerous because it 
is prophesied that it will produce a son who exceeds Zeus. Styx’s generative force is 
dangerous because of the emotions, goals, physical qualities, and actions it can 
produce, which could result in upheaval, and because those actions might themselves 
in turn cause hatred. It is a cyclical, self-sustaining generative force, and its by-
                                                
277 Arthur (1982: 73).  
278 One may wonder why Eros does not need to be brought under Zeus’ sway as other generative forces 
are. Apart from the fact that he is not a feminine generative force, and therefore does not represent 
quite the same type of threat, Arthur argues that he is still subsumed into Zeus’ order. Eros becomes an 
attendant of Aphrodite at her birth. In doing so he ‘survives in a “feminized” form… the force which 
he represents is made gentler and sweeter, or “feminine.”’ (1982: 67). Aphrodite herself is already a 
sublimated female generative power, having only male deities involved in her creation – Ouranos, from 
whose severed genitals she springs, and Kronos, who severs them; she is the embodiment of their 
generative power. Given this, all Zeus need do to gain control of Eros is to accept Aphrodite into a 
lower rank of his Olympian hierarchy.  
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products threaten to generate new hierarchical constructions and orderings of the 
universe.  One might be dubious about including ‘violence’, as a ‘generative force’, 
given that it is considered intrinsically destructive in contemporary Western society – 
the antithesis of a generative force. This is something which we can only address after 
we have discussed Bie herself, and thus something we will return to after discussing 




To our developing script of hatred, then, we can add that it is manifested by and in 
relationships of inequality. If not handled correctly, zēlos and victory can produce a 
reciprocal cycle of hatred. Hatred does not seek just to punish, destroy, or ostracise, 
but explicitly seeks to do so because of a desire for superiority. Hatred is not 
mindless, or irrational. It is not a negative desire to destroy for the sake of destroying. 
It is a response to inequalities. It is a desire to destroy the superior position of the 
other, but it is a positive desire to obtain something for oneself as well. It is generative 
as well as destructive. But it is also part of the motivation to hang on to a position of 
superiority, to continue to own the desired object or position. It is a desire for 









We now turn to the remaining two children: Kratos and Bie. As before, I shall address 
first Kratos, and then Bie, examining the range of meanings of these words, and 
associated concepts that appear through the analysis of Hesiod’s poems. But before 
we discuss Kratos and Bie as individuals, it is worth commenting on the semantic 
overlap between kratos,279 nikē, and biē, especially given, as we have already seen, 
the frequency with which kratos occurs alongside nikē and biē. To illuminate this, I 
shall examine the etymologies of the words, revealing the inter-connecting ideas that 
relate them to each other. I shall then comment on the potential meanings and 
etymology of kratos specifically, noting what we can learn about how it is distinct 
from nikē and biē.  
 
Armed with this insight, we shall then examine the occurrences of kratos and related 
words in Hesiod’s poems. Doing so will reveal the nature of kratos and its place in 
Zeus’ world, as well as the relationship between Zeus and kratos, and what it means 
for Zeus to possess Kratos. Finally, we shall turn to investigate how this new 
knowledge develops our understanding of the nature of hatred.   
 
 
Kratos, Nikē, and Biē 
The frequent usage of kratos and biē in conjunction with nikē in the Theogony hints at 
the conceptual connection between them. Indeed, in the case of kratos and nikē, the 
LSJ cites Iliad I 509 as an example in which kratos is used to mean ‘victory’: 
 
ἀλλὰ σύ πέρ µιν τεῖσον, Ὀλύµπιε µητίετα Ζεῦ· 
τόφρα δ᾽ ἐπὶ Τρώεσσι τίθει κράτος, ὄφρ᾽ ἂν Ἀχαιοὶ 
υἱὸν ἐµὸν τείσωσιν ὀφέλλωσίν τέ ἑ τιµῇ. 
       (I 508-10) 
 
‘But you can make him pay for this, profound 
mind of Olympus! Lend the Trojans power, 
                                                
279 I remind the unfamiliar reader of Ancient Greek that kratos and kartos are the same word.  
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until the Achaeans recompense my son 
and heap new honour upon him!’   
 
Thetis begs Zeus to allow the Trojans to overpower the Achaeans – to be victorious, 
until they recompense her son, Achilles. Clearly kratos can easily be translated as 
‘power’ or ‘might’ here – as Fitzgerald has done, but this exemplifies the overlap in 
meaning between the concepts. When Thetis asks Zeus to give might to the Trojans 
she is not just asking that they fight with more power than they have done previously, 
but that they fight with more power than their Achaean opponents; she is asking that 
they temporarily be granted victory in battle until the wrongs against her son are 
corrected.  
 
This idea is borne out by ancient definitions and etymologies of kratos: In the 11th 
century CE Etymologicum Gudianum we find ‘νῖκος, ἰσχὺς, κράτος’ (nikos, ischus, 
kratos) – that is ‘victory, strength, force’ – given for the definition of kartos (Kappa, 
p. 301: 34).280 Kratos itself is given as the word from which κρείσσων derives, a 
comparative adjective meaning ‘stronger’, ‘mightier’, thus implying superiority 
(Kappa, p. 345: 5) – an etymology also found in the slightly earlier (late 9th century 
CE) Epimerismi Homerici (80, a1). Kratos is also given as the word from which 
κρείων (kreiōn) – ruler, king – derives (Et. Gud. Kappa, p. 345: 5-24). These notions 
of superiority intrinsically tie in to the idea of victory and leadership. This connection 
is further enforced by the fact that the verb form of kratos, κρατέω, (krateō), and the 
participle formed from it, can not only be used to mean ‘to rule’, but can also be used 
to mean the same thing as the verb form of nikē: ‘to conquer’. We see a clear example 
of this with a participle form in the words of Klytemnestra in Aeschylus’ 
Agamemnon: 
 
καὶ τῶν ἁλόντων καὶ κρατησάντων δίχα 
φθογγὰς ἀκούειν ἔστι, συµφορᾶς διπλῆς· 
       (324-25) 
 
the voices of the vanquished and those who have conquered 
are heard as separately as their fortunes are distinct. 
 
However, in most instances of the verb form, the two meanings of ‘to rule’ and ‘to 
                                                
280 Νῖκος is a late form of νίκη. 
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conquer’ are interchangeable, further enforcing the connection between the two ideas.  
 
To complete the triad, contemporary etymologies of biē connect it, too, to victory. 
Frisk and Chantraine relate bia281 to the Sanskrit j(i)yā, which they take to mean 
‘excessive force’ (‘Übergewalt’), or ‘predominance, domination’ (‘prédominance, 
domination’) respectively.282 Manfred Mayrhofer dismisses this connection, arguing a 
different root for JYA; but Mayrhofer also takes JYA to mean ‘robbery’ and Beekes 
tentatively follows suit.283 The Sanskrit word which Mayrhofer does connect to bia is 
JAY/jáyati, from the root ji- ‘to win, to conquer’ deriving both from *gwei- and again, 
Beekes follows this.284 Despite the differences in opinion over the meanings and 
etymologies of the Sanskrit words, all of these scholars connect biē to a word with the 
meaning of ‘to conquer’. 
 
Thus, the various etymologies demonstrate a conceptual overlap between kratos, biē, 
and nikē, which is strengthened by the shared meaning of ‘ruling’ in the verb forms. 
The connection is present too in contemporary etymologies that relate biē to the ideas 
of victory and conquering. We also see the connection between biē and kratos in 
terms of ‘strength’ in ancient etymologies. The earliest etymology for bia, is given by 
Orion (5th century CE), who derives the word from ἴς (is), meaning ‘strength’ or 
‘force’ (Beta, p.33: 6-7), which is itself a word related to the ischus given by the 
Etymologicum Gudianum, and repeated by many later ancient etymologists, as a 
meaning of kratos.  
 
The children of Styx represent a tight cluster of interrelated ideas, their qualities 
blurring together. Although no etymological connection can be made between these 
three children and Zelos, the conceptual overlap and intrinsic interrelatedness is 
demonstrated in Hesiod’s poems, as we shall see as we investigate kratos further.  
                                                
281 Biē and bia are different dialectical forms of the same word. 
282 Frisk (1960: 235); Chantraine (1999: 175). 
283 Beekes (2010: 213). The differences between what they take as the meaning of the word are caused 
by the fact that it is not well attested.   
284 Mayrhofer (1986: 573-74); Beekes (2010: 213). Mayrhofer appears to change opinion about the root 
JYA between the 1956 Kurzgefaßtes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen / A Concise 
Etymological Dictionary (Band I) which gives jyá̄ as meaning ‘force, violence, power’ and relates it to 
the Greek biē, and the 1986 Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindoarischen (Band I) which dismisses 
a connection between JYA and biē, and gives the meaning of JYA as ‘jemanden um etwas bringen, 
jemanden einer Sache berauben, ausrauben, Gewalt antun’: to deprive someone of something, to rob 






We now turn to examine kratos by itself. Let us observe some final points about the 
range of meanings represented by kratos before we move on to investigate its usage in 
the text. As with Zelos, Kratos is another child whose name translators and scholars 
vary in translating. Solmsen, Lattimore, and Athanassakis give ‘Power’;285 Evelyn-
White, West, Hine, and Nelson give ‘Strength’;286 Frazer gives ‘Sovereignty’; and 
Most gives ‘Supremacy’.287 ‘Power’ suggests ideas of having the capacity to achieve 
something, the ability to control people and events, and the idea of hierarchical 
authority. ‘Strength’ suggest a physical quality, and ‘Sovereignty’ suggests rulership.   
 
The ideas of sovereignty and supremacy are also indicated, as we have already seen, 
in the verb form of kratos, krateō, and the conceptual link is supported by ancient 
etymologies. In the Etymologicum Gudianum we find kratos given as the source from 
which κράτα (krata), meaning ‘head’, is derived, because the head is the ruling part 
(ἀπὸ τοῦ κράτος ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ἡγεµονικοῦ τυγχάνοντος [Kappa, P. 343: 12-17]). We 
also find the same reasoning applied to the etymology of καρδία (kardia, ‘heart’), 
which the text also derives from kratos based on the same reasoning that the heart is 
the part of the body that rules (Kappa p. 299: 15). Kratos is the metaphorical ‘head’ of 
a group, the ruler. The internal sovereignty, whereby kratos can mentally be held in, 
or experienced in, the strongest (the most powerful, the leading) part of the body, 
(whether that be the head or the heart), mirrors the external sovereignty that the use of 
kratos creates. 
 
The internal, mental element of kratos is also seen in the contemporary etymology of 
the word. Chantraine connects it to the Sanskrit kratu-, meaning ‘force, intelligence, 
will’, and the Avestan xratu, meaning ‘intelligence, will’.288 Beekes gives the same 
comparison, but notes that it is not an exact correspondence.289 Frisk notes that others 
have expressed concern over this association, because of the mental component of 
                                                
285 Solmsen (1949: 32); Lattimore (1976: 145); Athanassakis (1983: 46). 
286 Evelyn-White (1914: 107); West (1988: 14); Hine (2005: 67); Nelson (2009: 37).  
287 Frazer (1983: 52); Most (2007a: 35).  
288 Chantraine (1999: 578-79) 
289 Beekes (2010: 773).  
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xratu, but dismisses this because the same overlap in meaning is present in the Anglo-
Saxon cræft.290 Indeed, within the Theogony and Works and Days we find two kratos-
related adjectives, κρατερόφρων (kraterophrōn, ‘strong-willed’) and καρτερόθυµον 
(kraterothumon, ‘strong-spirited’),291 which suggests that the connection is a valid 
one for Hesiod.  
 
Thus, like zēlos, kratos can be experienced as a mental thing. But kratos is not just a 
mental experience; its full range of meaning includes ‘to be strong, to be powerful’, 
giving us a physical presentation as well. The ancient etymologies provided by the 
Etymologicum Gudianum enforce a connection with rulership: kratos is given as the 
word from which κρείσσων (kreissōn), ‘ruler, king’, derives, and κρατῶ (kratō – a 
verb form of kratos) as the word from which κρείων (kreiōn), ‘ruler, master’, derives   
(Kappa, p. 345: 5-24). This is further enforced by derivations of krata (‘head’ [Kappa, 
p. 343: 12-17]) and kardia (‘heart’ [Kappa p. 299: 15]) from kratos, which identify 
kratos with the ‘leading parts’ of the body. Further, as we have already mentioned, the 
verb form of kratos can be used to mean ‘conquering’, giving us the sense of action, 
and of something intrinsic to the action. Kratos is pervasive throughout the body and 
psyche, manifests itself in action, and maintains status. This cluster of meanings also 




Kratos in the Theogony 
We turn now to examine the usage of kratos and related words in the works of 
Hesiod. The frequency of kratos makes it the most commonly featured concept 
personified by a child of Styx. It appears 33 times in the Theogony, and once in the 
Works and Days. The figures to whom kratos is applied, or who demonstrate kratos 
can be divided into six categories, the first five of which are: Zeus and his allies, 
Zeus’ opponents, the Titanomachy, monstrous figures, and ambiguous figures. The 
sixth category we will defer discussing until later, in connection with our discussion 
of biē. Despite the division, the groups are interlinked by the fact that some figures 
                                                
290 Frisk (1970: 10). 
291 Note that there is no easy way to translate the ‘thumos’ of kraterothumon or the ‘phrēn’ of 
kraterophrōn into English. Each can cover a similar range of meanings of ‘heart’, ‘mind’, ‘soul’, 
‘spirit’, etc. For a discussion of the complexity of these terms, see Padel (1994). 
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appear in more than one category. We must also bear in mind the various different 
and interlinking meanings of kratos, and ascertain its meaning in each occurrence, 
further developing our understanding of each meaning by its relation to the different 
groups of figures. This will also further develop our understanding of the relationships 
between zēlos, nikē, kratos, and biē.  
 
The nature of this material is intrinsically complex. My discussion will address each 
group in turn and examine both the significance of the grouping and its related 
meanings, and then how that impacts our understanding of the nature of the 
relationship between zēlos, nikē, kratos, and biē, thus evolving our understanding of 
kratos as each new group is discussed and new interlinkings revealed. Having 
developed the meaning of kratos through understanding the complex web of 
interrelations, we will then be in a position to investigate the relationship between 
kratos and hatred.  
 
The first group we will examine is that of Zeus and his allies. The first instance of the 
noun kratos is in verse 49. It is part of the hymn to the Muses to describe how Zeus is 
‘greatest [µέγιστος, megistos] in power [κάρτεί, kartei]’ (ὅσσον φέρτατός ἐστι θεῶν 
κάρτεί τε µέγιστος). Here, once again, the sense of kratos as ‘power’ and ‘might’ 
blur closely with the idea of ‘rulership’: it is being greatest in power – both physical 
and mental, that grants him victory and makes him a ruler. 
 
It is also used in verse 437 to describe Hekate’s criteria for distributing victory: 
 
ἐσθλὴ δ᾽ αὖθ᾽ ὁπότ᾽ ἄνδρες ἀεθλεύωσ᾽ ἐν ἀγῶνι,  
ἔνθα θεὰ καὶ τοῖς παραγίνεται ἠδ᾽ ὀνίνησιν,   
νικήσας δὲ βίῃ καὶ κάρτεϊ καλὸν ἄεθλον  
ῥεῖα φέρει χαίρων τε, τοκεῦσι δὲ κῦδος ὀπάζει·   
       (435-38) 
 
She is great, too,  
   where men contend in athletics,  
and there the goddess stands by those  
   whom she will, and assists them. 
When, conquering by force and strength, 
   he has won a fine prize,  
he lightly and gladly carries it home, 
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   and brings glory to his parents.292  
 
We have already discussed these lines in detail in Chapter Two (p.121) where we 
argued that Hekate represents the will of Zeus, she grants the victory to whom he 
wills, and thus the criteria for awarding victory are also his criteria. Expressing kratos 
and biē presents the qualities necessary for attaining nikē, both for the athlete, and for 
Zeus himself.  
 
Kratos is also used once to describe what Zeus seeks from the battle with the Titans – 
νίκης καὶ κράτεος – victory and kratos (647). And yet, kratos is also what he will 
have used in order to overcome Kronos and win victory in that same battle, as we are 
earlier told in verse 73:  
 
ὃ δ᾽ οὐρανῷ ἐµβασιλεύει,  
αὐτὸς ἔχων βροντὴν ἠδ᾽ αἰθαλόεντα κεραυνόν,  
κάρτει νικήσας πατέρα Κρόνον·  
       (71-73) 
 
       to him 
   who is king in heaven, 
who holds in his own hands the thunder 
   and the flamy lightning, 
who conquered by strength 
   his father Kronos…293 
 
Zeus prevails over his father with kratos. A demonstration of superiority must be 
displayed in order to gain rulership, and it is a requisite component of a stable 
rulership. 
 
Verse 73 also underlines a very physical nature to this kratos. He reigns in heaven, 
having conquered his father by the use of kratos, in the battle. The nature of that 
kratos is made textually explicit: Zeus reigns, still holding the weapons he was given 
by the Cyclopes and which he used to defeat his father – the lightning and the burning 
thunderbolt are his kratos, a physical force of nature. This is a force, a power, a 
sovereignty, that is physical as well as intellectual, and backed by the silent threat of 
                                                
292 Adapted from Lattimore (who does not transpose any verses).  
293 Adapted from Lattimore in order to make clear the equivalence between the Greek and the English.  
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violence, just as Bie stands silent in the Prometheus Bound whilst Kratos orders 
Hephaistos on, demanding the physical and forceful binding of Prometheus (1-87). 
This kratos, manifest in the burning thunderbolt is, as was the case with zēlos, 
associated with heat: kratos is, as Lattimore has delightfully translated it, the ‘flamy’ 
(αἰθαλόεντα, aithaloenta [72]) lightning.  
 
This association with heat seen here, combined with two adjective forms mentioned 
previously, kraterophrōn (‘strong-willed’) and kraterothumon, (‘strong-spirited’), 
connects the experience of kratos to a mental and bodily experience. It impacts the 
seats of mental activity located in the body. It is not just the physical strength one 
might display, but also something that is felt strongly within the body, as extreme 
sensations, just as burning hot zēlos is. As with zēlos this suggests the disruptive 
power of kratos, not just to the body, but also to the established order. Zeus needs 
kratos to disrupt the rule of his father, and to construct his own universe, but others 
possessing kratos present a threat to Zeus’ rule and the ordering of his universe. But, 
just as with zēlos, kratos is not only destructive, but also constructive.  
 
This simultaneously constructive and disruptive element highlights the ambiguous 
nature of kratos already indicated by the adjective arideiketa (‘conspicuous’), as we 
discussed at the beginning of Chapter Two (p. 80).   
  
The sense of ‘rulership’ apparent in verse 647, when Zeus explains what he seeks 
from the battle with the Titans, is the same sense in which kratos appears in verse 
662, when the Hekatoncheires make explicit what it is they will help Zeus obtain in 
the battle against the Titans: 
  
“τῷ καὶ νῦν ἀτενεῖ τε νόῳ καὶ ἐπίφρονι βουλῇ 
ῥυσόµεθα κράτος ὑµὸν ἐν αἰνῇ δηιοτῆτι,  
µαρνάµενοι Τιτῆσιν ἀνὰ κρατερὰς ὑσµίνας.” 
       (661-63) 
 
“Therefore now, with stubborn spirit 
   and resolute purpose  
we shall be defenders of your power 
   in the grim encounter  
and fight against the Titans 





By joining his side the Hekatoncheires agree that they will help Zeus attain the 
leadership, and will respect his position because he has freed them from their bonds. 
Note that this is different from Styx and others, who are chasing the reward of 
honours. The Hekatoncheires act not on expectation, but out of gratitude. They 
acknowledge Zeus as the defender of the deathless ones from chill ruin: ἀλκτὴρ δ᾽ 
ἀθανάτοισιν ἀρῆς γένεο κρυεροῖο (657). In return, they will now protect (ῥυσόµεθα, 
rusometha [662]) his kratos against the Titans, just as they will continue to do so after 
the Titanomachy, when they take their positions as guardians at the gate of Tartaros, 
and become his φύλακες πιστοὶ, phulakes pistoi - his ‘trustworthy guards’ (734-35). 
This is kratos as the power of a position of authority, obtained and maintained.  
 
Thus far all these instances of kratos have been in its noun form. There is one final 
instance of the noun, which is, of course, in verse 385 where it is Kratos himself. 
Kratos is immediately designated as both an ally of Zeus, and, along with his siblings, 
Zeus’ permanent attendant. Here, kratos contains all its potential meanings. It is the 
leading part, the ruler; the highest position – enviable. It is, like nikē, both the ability 
to conquer, the victory itself, and the maintenance of that victory. It is, like biē, a 
method of gaining a position of power, and also (as we shall see with biē shortly), a 
method of maintaining that power. 
 
The word also appears in verb form once, where it is applied to Zeus and his reign:  
αὐτὸς δὲ µέγα κρατεῖ ἠδὲ ἀνάσσει (‘mightily he himself kratei and [ἀνάσσει, 
anassei] holds sway [403]).294 Here kratei can be understood either as ‘conquers’, 
demonstrating his ability to maintain his sway; or as ‘rules’, mirroring anassei and 
thus emphasising the strength of his rule.  
 
Each of the above occurrences reinforces the connections between nikē and kratos, 
and between victory, rulership, strength, superiority, and conquering. It is worth 
noting that this group contains all of the instances of kratos as a noun, as well as the 
sole instance of it as a verb: only Zeus and his allies so explicitly have power, and 
only Zeus so explicitly demonstrates its usage. His is the mightiest victory, the 
                                                
294 My translation.  
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mightiest reign.  
 
The final instances of kratos in the category of Zeus and his allies are when the 
adjective κρατερός (krateros) is twice applied to the Hekatoncheires: first when they 
are first mentioned at their birth (153), and then in the battle line-up for the 
Titanomachy, after they have just agreed to lend Zeus their strength: 
 
   Ὥς φάτ᾽· ἐπῄνησαν δὲ θεοί, δωτῆρες ἐάων  
µῦθον ἀκούσαντες· πολέµου δ᾽ ἐλιλαίετο θυµὸς   [665] 
µᾶλλον ἔτ᾽ ἢ τὸ πάροιθε· µάχην δ᾽ ἀµέγαρτον ἔγειραν  
πάντες θήλειαι τε καὶ ἄρσενες ἤµατι κείνῳ  
[Τιτῆνές τε θεοὶ καὶ ὅσοι Κρόνου ἐξεγένοντο] 
οὕς τε Ζεὺς Ἐρέβευσφι ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἧκε φόωσδε,  
δεινοί τε κρατεροί τε, βίην ὑπέροπλον ἔχοντες.  [670] 
       (664-70) 
 
      So he spoke, and the gods, 
   the givers of blessings, assented 
and they heard what he said, 
   and the spirit in them was insistent on battle 
more even than it had been, 
   and they launched an unwelcome onset, 
all, the female and the male gods alike. 
   on that day, 
and the Titan gods, and those  
   of the generation of Kronos, 
and those whom Zeus had upraised 
   from under the earth and Erebos 
back to the light, fierce gods and mighty, 
with strength overmastering.  
 
Ouranos and Kronos imprisoned the Hekatoncheires because they are krateroi. Here 
they are free, opposing Ouranos and Kronos just as they feared they would. No longer 
constrained, the kratos of the Hekatoncheires is now enhanced by their biē. Here too, 
kratos is closely connected to victory and rulership through superior strength. But it is 
not the victory or rulership of the Hekatoncheires. Instead, they agree to defend Zeus’ 
kratos. This is something far greater that simply agreeing to help him win: the 
Hekatoncheires extend their period of support beyond the end of the Titanomachy. 
The kratos and biē of the Hekatoncheires are perpetually in the service of Zeus, and 
are put to use by giving them the role of monitoring the imprisoned Titans as his 
‘trustworthy guards’ (75). This also explains why the Hekatoncheires do not pose a 
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threat to Zeus as they did to Ouranos and Kronos: the Hekatoncheires use their kratos 
and biē to support Zeus, rather than oppose him. Rather than being a new and separate 
threat to Zeus, Zeus’ freeing of the Hekatoncheires results in him obtaining their 
kratos and biē for himself – just as he does with Styx.  
 
 
The Opponents of Zeus 
We now turn to the second category of figures associated with kratos: the opponents 
of Zeus. Given that kratos can have a sense of ‘rulership’ it is unsurprising that kratos 
is applied to this group far more infrequently than it is to Zeus and his allies. There 
are only two instances of kratos directly being applied to an opponent of Zeus, and 
one further instance when it is metaphorically applied to an opponent. The first is 
when the adjective krateros is used of Kronos himself (465), although it is very 
notable here that it is in the context of describing Kronos’ defeat at the hands of Zeus:  
 
πεύθετο γὰρ Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος  
οὕνεκά οἱ πέπρωτο ἑῷ ὑπὸ παιδὶ δαµῆναι  
καὶ κρατερῷ περ ἐόντι, Διὸς µεγάλου διὰ βουλάς. 
        (463-65) 
For he had heard, from Gaia 
   and from starry Ouranos, 
that it had been ordained for him,  
   to be beaten by his son, 
despite his strength,  
through the designs of great Zeus.295   
 
This mention of Kronos’ kratos is specifically in the context of its inferiority to Zeus’: 
although Kronos is krateros, he will be defeated. This sense of Kronos’ inferior 
kratos is compounded by the word being textually sandwiched between Gaia and 
Ouranos telling him that he will be defeated by his son, and the more specific fact that 
his defeat will come about through the design (βουλάς, boulas) of Zeus: Kronos is 
destined to be overcome (δαµῆναι, damēnai) by his child and, despite his strength 
(κρατερῷ, kraterōi), Zeus’ boulai will be greater than his kratos. Kronos’ kratos is 
not enough to secure him Kratos. This idea is compounded when, a few lines later, 
Gaia and Ouranos relate to Rhea what they have just told Kronos; they tell her 
everything that is destined for Kronos and his υἱέι καρτεροθύµῳ (huiei karterothumō) 
                                                
295 Adapted from Lattimore, who does not preserve the word order.  
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– his ‘strong-willed son’ (476): it is Zeus’ kratos which is mentioned here, not 
Kronos’.  
 
If we remember the contemporary etymologies which link kratos to the Sanskrit 
kratu-, (‘force, intelligence, will’), and the Avestan xratu, (‘intelligence, will’),296 
then it is worth noting that boulai, as well as meaning ‘designs’ can also mean simply, 
‘will, determination’. The contest of kratos between Zeus and Kronos is not just one 
of physical strength, but of mental determination – of the strength of their wills. Once 
again, we are presented with the idea of kratos as permeating both body and psyche.  
 
The second usage of krateros in relation to one of Zeus’ opponents is in verse 824, 
where Typhoeus is described as kraterou theou – ‘mighty god’. This occurs at the 
beginning of a detailed physical description of the god (823-35), after which Zeus 
immediately begins to fight him, having perceived the threat he represents. Typhoeus 
reignites the contest of kratos: whose is greater? The answer is Zeus – he who now 
possesses Kratos himself. Indeed, krateros, in a superlative form, appears again in this 
description of the battle, as part of a series of metaphors describing Typhoeus’ defeat: 
 
Ζεὺς δ᾽ ἐπεὶ οὖν κόρθυνεν ἑὸν µένος, εἵλετο δ᾽ ὅπλα,  
βροντήν τε στεροπήν τε καὶ αἰθαλόεντα κεραυνόν,  
πλῆξεν ἀπ᾽ Οὐλύµποιο ἐπάλµενος· ἀµφὶ δὲ πάσας   [855] 
ἔπρεσε θεσπεσίας κεφαλὰς δεινοῖο πελώρου.  
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δή µιν δάµασε πληγῇσιν ἱµάσσας,  
ἤριπε γυιωθείς, στενάχιζε δὲ γαῖα πελώρη.  
φλὸξ δὲ κεραυνωθέντος ἀπέσσυτο τοῖο ἄνακτος  
οὔρεος ἐν βήσσῃσιν ἀιδνῇς παιπαλοέσσῃς    [860] 
πληγέντος· πολλὴ δὲ πελώρη καίετο γαῖα  
ἀτµῇ θεσπεσίῃ καὶ ἐτήκετο κασσίτερος ὣς  
τέχνῃ ὕπ᾽ αἰζηῶν ὑπό τ᾽ εὐτρήτου χοάνοιο 
θαλφθείς, ἠὲ σίδηρος, ὅ περ κρατερώτατός ἐστιν,  
οὔρεος ἐν βήσσῃσι δαµαζόµενος πυρὶ κηλέῳ   [865] 
τήκεται ἐν χθονὶ δίῃ ὑφ᾽ Ἡφαιστου παλάµῃσιν· 
ὣς ἄρα τήκετο γαῖα σέλαι πυρὸς αἰθοµένοιο. 
       (853-67) 
 
But now, when Zeus had headed up 
   his own strength, seizing 
his weapons, thunder, lightning, 
                                                
296 Chantraine (1999: 578-79). 
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   and the glowering thunderbolt, 
he made a leap from Olympos, and struck, 
   burning up 
all those wonderful heads set about 
   on the dreaded monster. 
Then, when Zeus had overpowered him 
   with his strokes, Typhoeus 
crashed, crippled, and the gigantic earth 
   groaned beneath him, 
and the flame from the great lord 
   so thunder-smitten ran out 
along the darkening and steep forests    
   of the mountains 
as he was struck, and a great part 
   of the gigantic earth was burned 
by the awful steam, 
   and melted, just as tin, 
worked by craftsmen in  
   the carefully grooved crucible, 
is softened by heat, or as iron, 
   though that is the strongest of all, 
is subdued by the burning fire    
   in the mountain forests 
and melts under the handicraft 
   of Hephaistos inside the divine earth.  
So earth melted in the flash    
   of the blazing fire…297 
 
Zeus strikes, burning (ἔπρεσε, eprese [856]), Typhoeus’ heads; he has overpowered 
(δάµασεν, damasen [857]) him, sending him ‘thunder-stricken’ (κεραυνωθέντος, 
keraunōthentos [859]), to the earth that had originally spawned him. This display of 
Zeus’ kratos, in the form of his lightning bolt, sets fire to Typhoeus’ heads, causes 
flames to shoot from them, which then scorch the earth and melt it when he lands – 
just as iron, ‘mightiest’ (κρατερώτατος, kraterōtatos [864]) of all things, is melted 
(τήκεται, tēketai [867]) by the divine fire of Hephaistos. Zeus’ kratos, represented by 
the lightning-caused fire, is what allows him to defeat Typhoeus.  
 
Some scholars have taken the whole Typhoeus episode, verses 820-80, to be a later 
interpolation. West provides a succinct summary of the arguments for and against its 
authenticity, and neatly answers the objections of those who argue to reject it.298 One 
                                                
297 Adapted from Lattimore to more accurately reflect the range of words Hesiod uses to emphasise the 
fire and heat, and to better maintain the word order of the Greek.  
298 West (1968: 379-82).  
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of the arguments against it is that it simply repeats what we have already seen in the 
Titanomachy and adds nothing.299 But this is not the case. Zeus’ weapons are the fires 
of his lightning bolt. Zeus’ control of fire is an advantage that the Titans lack. But 
unlike the Titans, Typhoeus also has his own fire:  
 
ἐκ δέ οἱ ὄσσων 
θεσπεσίῃς κεφαλῇσιν ὑπ᾽ ὀφρύσι πῦρ ἀµάρυσσεν· 
πασέων δ᾽ ἐκ κεφαλέων πῦρ καίετο δερκοµένοιο· 
(826-28) 
   and from the eyes on 
the inhuman heads fire glittered 
   from under the eyelids: 
from all his heads fire flared 
   from his eyes’ glancing 
 
Typhoeus’ destructive fire is seen in his eyes. Recall the violent dangers of the evil 
eye, and the hate-filled look of Zelos, and the close association between envy and 
victory. I have already suggested that Typhoeus’ attack was the inevitable 
consequence of Zeus’ victory over the Titans. Zeus has made himself a target of envy, 
and now Typhoeus has risen against him, with his destructive, envious, and burning 
gaze. His fiery eyes are not just where his envy is seen, but also where his kratos and 
biē emanate. His gaze is as destructive as the ‘hateful look’ of stugerōpēs Zelos. The 
Titanomachy was about Zeus gaining power and victory, the Typhonomachy is about 
proving that he is deserving of maintaining it.  
 
But Typhoeus’ kratos and biē – his own use of fire – is not enough. Instead, it simply 
highlights the significance of his defeat:  
 
καῦµα δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀµφοτέρων κάτεχεν ἰοειδέα πόντον  
βροντῆς τε στεροπῆς τε, πυρός τ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῖο πελώρου,  
πρηστήρων ἀνέµων τε κεραυνοῦ τε φλεγέθοντος.  
ἔζεε δὲ χθὼν πᾶσα καὶ οὐρανὸς ἠδὲ θάλασσα:  
θυῖε δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἀµφ᾽ ἀκτὰς περί τ᾽ ἀµφί τε κύµατα µακρὰ  
ῥιπῇ ὕπ᾽ ἀθανάτων… 
(844-49) 
 
and the burning heat from both of them 
   was on the dark-faced sea, 
from the thunder and lightning of Zeus 
                                                
299 E.g. Hamilton (1989: 23). 
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   and from the flames of the monster, 
from his blazing bolts and from 
   his hurricane winds, 
and all the ground and the sky 
   and the sea boiled, and towering 
waves were tossing and beating all up 
   and down the promontories 
in the wind of these immortals 300 
 
 
Burning heat (καῦµα, kauma) takes hold of the sea, caused by Zeus’ thunder 
(βροντῆς, brontēs) and his flashing lightning (στεροπῆς, steropēs), the fire (πυρός, 
puros) from Typhoeus’ eyes and from Zeus’ scorching (φλεγέθοντος, phlegethontos) 
thunderbolt (κεραυνοῦ, keraunou). Typhoeus’ fire is textually encapsulated within 
Zeus’ thunder and lightning, just as Kronos’ kratos was textually encapsulated with 
the details of his defeat. Here again, Zeus’ all-encompassing superiority, the kratos 
and biē he wields through the fiery, Cyclopes-forged weapons, is displayed.  
 
Thus, despite applying to the opponents of Zeus, these instances notably occur in the 
context of Zeus conquering them. Kratos is not just connected with victory, but 




The adjective krateros is used three times to modify ὑσµίνη (husminē, battle), where 
the battle in question is the Titanomachy (631, 663, 712) and once to describe the 
physical strength with which the rocks in the battle are hurled by each side (683). The 
conflict is the physical manifestation of the rivalry between the two sides, of the zēlos 
that results in displays of kratos which in turn leads to nikē, in order to obtain and 
deprive others of zēlos, nikē, kratos, and biē.  
 
Only two verses above 712, verse 710 is used to describe the κάρτος ἔργων, kartos 
ergōn, ‘power of the deeds’ shown by both sides in the Titanomachy: 
                                                




    ὄτοβος δ᾽ ἄπλητος ὀρώρει  
σµερδαλέης ἔριδος, κάρτος δ᾽ ἀνεφαίνετο ἔργων, 
ἐκλίνθη δὲ µάχη· 
        (709-11) 
 
   and a horrible tumult  
of grisly battle uprose 
   and both sides showed power in the fighting. 
Then the battle turned… 
 
The Titanomachy is a contest of kratos in order to determine who is worthy of 
possessing Kratos. Kratos must be displayed in order to be fully obtained; the battle 
must be one of kratos to allow Zeus to demonstrate his mastery.  
 
Kratos, just as with zēlos and nikē, represents both overcoming, and having 
overcome. It is necessary in order to win the struggle for superiority, and it also 
represents being in that position of superiority. It is about gaining superiority (73, 
710), and about keeping it (647).  
 
 
The Monstrous Ones 
One of the categories associated with kratos comprises figures who are nearly all 
‘monstrous’. This also includes the Hekatoncheires (153, 670). They do, after all, 
each have one hundred hands and fifty heads. This monstrous group is the most 
populous category in terms of kratos.  
 
Krateros is used of Kerberos (312), Chimaira (320), and specifically Chimaira’s 
dragon head (322). The adjective κρατερόφρων (kraterophrōn, ‘strong-willed’) is 
used to describe ‘monstrous’ figures: it is used of Echidna (297); and of her children, 
Orthos, the hound of Geryones; Kerberos; and the Lernaean Hydra (308).301 It is also 
used of Atlas (509). I shall delay the discussion of Atlas until Chapter Four, where I 
will present a fuller discussion of the fate of all four of the sons of Iapetos.   
 
                                                
301 The grammar of verse 319 leaves it uncertain who exactly Chimaira’s mother is, and there is no 
scholarly consensus on the issue. See Clay (2009: 159-161) for an interpretation of this as a feature, 
rather than a flaw, mirroring the disordered nature of the monsters themselves. For our purposes, the 
issue of Chimaira’s parentage is not essential.  
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In this group we also find the sole instance of a kratos-related word appearing in the 
Works and Days (147): the violent men of the bronze age, who love violence and 
Ares, and have κρατερόφρονα θυµόν, kraterophrona thumon, strong-willed spirit. 
The monstrosity of these men is indicated by the similarity between the description of 
them, and that of the Hekatoncheires: 
 
Ζεὺς δὲ πατὴρ τρίτον ἄλλο γένος µερόπων ἀνθρώπων  
χάλκειον ποίησ᾽, οὐκ ἀργυρέῳ οὐδὲν ὁµοῖον,  
ἐκ µελιᾶν, δεινόν τε καὶ ὄβριµον· οἷσιν Ἄρηος   [145] 
ἔργ᾽ ἔµελεν στονόεντα καὶ ὕβριες: οὐδέ τι σῖτον  
ἤσθιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀδάµαντος ἔχον κρατερόφρονα θυµόν.  
[ἄπλαστοι· µεγάλη δὲ βίη καὶ χεῖρες ἄαπτοι 
ἐξ ὤµων ἐπέφυκον ἐπὶ στιβαροῖσι µέλεσσι.] 
       (143-49) 
 
then Zeus the father created the third generation 
   of mortals,  
the age of bronze. They were not like  
   the generation of silver. 
They came from ash spears. They were terrible  
   and strong, and the ghastly 
action of Ares was theirs, and violence. 
   They ate no bread, 
but maintained a strong-willed and adamantine spirit. 
None could come near them; their strength was big, 
   and from their shoulders 
the arms grew irresistible on their ponderous bodies.302 
 
The description of the bronze men in verses 149 above mirrors both verse 152 and 
671, which both form parts of the descriptions of the Hekatoncheires: ἐξ ὤµων 
ἐπέφυκον ἐπὶ στιβαροῖσι µέλεσσιν (and from their shoulders // the arms grew 
irresistible [152; 671]). 
 
Further similarities in the description reinforce the connection. The Hekatoncheires 
are ἄπλαστοι, aplastoi – ‘unapproachable’ (Th. 152). Here Lattimore translates it as 
‘none could come near them’. In Works and Days 148 it is used of the bronze men, 
where Lattimore translates it as ‘irresistible’. Hofinger renders the word as 
‘inabordable, terrible’ (‘inaccessible’, ‘terrible’), noting that this is the meaning given 
                                                
302 Adapted from Lattimore. I have changed his translation of kraterophrona in verse 147 to ‘strong-
willed’ so that the reader relying on the translation can see clearly where the word falls in the English, 
since this is how I have translated it throughout.  
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by scholia on Th. 151, and W&D 148.303 They are also all described using µέγας 
(megas, mighty). The Hekatoncheires are µεγάλῳ εἴδει, ‘with mighty form’ (Th. 153), 
and the bronze men have µεγάλη βίη – ‘mighty biē’.  
 
The association of kratos with this monstrous group reminds us of the danger of 
kratos. They are dangerous figures, and many are figures encountered, and killed 
(Geryones, Orthos, Lernaean Hydra) or defeated (Kerberos) by Herakles as part of his 
labours. The fact that they are nearly all figures defeated by Herakles tells us the 
precise nature of the threat they represent to Zeus: they have the potential to disrupt 
his ordering of the world of man, and thus Herakles, as the representative of Zeus in 
the world of man, must subdue them and maintain the order.  
 
Orthos, Kerberos, and the Hydra are the children of Echidna by Typhoeus. Strauss 
Clay notes that ‘their children embody features of both parents and share their 
epithets’. This includes being krateros and kraterophrōn, but Echidna and Kerberos 
are both also ‘impossible’ (ἀµήχανος, amēchanos [295, 310]), and also both eaters of 
raw flesh (ὠµηστής, ōmēstēs [300, 311]). The ‘baneful minded’ (λυγρὰ ἰδυῖαν, lugra 
iduian) Hydra resembles her ‘baneful’ (λυγρή, lugrē) mother Echidna.304 Echidna’s 
association with kratos is unsurprising given who her children and partner are. But 
just as Zeus defeats the child of Gaia and Tartaros, Herakles defeats the children of 
Echidna and Typhoeus. The defeating of Typhoeus’ offspring by the offspring of 
Zeus mirrors Zeus’ defeat of Typhoeus.  
 
The mention of krateros in relation to Chimaira (320) and her dragon head (322) is 
directly before we are told she is defeated by Pegasos and another hero – Bellerophon. 
Earlier in the poem we have been told that Pegasos is the lightning-bearer of Zeus. He 
dwells with Zeus after leaving the earth – the mother of flocks – to reside in Zeus’ 
halls, just as the children of Styx do (284-6). The mention of his presence at the defeat 
of Chimaira marks Bellerophon as an agent of Zeus’ will, and a representative of 
Zeus’ kratos.  
 
The adjective krateros is also used of the race of Giants in verse 50. It is difficult to 
                                                
303 Hofinger (1975-78: 67). Cunliffe does not know the word.  
304 Clay (2009: 156).   
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know what to make of the presence of the Giants here, let alone why this adjective 
should be applied to them. They are only mentioned here, and in verse 185. They are, 
like the Erinyes, born from the spilling of Ouranos’ blood onto Gaia. We do not know 
of any progeny or what deeds they might have committed, but we are told by Hesiod 
that they are born wearing gleaming armour and holding spears (185-6). Note that this 
is the same passage in which their sisters, the Erinyes, are described with the same 
adjective.  
 
Neither Hesiod nor Homer make mention of the Gigantomachy, but Homer mentions 
the Giants in the Odyssey, where they are described as ὑπέρθυµοι (huperthumoi), 
‘overweening’, and immediately destroyed, along with their ruler, Eurymedon (VII. 
58-60). Later they are also compared to the Cyclopes, as king Alkinoos explains to 
Odysseus that his people, like the Cyclopes and the ἄγριοι (agrioi, ‘wild, savage’) 
Giants, are closely related to the gods. Finally, the Laistrygonians, who eat one of 
Odysseus’ men and who hurl boulders at the ships from the cliffs of their island are 
compared to the Giants (X. 114-21). From these fragments of evidence we can 
reasonably suppose that Hesiod meant us to understand that they would in the future 
pose some sort of threat, but beyond this we cannot say anything.  
 
What of the Hekatoncheires? Their similarity to other monstrous figures underlines 
the danger that their kratos could represent. The Hekatoncheires present a kratos that 
is both dangerous and useful to Zeus, and their kratos is useful to Zeus precisely 
because it is dangerous. What sets them apart is their willingness to wield their kratos 
in the service of Zeus, rather than themselves. It is this allegiance that spares them the 
fate of so many of the other krateros monsters. 
 
As for the race of bronze described in the Works and Days, their kratos is dangerous 
not to Zeus, but to themselves. Unlike the race of silver, whom Zeus destroys, the race 
of bronze destroy themselves through their fighting (152-4): 
 
καὶ τοὶ µὲν χείρεσσιν ὕπο σφετέρῃσι δαµέντες  
βῆσαν ἐς εὐρώεντα δόµον κρυεροῦ Αίδαο, 
νώνυµνοι· 
 
Yet even these, destroyed beneath the hands 
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   of each other, 
went down into the mouldering domain of cold Hades; 
   nameless… 
  
We shall have more to say about the race of bronze and the danger it represents when 
we turn to examine biē. For now, it is enough to note that they are monstrous, and 
represent a dangerous form of kratos. 
 
 
The Ambiguous Category 
We have already discussed the adjective καρτερόθυµος (karterothumos, ‘strong-
spirited’), in relation to Zeus and his destiny to defeat his father, but it is also used of 
Eris (225) and the winds Zephyrus, Boreas, and Notos (378), sons of Eos (Dawn), 
who are specifically hailed as good in verses 869-71. The race of Giants (50) and the 
Erinyes (185) are also both described with the adjective krateros. 
 
This is a mixed bag of figures – Eris is ambiguous, though widely considered 
negative, the winds are positive aspects of Zeus’ ordered universe, the Erinyes are 
dark creatures of vengeance, and the Giants are never mentioned again. The winds 
must have some degree of kratos because they must compete with the unruly winds 
that issue from Typhoeus (869-80), and despite their grim appearance, both Eris and 
the Erinyes are associated with Horkos – the oath that helps govern humans. Their 
kratos represents the authority of the oath in the human realm, just as Herakles’ 
represents Zeus’ kratos in the defeat of monsters. Further, Eris’ essential role in the 
Works and Days indicates her prominent role governing the lives of men.  
 
The frequent use of kratos emphasises its pervasiveness in Zeus’ universe. This 
further underlines its potential danger as seen also in the monstrous group. But we 
also see kratos as something crucial. It is something that Zeus’ enemies must possess 
in order for him to be able to demonstrate his own kratos. The fact that the winds, 
Eris, and the Erinyes are karterothumoi indicates that it is essential to that universe: as 
both mental and physical properties, and as a governing principle. The kratos of the 
winds, who are positioned in opposition to Typhoeus, mirrors the kratos of Zeus’ own 





Let us remind ourselves what we have discovered thus far. We have seen the 
conceptual overlap between nikē, kratos, and biē indicated by their etymologies 
present also in Hesiod’s poems. We have seen kratos represented as a bodily and 
mental force, as the act of conquering, as the act of ruling and the position of 
supremacy. And we have therefore also seen what it means for Zeus to be related to 
kratos. Kratos both sustains and threatens his ordered universe. It is a force which 
must be possessed, but the existence of which presents a threat. Once again, a quality 
associated with Styx is a force that Zeus must manage carefully, and it is because 
Zeus has earned the allegiance of Styx and her children that he alone has the ultimate 
kratos. Let us turn now to consider in more detail the nature of the relationship 
between Styx, hatred, and kratos. 
 
 
Hatred and Kratos 
We have already discussed the relationship between ‘victory’ (nikē) and hatred. The 
same points hold true when it is kratos being used to mean ‘conquering’: hatred is 
essential to conquering (hence Zeus’ possession of both Nike and Kratos) as indicated 
by the fact that he requires Styx as an ally to procure them both. Hatred is also 
essential to the procurement of rulership, of kratos. Further, being conquered, and 
thus being placed in a position of inferiority, provokes zēlos, and hatred is a strong 
(kratos) incentive to the victory zēlos seeks. Hatred provides both a mental fortitude 
and the physical strength necessary to obtain kratos. 
 
The idea that the conquered hate the conqueror must be investigated further. It raises a 
problem for the situation in which kratos means ‘ruler’. The conquered hate the ruler 
because the ruler has deprived them of something, and because the ruler now 
possesses something they both want for themselves, and want to deprive the ruler of: 
the conquered hate the ruler because of their zēlos of his kratos – of his will, of his 
strength, and thus of his rulership. Such a situation leads to conflict, and the 
possibility of Zeus’ universe being overturned. Zeus must thus develop a way to 
control these forces; kratos is essential to this. It is Zeus’ ability, as ruler, the 
possessor of kratos, to regulate Styx, to control hate, which allows him to shift hatred 
towards him elsewhere. When Zeus makes Styx the oath of the gods he transposes 
 
155 
that hatred for the ruler onto hatred for the perjurer. Zeus swears to be just, and as 
long as he is, as long as he does not perjure himself, he will not be the target of the 
hatred of his subordinates. In making an oath to grant other gods their due honours, 
Zeus relegates their hatred to the situation in which he breaks his oath.  
 
In turn, this reveals more of the nature of the relationship of Styx to Zeus – 
specifically in this case to his dikē, his justice. Giving others their due honours is part 
of the dikē, the justice, of Zeus’ universe. Zeus’ justice has a fundamental role in 
controlling hatred – and hatred has a fundamental role in controlling his justice. His 
position as ruler is guaranteed through successfully controlling who will be the target 
of hatred. The rainbow Iris’ trip to fetch the oath of the gods is Zeus’ promise that the 
conditions of the old world will not occur again. He will never be the figure they hate. 
Controlling hatred is requisite to the ruler, and Zeus’ justice has been designed to 
achieve this. Zeus’ creation and enaction of justice is a Machiavellian decision 
designed to keep him in power. Zeus cares about dikē because of its necessity in 




We turn now to the final child of Styx: Bie. There is much to be said about biē in 
Hesiod’s poems, which is unsurprising, perhaps, given that Bie is the last child in the 
list of Styx’s children – the same space Styx herself occupies in the list of Okeanos’ 
daughters, and which indicates her importance. Once again we shall begin our 
investigation by examining the potential meanings of the word, and the different 
qualities associated with it. This will reveal a morally ambiguous figure, as we have 
seen thus far with Styx and her other children.  
 
Whilst the nature of biē in Hesiod as a morally ‘bad’ thing (or of being unjust, or 
having morally ‘bad’ motivations, or dysfunctional and destructive consequences) 
will be clear, the argument for it being morally ‘good’ and functional, and thus overall 
representing an ambiguous quality, requires more explanation. Having examined the 
potential of biē to be just, or useful, I shall then turn to examine whether the 
Theogony’s depiction of violence contains elements where it functions as such a 




Having established that violence can indeed be a morally good/functional tool, we 
will then examine the precise nature of the morality in which biē operates. The 
contemporary models of Alan Fiske and Tage Rai will be useful here in illuminating 
the morally good uses of violence in maintaining a social group, and thus its 
importance to the maintenance of Zeus’ universe.  
 
I will then turn to discuss the Works and Days, which contains a much-discussed 
passage on the nature and morality of violence, to investigate the implications this 
passage, and the Works and Days as a whole, may have for our understanding of 
violence, and whether this impacts how we interpret biē in the Theogony. After 
establishing the exact nature of biē as revealed through the fable, we will then be able 
to examine the rest of the poem to see what else it can tell us about biē.  
 
A final feature of biē we must understand is its relationship to necessity. This 
discussion will be the final comment on biē in this chapter. Its relationship to hatred 
will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 
The Meaning of Biē  
We have already mentioned the etymologies of bia in relation to the overlap in 
meaning with kratos, but let us briefly remind ourselves of the details: Orion’s 5th 
century CE etymology for bia is the oldest we possess, and he derives the word from 
ἴς (is), meaning ‘strength’ or ‘force’ (Beta, p. 33: 6-7). This is the only etymology we 
find in the ancient sources. Contemporary etymologies of biē connect it to victory, 
conquering, and excessive force.  
 
Cunliffe’s Homeric lexicon lists seven different meanings for biē; the first three 
connect it to idea of strength and power, and the action of using them. The fourth 
connects it to ‘courage, spirit’, the fifth to the idea of a person’s ‘might’. The sixth 
connects it to ‘wrongful exercise of strength or power, violence’, and ‘violent 
manifestations of force’. The final meaning relates it to ‘might, power, authority, 
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influence.’305 Hofinger’s Hesiodic lexicon gives ‘force, vigueur, usage de la force; 
violence, usage illégitime de la force’ (‘force, strength, use of force; violence, 
illegitimate use of force).306 Similarly, for the verb form of biē, βιάζω (biazō), 
Cunliffe gives ‘To bring one’s might to bear upon, bear hard upon, press’, and ‘use 
violence against’.307 Hofinger gives ‘user de violence’ – ‘the use of violence’.308 The 
same ideas of ‘force’ and (improper) ‘violence’ also run throughout their entries for 
adjectival and adverbial forms of biē. Hofinger, then, seems to have found the 
connection between ‘force’ and ‘violence’ in Hesiod’s poems obvious. So too, with 
the idea of violence (and biē) as an immoral, unjust, or dysfunctional thing – it is an 
illegitimate use of violence. Equally, Cunliffe connects it to positive ideas such as 
courage and authority. Even within these definitions, we see the presence of a moral 
ambiguity in biē.  
 
When it comes to translations of Bie’s name, nearly all of the translators we have 
examined agree on ‘Force’;309 the exceptions are Frazer, who gives ‘power’,310 and 
Solmsen and West, who give ‘Strength’.311 Throughout the whole of the Theogony, 
only one translator – Lattimore – ever translates biē as ‘violence’. But although the 
word is most frequently translated as ‘force’, the association of violence clearly lurks 
behind it, as we shall see below. The translational decision by so many to avoid 
translating biē as ‘violence’ is indicative of the scholarly concerns with reconciling 
Zeus as a morally positive figure with his use of biē to maintain his rule.  
 
Biē as ‘force’ is still the physical ‘force’ used to overpower someone. Bie is thus the 
hardest to account for among those scholars who read Hesiod as unambiguously 
praising Zeus and attributing to him a positive morality, whilst simultaneously 
attributing a negative morality to the violence represented by biē. Indeed, Zeus’ 
universe, on their reading, is dependent on him behaving justly (i.e. non-violently) 
and honouring the other gods. Zeus must be lawful good, not lawful evil, and thus 
                                                
305 Cunliffe (2012: 70-71). 
306 Hofinger (1975-78: 111). 
307 Cunliffe (2012: 70).  
308 Hofinger (1975-8: 110).  
309 Evelyn-White (1914: 107); Lattimore (1976: 145); Athanassakis (1983: 46); Hine (2005: 67); Most 
(2007a: 35). 
310 Frazer (1986: 52). 
311 Solmsen (1949: 32); West (1988: 14). The translations of Frazer, Solmsen, and West match how 
others have translated kratos, highlighting the semantic overlap of the words.   
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interpretations have focused on presenting biē as morally acceptable because it is not 
violence, or because it can only be used in specific circumstances. However, there is 
no justifiable reason to assume that the positive morality represented by Zeus’ justice 
is identical to that of contemporary, Western, justice (indeed, it is very obviously not 
the same). Nor is there a reason to assume that biē must be either wholly good, or 
wholly bad. We must eschew these assumptions and instead first examine what the 
poems tell us about the morality of biē. Then we can turn to examine its relationship 
to justice. This knowledge will be crucial to fully understanding the nature of hatred.  
 
 
The Functionality/Morality of Violence 
Discussing Zeus’ rulership style, Christopher Ulf comments that Zeus ‘forgoes the 
violence upon which Uranus and Cronus had relied’, and ‘in contrast to the older 
gods, he refrains from violence so long as he is not forced to use it’ (my emphasis).312 
The modern reader may be uncomfortable with this apology – it is, after all, the 
defence of tyrants and abusers, and it reminds us that violence is still considered 
justifiable, given the right circumstances, even in contemporary Western societies. 
But it is also a questionable defence when placed next to what the Theogony itself 
presents us with, as is the claim that Zeus forgoes the violence of his father and 
grandfather. Kronos castrates his father in order to free himself and some of his 
siblings (leaving the Cyclopes and the Hekatoncheires entombed). He then begins his 
reign and swallows his own children in order to stop them overthrowing him. 
Similarly, Zeus, with the help of Rhea, somehow forces Kronos to vomit up the 
offspring he has swallowed, through both biē and τέχνη (technē, ‘craft, art’) – i.e. 
through his craft and his violence. He then leads his siblings in a ten-year war so 
terrible in its final moments that it shakes heaven and Mount Olympos to its 
foundations, and even reaches down to Tartaros (678-83). After this he engages in 
violent struggle again with Typhoeus, and also binds his foe Prometheus in chains, 
leaving him to be partially eaten alive in a daily cycle of pain. From there he proceeds 
to swallow his wife Metis (rather than her offspring), having been warned that her 
offspring would overthrow him, just as Kronos before him was warned, and who 
similarly attempted to avoid that fate by swallowing family members. Biē is clearly 
                                                
312 Ulf (2009: 93, 95). 
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violent, and Zeus does not forgo it. In fact, he uses it in a very similar way to his own 
father, and ultimately surpasses him by coming to possess the personification of Bie. 
Zeus’ use of violence is not any different to, or more restrained than, that of his father.  
 
The violence of Zeus, and the equally violent nature of the thunderbolt is most 
obviously seen in verse 689 in the culmination of the Titanomachy: 
 
Οὐδ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἔτι Ζεὺς ἴσχεν ἑὸν µένος, ἀλλά νυ τοῦ γε  
εἶθαρ µὲν µένεος πλῆντο φρένες, ἐκ δέ τε πᾶσαν  
φαῖνε βίην· ἄµυδις δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἀπ᾽ οὐρανοῦ ἠδ᾽ ἀπ᾽ Ὀλύµπου   
ἀστράπτων ἔστειχε συνωχαδόν, οἱ δὲ κεραυνοὶ   [690] 
ἴκταρ ἅµα βροντῇ τε καὶ ἀστεροπῇ ποτέοντο  
χειρὸς ἄπο στιβαρῆς, ἱερὴν φλόγα εἰλυφόωντες  
ταρφέες. ἀµφὶ δὲ γαῖα φερέσβιος ἐσµαράγιζε  
καιοµένη, λάκε δ᾽ ἀµφὶ πυρὶ µεγάλ᾽ ἄσπετος ὕλη·    
ἔζεε δὲ χθὼν πᾶσα καὶ Ὠκεανοῖο ῥέεθρα    [695] 
πόντος τ᾽ ἀτρύγετος· τοὺς δ᾽ ἄµφεπε θερµὸς ἀυτµὴ  
Τιτῆνας χθονίους, φλὸξ δ᾽ ἠέρα δῖαν ἵκανεν  
ἄσπετος, ὄσσε δ᾽ ἄµερδε καὶ ἰφθίµων περ ἐόντων  
αὐγὴ µαρµαίρουσα κεραυνοῦ τε στεροπῆς τε.  
καῦµα δὲ θεσπέσιον κάτεχεν Χάος· 
       (687-99) 
 
Now Zeus no longer held in his strength, 
   but here his heart filled 
deep with strength, and now he showed 
   his violence entire 
and indiscriminately. Out of the sky 
   and off Olympos 
he moved hurling his lightning incessantly, 
   and the thunderbolts,  
the crashing of them and the blaze 
   together came flying, one after  
another, from his ponderous hand, 
   and spinning whirls of inhuman 
flame, and with it the earth, 
   the giver of life, cried out 
aloud as she burned, and the vast forests 
   in the fire screamed. 
All earth was boiling with it, 
   and the courses of the Ocean 
and the barren sea, and the hot 
   steam of it was engulfing 
the Titans of the earth, while the flames 
   went up to the bright sky 
unquenchably, and the glaring 
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   flash of thunder and lightning 
blinded the eyes of the Titan gods, 
   for all they were mighty. 
The awful burning heat gripped Chaos…313 
 
The biē he demonstrates is the hurling of his weapon, the lightning bolt – a violent, 
damage-inflicting, action. Zeus’ use of biē here allows him to triumph over the Titans. 
Much of the description of the damage caused by Zeus’ lightning we have seen 
already in relation to the Typhonomachy (which comes narratively and 
chronologically after the Titanomachy). Just as we saw with kratos, biē is strongly 
associated with the thunderbolt. Here, as with kratos, the lightning is explicitly 
associated with heat and fire. Not only does the thunderbolt of Zeus burn the earth 
and forests, boil the sea, and send flames up to the sky, but it is also described as 
‘spinning whirls of inhuman // flame’ (ἱερὴν φλόγα εἰλυφόωντες [692]). Just as with 
zēlos and kratos, we see an association with burning, as something which disrupts the 
body, and as manifesting as destructive heat.  
 
Biē is violent and it is essential to his victory; it is useful, and allows him to establish 
justice. But we also see the incredibly destructive power of both biē and kratos (and 
therefore also zēlos): they boil the earth and sea; they burn forests. They destroy the 
ordered universe.  
 
Given the fact that Zeus’ forefathers’ use of violence (especially that of Kronos) is 
easily seen as morally bad, or dysfunctional (because it threatens Zeus and his 
siblings), and the fact that Zeus himself uses that same violence, the idea that Zeus’ 
biē is acceptable because it is not violence, or is only used as a last resort, is 
unfeasible. We cannot understand biē as something other than violence, and we 
cannot understand Zeus’ biē as different to the violence of Kronos and Ouranos. Thus, 
we must conclude that either Zeus’ use of violence is also unjust, or dysfunctional, or 
that violence can be just and functional. 
 
                                                
313 Adapted from Lattimore, who translates the µένεος of verse 688 as ‘fury’. I have instead given 
‘strength’ because µένος is the same word as in the verse above, which Lattimore has translated there 
as ‘strength’. It has the same range of meanings as biē and kratos can – it is associated with 
spiritedness and intention. I have also made changes so that the position and quantity of words relating 
to fire and heat more closely match that of the Greek.     
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For the sake of thoroughly outlining all the problems with the idea of biē as 
intrinsically immoral, or of not being violent, and with the idea of biē not being 
associated with Zeus, it is worth making note of the other figures in the Theogony to 
whom biē is applied. The above mention of biē in relation to Zeus’ lightning draws 
our attention back to the narratological first mention of biē in the Theogony. In verse 
146 it is used to describe the Cyclopes’ works and creations – they who made the very 
thunderbolts Zeus now hurls in the Titanomachy: ἰσχὺς τ᾽ ἠδὲ βίη καὶ µηχαναὶ ἦσαν 
ἐπ᾽ ἔργοις (ischus, biē, and µηχαναὶ, mēchanai, are in their works). The violence of 
the Cyclopes is the biē of the thunderbolts they create for Zeus.  
 
The Hekatoncheires are also frequently associated with biē (649, 670, 677), meaning 
that the three sets of Zeus’ allies in his violent battle – the Hekatoncheires, the 
Cyclopes, and, of course, Styx and her children – all possess or use biē. The fact that 
the violence of all these figures is necessary for Zeus’ victory again suggests a 
beneficial violence – a violence with positive outcomes.  
 
As we have already noted in Chapter Two, the figure most frequently associated with 
biē is Herakles, who is described four times as possessing biē (289, 315, 332, 943). 
And, as we have also already noted, there is a significant overlap between Herakles’ 
possession of biē and his violent acts of killing monsters – acts that are certainly of 
benefit to men, and which mirror the actions of his father. He manifests Zeus’ biē in 
the mortal sphere.   
 
Biē is also associated with Zeus in several other verses. In verses 490-91 it is one of 
the tools by which Zeus will overcome Kronos: ὅ µιν τάχ᾽ ἔµελλε βίῃ καὶ χερσὶ 
δαµάσσας (who soon by force // and his hands defeated him). Here, biē represents a 
violent action, and an action necessary for Zeus to conquer his father. Mere verses 
later biē is used again, in this same description of his victory over his father, again as 
one of the tools with which Zeus has now overcome his father: νικηθεὶς τέχνῃσι 
βίηφί τε παιδὸς ἑοῖο (‘conquered by the craft and violence of his son’ [496]). 
 
It is also, as we have already seen, one of the qualities shown by those to whom 
Hekate, by the will of Zeus, grants victory in games (437). The same associations 
with Zeus, and with a morally positive force, and one necessary for victory, all appear 
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again here.   
 
Finally, in verse 882, biē is used to describe the force by which the Olympians 
collectively have won the Titanomachy. Once again: victory and violence are 
interlinked, and violence serves a functional/moral purpose. The above instances 
represent all of the mentions of biē in the Theogony, and they are all in relation to 
Zeus or his allies. This demonstrates that, contrary to being more associated with 
Zeus’ forebears than with Zeus himself, biē, as violence, is more closely associated 
with Zeus than with his forebears. What’s more, if the actions of Zeus’ father and 
grandfather are violent, it is because they are similar to the actions of Zeus himself.  
 
The fact that biē is only associated with Zeus and his faction underlines its potential, 
as violence, to be considered functional/morally good. It is not justifiable, then, to 
argue either that Zeus’ use of violence is really any different to, or more restrained 
than, that of his father; or that violence is intrinsically morally bad. Given this, we 
must question what it means for violence to be functional/morally good, the details of 
its functionality/moral goodness, and its relationship to justice.  
 
This fact, coupled with the fact that Herakles’ use of biē to overcome monsters 
frequently described using krateros or some related word, adds credence to the idea 




A model that helps illuminate Hesiod’s presentation of violence is the idea of the 
‘virtuous violence’ expounded by Fiske and Rai. Building on the Relational Model 
Theory proposed by Fiske’s 1991 work, Structures of Social Life: The Four 
Elementary Forms of Human Relationships, their theory of virtuous violence explores 
how violence can be used to maintain, end, and initiate social relationships based on 
the four relationship models: Communal Sharing (CS), Authority Ranking (AR), 
Equality Matching (EM), and Market Pricing (MP).314 Of primary interest to our 
current enquiry is the model of AR – how violence can be used to create, sustain, and 
                                                
314 Fiske & Rai (2015). 
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end the social relationships that constitute a hierarchy, but I shall outline briefly all 
the models, as the others will also be relevant, albeit to a lesser extent.  
 
First, however, we must establish whether Fiske and Rai’s work is applicable to our 
investigation; in order for their work to be relevant it must be the case that the 
definition of ‘violence’ they use overlaps meaningfully with that of Hesiod’s biē. The 
definition of violence within which Fiske and Rai work is that consisting ‘of action in 
which the perpetrator regards inflicting pain, suffering, fear, distress, injury, maiming, 
disfigurement, or death as the intrinsic, necessary, or desirable means to the intended 
ends’.315 This definition matches well with the range of actions which biē is used to 
describe in the Theogony: the infliction of pain and suffering (Zeus’ punishment of 
Prometheus [521-5]), fear (which prevents the other children of Gaia from rebelling 
against their father [167-9]), injury (the Titanomachy), and disfigurement and death 
(the monstrous opponents of Herakles). As the examples show, the types of violence 
expressed by Fiske and Rai are present in Hesiod’s poems.  
Fiske and Rai suggest not only that violence can be perceived as moral, but that it is 
usually perceived as having moral motivation – that ‘most violence is the exercise of 
moral rights and obligations’.316 Further, they argue that people conceive of violence 
as a moral necessity for maintaining many social relationships.317 If this conception is 
true of Hesiod, then the exercise of biē becomes an intrinsic part of Zeus’ ability to 
sustain his ordered universe. Before we look at how the virtuous violence model 
enhances our understanding of Hesiod, we must first know what Fiske and Rai’s 
different models of violence are. I shall briefly outline these now.  
 
In the model of Communal Sharing (CS) the guiding principle is one of unity, which 
‘is directed toward caring for and supporting the integrity of in-groups through a 
sense of collective responsibility and common fate.’ The needs of one are the needs of 
all, the guilt of one is the guilt of all, and harm against one is harm against all, and 
requires a collective response.318 We see this model in the Greek notions of miasma, 
                                                
315 Fiske & Rai (2015: 3). This excludes incidents in which the inflicting of pain, suffering or distress is 
accidental, or when it is incidental (e.g. the unavoidable consequence of a surgery to save someone’s 
life). 
316 Fiske & Rai (2015: 1). 
317 Fiske & Rai (2015: 2). 
318 Fiske & Rai (2015: 18).  
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where the pollutions of the actions of one person is shared by a family unit, or even a 
whole city. The miasma created by the actions of Atreus and Tantalos infect the next 
two generations of their family. The miasma of the man who breaks his oath is shared 
by his family and his city, and the victory and glory of the athlete can be shared by his 
family. Kronos’ violence against Zeus’ siblings requires a response from Zeus. 
Violence within CS can also be used as a means of initiation. A violent initiation 
process bonds the group through a shared experience – they have all completed this 
rite of passage.  
 
In the case of Equality Matching (EM), the model strives for equality. Participants 
attempt to balance their relationship so that they maintain equality. This model 
‘provides the moral motivation for maintaining favor-for-favor forms of reciprocity 
and pursuing eye-for-an-eye forms of revenge.’319 The idea of reciprocity is highly 
prevalent in ancient Greece, and, in its positive sense, is seen most easily in the idea 
of xenia. We see this negative reciprocity at work in the fact that, when Zeus defeats 
Kronos, who had imprisoned Zeus’s siblings, Zeus imprisons Kronos instead. Their 
positions are directly reversed.   
 
The Market Pricing model (MP) is similar to EM, but shifts from an-eye-for-an-eye to 
an-eye-for-something-equivalent-to-an-eye. The motive underpinning this model is 
‘proportionality’.320 This model allows justice to manifest in the idea of a punishment 
being proportional to the crime. Fiske and Rai state that ‘the primary violation of 
proportionality is cheating, which we strictly define as referring to instances in which 
individuals attempt to gain benefits that, according to cultural standards, are not 
proportional to what they deserve’.321 To break an oath is an attempt to cheat, to gain 
unlawfully, and is met with a proportionally awful punishment. To attempt to gain 
what one has not earned is a form of envy. This model also has a utilitarian aspect – 
violence is not only moral when it is a proportional punishment, but also when, in a 
cost-benefit analysis, the potential positive result outweighs to potential harm.  
 
Finally, in the model of Authority Ranking (AR) violence is used to maintain the 
                                                
319 Fiske & Rai (2015: 20).  
320 Fiske & Rai (2015: 21).  
321 Fiske & Rai (2015: 21). 
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social and power hierarchies. Violence is perceived by members of the society as 
moral when used by a superior against a subordinate, but not when used by a 
subordinate against a superior. Fiske and Rai’s model does not conceive of the AR 
relationship as intrinsically immoral and they argue that people within the relationship 
– on both ends of the violence – do not perceive it that way either. AR is not simply 
the exercise of power by one individual for their own ends alone: the maintenance of 
the AR relationship also requires leaders to ‘lead, guide, direct, and protect’ their 
subordinates. It is a mutually beneficial model and is perceived by all participants as 
‘natural, good, legitimate, and even necessary’.322 Indeed, within the relationship the 
failure to properly implement violence can be perceived as actively immoral – a 
failure to maintain the relationship which all have entered into and expect to benefit 
from.323 Violence is intrinsic to the maintenance of a hierarchical society.  
 
Indeed, Fiske and Rai themselves demonstrate the presence of both the CS and AR 
models in the Iliad, noting elements such as the communal punishment of the Greeks 
by Apollo when Agamemnon refuses to give Chryseis back to her father, and Paris’ 




Let us turn now to examine the presence of these models in the Theogony. The poem 
contains several examples of authority ranking societies. The first is that established 
by Ouranos, then that of Kronos, and finally that of Zeus. Two of these hierarchies 
fail; only the final one succeeds. AR allows us to understand part of why this should 
be.  
 
Ouranos becomes head of the hierarchy by imprisoning his children. But it is this very 
act that dooms him: to establish a successful framework for the use of violence, the 
leader must also provide their underlings with benefits. Ouranos offers none. 
Likewise with Kronos: in attempting to maintain his position as leader by swallowing 
his children as they are born, he seals his fate. Because he offers no benefits to his 
                                                
322 Fiske & Rai (2015: 19-20). 
323 Fiske & Rai (2015: 19-20, 46). 
324 Fiske & Rai (2015: 86).  
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children, their act of rebellion and violence against their leader is not immoral.  
 
Only Zeus offers his subordinates appropriate compensation for supporting his 
position as leader. In swearing to maintain the honours of those who support him, and 
grant honours to those who lacked them, Zeus makes an oath to correct the mistakes 
of his paternal lineage. Zeus’ oath, and thus Styx, is essential in order for Zeus’ 
violence to be moral. Zeus’ society is founded upon the idea that the members of it 
will gain honours – that there will be some recompense for their lower position in the 
hierarchy.   
 
We have already discussed how oath functions in an MP model – the punishment is 
proportional to the crime, and cheating (or oath-breaking) is the greatest violation of 
this model. Oath and its violent punishment is also at work in the CS model. As we 
have already seen in Chapter One, Hesiod describes Horkos as ‘he who most ruins 
men on earth when anyone intentionally swears falsely’ (Th. 231-2), and also 
describes Styx as being a misery to all the gods (792). Hesiod emphasises this in the 
Works and Days, describing the destruction of men: 
 
αὐτίκα γὰρ τρέχει Ὅρκος ἅµα σκολιῇσι δίκῃσιν·  
τῆς δὲ Δίκης ῥόθος ἑλκοµένης, ᾗ κ᾽ ἄνδρες ἄγωσι   [220] 
δωροφάγοι, σκολιῇς δὲ δίκῃς κρίνωσι θέµιστας·  
ἣ δ᾽ ἕπεται κλαίουσα πόλιν καὶ ἤθεα λαῶν,  
ἠέρα ἑσσαµένη, κακὸν ἀνθρώποισι φέρουσα,  
οἵ τε µιν ἐξελάσωσι καὶ οὐκ ἰθεῖαν ἔνειµαν. 
       (219-24) 
The spirit of Oath is one who runs 
   beside crooked judgments.  
There is an outcry when Justice is dragged perforce, 
   when bribe-eating 
men pull her about, and judge their cases 
   with crooked decisions.  
She follows perforce, weeping, to the city 
   and gatherings of people. 
She puts a dark mist upon her and brings a curse 
   upon all those  
who drive her out, who deal in her 
   and twist her in dealing.  
 
Horkos accompanies justice to the city of the one who has wronged them, visiting all 




οἷς δ᾽ ὕβρις τε µέµηλε κακὴ καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα,  
τοῖς δὲ δίκην Κρονίδης τεκµαίρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεύς. 
πολλάκι καὶ ξύµπασα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπηύρα,   [240] 
ὅστις ἀλιτραίνῃ καὶ ἀτάσθαλα µηχανάαται.  
τοῖσιν δ᾽ οὐρανόθεν µέγ᾽ ἐπήγαγε πῆµα Κρονίων,  
λιµὸν ὁµοῦ καὶ λοιµόν, ἀποφθινύθουσι δὲ λαοί· 
      (238-43) 
 
      But when men like harsh violence 
   and cruel acts, Zeus 
of the wide brows, the son of Kronos, 
   ordains their punishment. 
Often a whole city is paid punishment 
   for one bad man 
who commits crimes and plans reckless action. 
   On this man’s people 
the son of Kronos out of the sky  
   inflicts great suffering.  
Famine and plague together, and the people die 
   and diminish.  
 
The whole society is punished for the breach of conduct by one of its members. CS 
gives all participants a motivation to help to police its order – it is self-maintaining. A 
shared punishment for the actions of one member gives all the incentive to ensure the 
other members do not violate the laws of the society. The gods’ communal hatred of 
oath, therefore, is because, even if they do not break an oath themselves, they will all 
suffer if any other member breaks their oath. They will suffer in particular, if one 
specific member – the authority in charge – breaks their oath. Should Zeus break his 
oath, he would no longer be fulfilling his position as leader by providing benefits to 
his subordinates. They will all lose their honours as Zeus’ society crumbles and a new 
one rises to take its place. The violent punishment for breaking the oath is necessary 
in order to guarantee it is kept, and the group-wide punishment explains their group-
wide hatred of oath. Equally, the benefit of Zeus keeping his oath is shared by all. 
Again, a positive morality lies behind the violence used to prevent perjury.   
 
An element of CS also appears in the communal violence of the rebellion against 
Kronos and the Titans. Fiske and Rai state that one of the things which can create a 
society based on Communal Sharing is a process of initiation. They give the example 
of a violent initiation into a gang wherein the initiate is beaten by existing 
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members.325 But the violence of the initiation need not be directed internally. An 
initiation into a group can also involve an act of violence to someone outside the 
group – a rival, or a perceived threat to the social group. When Kronos defeats his 
father, it is he and he alone who acts. It does not establish a community. But when 
Zeus moves against Kronos in the Titanomachy, others join in. The shared 
participation in the violence creates a newly shared bond and communal identity 
amongst the Olympians. Through the communal sharing in acts of violence, a new 
AR social group is formed, with Zeus at its head – it is an initiation ritual in which 
they have all partaken, and can thus belong to his social group.   
 
Having established his new social group, Zeus also uses violence to protect that group 
from outside threats such as Typhoeus – just as one would expect from the dominant 
member of an AR relationship. His violence protects the benefits of the members 
within the group, and is thus moral.  
 
From the above we see that Zeus’ violence is not only a necessary force for 
establishing and maintaining his universe, but that his use of violence within the 
society can be morally good as long as he also maintains the other duties of the head 
of the hierarchy. Having seen what the Theogony can tell us about biē, we shall now 
turn to see how we can further refine our idea through an examination of the Works 
and Days.  
 
 
The Works and Days: Biē and Hubris 
Within the Works and Days is a frequently discussed passage that may pose problems 
for the AR model demonstrated in the Theogony and thus to the idea of a moral biē. It 
is the fable of the hawk and the nightingale: 
 
Νῦν δ᾽ αἶνον βασιλεῦσιν ἐρέω φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς· 
ὧδ᾽ ἴρηξ προσέειπεν ἀηδόνα ποικιλόδειρον  
ὕψι µάλ᾽ ἐν νεφέεσσι φέρων ὀνύχεσσι µεµαρπώς· 
ἣ δ᾽ ἐλεόν, γναµπτοῖσι πεπαρµένη ἀµφ᾽ ὀνύχεσσι,   [205] 
µύρετο· τὴν ὅ γ᾽ ἐπικρατέως πρὸς µῦθον ἔειπεν· 
“δαιµονίη, τί λέληκας; ἔχει νύ σε πολλὸν ἀρείων· 
                                                
325 Fiske and Rai (2015: 19).  
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τῇ δ᾽ εἶς, ᾗ σ᾽ ἂν ἐγώ περ ἄγω καὶ ἀοιδὸν ἐοῦσαν·  
δεῖπνον δ᾽, αἴ κ᾽ ἐθέλω, ποιήσοµαι ἠὲ µεθήσω.  
ἄφρων δ᾽, ὅς κ᾽ ἐθέλῃ πρὸς κρείσσονας ἀντιφερίζειν·  [210] 
νίκης τε στέρεται πρός τ᾽ αἴσχεσιν ἄλγεα πάσχει.” 
ὣς ἔφατ᾽ ὠκυπέτης ἴρηξ, τανυσίπτερος ὄρνις. 
 
         (202-12) 
 
Now I will tell you a fable for the kings; 
   they understand it. 
This is what the hawk said when he had caught 
   a nightingale  
with spangled neck in his claws and carried her 
   high among the clouds.  
She, spitted on the clawhooks, was wailing pitifully, 
but the hawk, in his masterful manner, 
   gave her an answer: 
  “What is the matter with you? Why scream? 
   Your master has you.  
You shall go wherever I take you, 
   for all your singing.  
If I like, I can let you go. If I like, 
   I can eat you for dinner.  
He is a fool who tries to match his strength 
   with the stronger.  
He will lose his battle, and with the shame 
   will be hurt also.” 
So spoke the hawk, the bird who flies so fast 
   on his long wings.326   
 
The narrative of the fable is simple: a hawk catches a nightingale in his talons, and 
tells her the harsh reality that, sing though she may, the hawk is ‘mightier’ (ἀρείων, 
areiōn [207]) and he will do with her as he pleases. The moral, then, appears to be 
that it is foolish to try and fight against one who is stronger (κρείσσων, kreissōn 
[210]), and doing so leads only to pain (ἄλγος, algos) and shame (αἶσχος, aischos).  
 
But who do these birds represent? The most obvious interpretation of the identity of 
the characters in this fable is that Hesiod himself is the nightingale, and the hawk as 
either the βασιλῆς (basilēs, ‘kings’) or Perses.327 But the parallel between Hesiod and 
the nightingale is obvious: the nightingale is, after all, a songbird and Hesiod a 
rhapsode. The two are explicitly associated in Greek literature.  
                                                
326  Adapted from Lattimore, who translates βασιλεῦσιν as ‘barons’, which is unjustifiably 
anachronistic. I have made this change in all subsequent quotations.  




If Hesiod is the nightingale then whom is the hawk? Before he begins the fable, 
Hesiod states that it is directed towards the basilēs, who ‘understand it’; immediately 
after the fable, Hesiod directs his advice towards Perses. Later, he turns back to the 
basilēs (248-41) before again returning to his brother (274-75). The fact that the fable 
is sandwiched between the basilēs and Perses, and that he refers to both again later 
suggests that both the basilēs and Perses are intended to understand themselves as the 
hawk, and we should understand the identity of the hawk in relation to who Hesiod is 
addressing at the time.  
 
This being the case, it would be odd indeed to understand Hesiod as advocating for 
the violence he clearly thinks he unjustly suffers from. But this identification might 
prove problematic for a number of other reasons. First, in identifying himself with the 
nightingale, Hesiod, equates his own words to the useless song of the nightingale: she 
can sing all she wants, she will not change the mind of the hawk. This would mean 
that all of Hesiod’s exhortations to Perses to behave better would be useless, just as 
the nightingale’s singing is. 
 
Another immediate problem raised by this interpretation is that Hesiod appears to be 
claiming that the violent actions of the hawk are, in fact, just and morally right. This 
would mean that violence can be considered morally right even when there is no 
benefit offered in exchange, and no misdeed to punish. The hawk provides no benefit 
to the nightingale. This would mean that Perses’ violence is morally just, even if he 
provides no benefit to Hesiod for enduring his violence, and even though he should be 
Perses’ equal.  
 
Finally, this moral would diametrically oppose Hesiod’s two exhortations to Perses, 
the first of which is addressed to Perses, and immediately follows the fable: 
 
῏Ω Πέρση, σὺ δ᾽ ἄκουε δίκης µηδ᾽ ὕβριν ὄφελλε· 
ὕβρις γάρ τε κακὴ δειλῷ βροτῷ, 
      (213-14) 
 
But as for you, Perses, listen to justice; 
   do not try to practise 





The second instance comes later, immediately preceding a reference to animals, and 
drawing our attention back to the fable. Animals lack justice, we are told, but men 
were granted justice by Zeus. Because of this, Hesiod advises his brother once again 
to avoid violence: 
 
῏Ω Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα µετὰ φρεσι βάλλεο σῇσι  
καὶ νυ δίκης ἐπάκουε, βίης δ᾽ ἐπιλήθεο πάµπαν. 
       (274-75)  
 
You, Perses, should store away in your mind all 
   that I tell you, 
and listen to justice, and put away 
   all notions of violence. 
 
If we take the fable at face value, then it would appear that Hesiod has gravely 
misunderstood the meaning of his own fable. In answer to these problems, the most 
common reinterpretation of the “fable” has been to take it as not functioning as a fable 
at all, but simply a story of two animals behaving as animals are wont to do.328 Nelson 
has suggested that the intent was that we should reinterpret the fable by revising our 
understanding of who the hawk and the nightingale represent, and take the hawk to 
represent Zeus and the nightingale the kings and Perses.329 Both Nelson and Michael 
Mordine suggest that the true meaning reveals Hesiod’s belief that what constitutes 
justice and appropriate use of violence is different for animals, men, and gods. Nelson 
thinks that the violence of the hawk and Zeus are the same, and follow the same moral 
structure – just like the hawk, Zeus and the gods are not beholden to justice. Mordine, 
on the other hand, thinks that the violence between all three of them differs.330  
 
Mordine argues that the punishment of Prometheus in the Theogony ‘articulates a 
“Theogonic” use of power appropriate to the gods and to Zeus in particular’.331 But, 
for Hesiod, this ‘Theogonic’ use of power is not appropriate to the human realm: 
kings should not act like Zeus. Instead, kings should follow an ‘ethical system 
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appropriate for humans’.332 The model appropriate for humans is one governed by 
dikē, which, Hesiod tells us, was given to men by Zeus:  
 
τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόµον διέταξε Κρονίων,  
ἰχθύσι µὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς  
ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ µετ᾽ αὐτοῖς·  
ἀνθρώποισι δ᾽ ἔδωκε δίκην, ἣ πολλὸν ἀρίστη  
γίγνεται·          
       (276-80) 
 
Here is the law, as Zeus established it 
   for human beings; 
as for fish, and wild animals, and the flying birds,  
they feed on each other, since there is no idea 
   of justice among them; 
but to men he gave justice, and she in the end 
   is proved the best thing 
they have. 
 
The meaning here is clear: violence (biē) is for animals; humans should use dikē  
instead. The logic of such a reading, if used to revise our understanding of the fable, is 
obvious: if animals do not have dikē then the neither the words nor actions of the 
hawk can be taken as a statement on the nature of justice insofar as humans are 
concerned. Equally, the nightingale’s words are useless because they do not have the 
power, as Hesiod’s words do, to speak the will of Zeus, justice, and the truth of 
things. The nightingale’s world lacks justice, and thus their song lacks the power to 
invoke it. The moral(s) we must supply for the original fable would then be that the 
basilēs and Perses are acting as animals do – without justice and with violence. For 
Mordine, the lesson is that they must correct their behaviour and act in a way 
appropriate to humans; they must ‘follow the dictates of justice of arbitrary power’ 
(my emphasis).333  
 
The question then becomes whether Hesiod is saying that that all violence should be 
avoided, or whether it must be regulated by dikē (and that this is requires men to 
follow different rules than those of the gods). If Hesiod is presenting biē and dikē as 
mutually exclusive, the claim becomes an opposition of justice – violence is always 
unjust, and thus always wrong. If this were to be the case, such a total eschewing of 
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violence would contradict Fiske and Rai’s model of virtuous violence, and would 
indeed suggest that Hesiod conceives of violence as inherently morally wrong. We 
would then have to examine what impact this had on the applicability of the idea of 
virtuous violence. Before we can commence such an examination, we must, of course, 
inspect more closely the advice Hesiod gives in order to establish the exact nature of 
biē in the Works and Days.  
 
The first instance of Hesiod advising Perses to abandon violence is in verse 213, 
which comes immediately after the end of the fable: 
 
῏Ω Πέρση, σὺ δ᾽ ἄκουε δίκης, µηδ᾽ ὕβριν ὄφελλε· 
ὕβρις γάρ τε κακὴ δειλῷ βροτῷ… 
      (213-14) 
 
But as for you, Perses, listen to justice; 
   do not try to practise 
violence; violence is bad for the weak man; 
 
The word here for ‘violence’ is not biē, but ὕβρις (hubris), Hubris has connotations of 
unrestrained, excessive or inappropriate violence, of an arrogant pride that assumes 
superiority when there is none. It is this that Mordine takes to be ‘arbitrary power’.334 
Hubris is closely related to, but not identical with, biē. However, just as was the case 
with zēlos and phthonos, investigating the meaning of this other word will enhance 
our understanding of biē.  
 
If we examine the appearance of hubris and related forms in the whole of the Works 
and Days, and in the Theogony, we find it used solely in a negative context. In the 
Works and Days it is used to describe one of the factors that leads to the mutual self-
destruction of the silver race of men:  
 
ἀλλ᾽ ὅτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἡβήσαι τε καὶ ἥβης µέτρον ἵκοιτο,  
παυρίδιον ζώεσκον ἐπὶ χρόνον, ἄλγε᾽ ἔχοντες  
ἀφραδίῃς· ὕβριν γὰρ ἀτάσθαλον οὐκ ἐδύναντο  
ἀλλήλων ἀπέχειν, οὐδ᾽ ἀθανάτους θεραπεύειν   [135] 
ἤθελον οὐδ᾽ ἔρδειν µακάρων ἱεροῖς ἐπὶ βωµοῖς,  
ᾗ θέµις ἀνθρώποις κατὰ ἤθεα. τοὺς µὲν ἔπειτα  
Ζεὺς Κρονίδης ἔκρυψε χολούµενος, οὕνεκα τιµὰς  
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οὐκ ἔδιδον µακάρεσσι θεοῖς οἳ Ὄλυµπον ἔχουσιν. 
      (132-39) 
 
But when it came time for them to grow up  
   and gain full measure, 
they lived for only a poor short time; 
   by their own foolishness 
they had troubles, for they were not able 
   to keep away from 
reckless violence against each other, 
   nor would they worship  
the gods, nor do sacrifice on the sacred altars 
   of the blessed ones,  
which is the right thing among the customs of men, 
  and therefore  
Zeus, son of Kronos, in anger engulfed them, 
   for they paid no due  
honours to the blessed gods who live on Olympos.335  
 
The men of this age cannot refrain from violence towards each other, but each man is 
attempting to use a violence that exceeds their rank. They are equals fighting equals: 
neither has the moral right to rule the other and therefore violence cannot be used 
among them to successfully establish a social relationship. As a group of equals, 
violence must be directed towards outsiders who present a threat to the group in order 
to be virtuous. Their second crime, of not worshipping or honouring the gods, also fits 
within the hierarchical model established by Zeus in the Theogony, in which order is 
maintained because the gods are given their due honours. Mordine points to the fact 
that one clear understanding of hubris is ‘when a human tries to act like a god.’336 
Thus, then men of the silver age break the rules for relationships of virtuous violence 
in two ways. Firstly, in their actions towards each other they are appropriating a type 
of violence from a higher rank in the hierarchy than is rightfully theirs. Secondly, the 
fact that the men of the silver age do not worship the gods puts them at odds with 
what their superiors should expect from them based on their respective places in the 
hierarchy. Thus, Zeus removes them from it.  
 
Hubris is also used of the bronze race of men, who love Ares, and destroy each other 
by their own hand, and who, we recall, also possess kraterophrona thumon (strong-
                                                
335 Adapted from Lattimore, who here translates ὕβριν, hubrin, as ‘crime’.  





Ζεὺς δὲ πατὴρ τρίτον ἄλλο γένος µερόπων ἀνθρώπων  
χάλκειον ποίησ᾽, οὐκ ἀργυρέῳ οὐδὲν ὁµοῖον,  
ἐκ µελιᾶν, δεινόν τε καὶ ὄβριµον· οἷσιν Ἄρηος  
ἔργ᾽ ἔµελε στονόεντα καὶ ὕβριες, οὐδέ τι σῖτον  
ἤσθιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀδάµαντος ἔχον κρατερόφρονα θυµόν.  
[ἄπλαστοι· µεγάλη δὲ βίη καὶ χεῖρες ἄαπτοι  
ἐξ ὤµων ἐπέφυκον ἐπὶ στιβαροῖσι µέλεσσι.] 
       (143-49) 
 
then Zeus the father created the third generation 
   of mortals,  
the age of bronze. They were not like  
   the generation of silver. 
They came from ash spears. They were terrible  
   and strong, and the ghastly 
action of Ares was theirs, and violence. 
   They ate no bread, 
but maintained a strong-willed and adamantine spirit. 
None could come near them; their strength was big, 
   and from their shoulders 
the arms grew irresistible on their ponderous bodies.337 
 
Note that both hubris and biē (which Lattimore has here translated as ‘strength’) 
appear in these verses. Hubris relates to the actions of these men – to their violence 
towards one another. Biē relates to their bodies. Their bodies possess the potential to 
be dangerous because of their biē but it is the actual demonstration of violence that is 
hubris. 
 
Thus far, this is compatible with the idea of how violence should and should not be 
used within an AR model: hubris is a negative violence, the incorrect use of violence. 
When bie is associated with hubris, it too, can represent the incorrect use of violence.  
 
Hubris is also used three times within Hesiod’s address to his brother after the fable 
of the hawk and the nightingale in a way that positions it as a negative quality. First, 
as we have seen, Hesiod tells Perses to avoid it (213). He then he states that even the 
good man cannot bear it easily (214-7). The end result of the good man trying to use 
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willed’ so that the reader relying on the translation can see clearly where the word falls in the English.  
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hubris will be, when he encounters ἄτη (atē, ‘bewilderment’, ‘ruin’, ‘folly’), 
corruption. He will start to make crooked judgements, breaking oaths and abandoning 
justice. This would result in the failure of the AR relationship: the good man’s 
violence cannot here be moral, because he is no longer supplying the benefits 
necessary to legitimise his rank and violence. 
 
The third mention of hubris in this passage is in the claim that Dike restrains (ἴσχει, 
ischei) Hubris. Dike holds the τέλος (telos) – the greater authority; it is the most 
supreme power (217-18): Dike will beat Hubris in the end. The positioning of these 
two as foes again suggests the idea that hubris cannot have a role in a just universe: 
hubris is never just. This would certainly be a problem for our AR model if hubris 
were to be identical to biē.  
 
The penultimate mention of hubris in the Works and Days is in verse 191, describing 
the awful end of the current age of man:  
 
οὐδέ τις εὐόρκου χάρις ἔσσεται οὐδὲ δικαίου  
οὐδ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ, µᾶλλον δὲ κακῶν ῥεκτῆρα καὶ ὕβριν  
ἀνέρα τιµήσουσι· δίκη δ᾽ ἐν χερσί· καὶ αἰδὼς  
οὐκ ἔσται, βλάψει δ᾽ ὁ κακὸς τὸν ἀρείονα φῶτα  
µύθοισι σκολιοῖς ἐνέπων, ἐπὶ δ᾽ ὅρκον ὀµεῖται.  
       (190-4) 
 
There will be no favour for the man 
   who keeps his oath, for the righteous 
and the good man, rather evil men shall give their praise 
   to violence 
and the doer of evil. Right will be in the arm.  
   Shame will 
not be. The vile man will crowd his better out, 
   and attack him  
with twisted accusations and swear an oath 
   to his story. 
 
They will not keep their oaths; men will instead praise the violence of him whose 
deeds are evil. Note that this sets hubris up against the role of Styx herself. It is a 
violence that destabilises the AR social group through perjury, rather than 
maintaining it by keeping oaths. It is wholly unsurprising, then, that in verses 238-9 




οἷς δ᾽ ὕβρις τε µέµηλε κακὴ καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα,  
τοῖς δὲ δίκην Κρονίδης τεκµαίρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεύς.  
 
      But when men like harsh violence 
   and cruel acts, Zeus 
of the wide brow, the son of Kronos 
   ordains their punishment.  
 
The ‘punishment’ is the correct ordination of judgement – of punishment. This is 
Zeus’ Justice. It is inseparable from the violence of punishment. The incorrect usage 
of violence is controlled by the correct application of punishment. The violent nature 
of Zeus’ punishment is virtuous, because it is in pursuit of maintaining his ordered 
universe and hierarchy.  
 
Turning to the Theogony, we find hubris used two times: in verse 307 it is used to 
describe Typhoeus, who will become Zeus’ final opponent; in verse 514 it is used of 
Menoetius, whom Zeus punishes for his hubris. We are given no details of what 
exactly his hubris was, but he is, like Atlas, a brother of Prometheus, and thus we 
shall put off until later discussing him in more detail.   
 
Every use, then, of hubris in both poems is wholly negative. This is hardly surprising, 
given the meaning of the word, but in each instance the word is used in a way that is 
in line with what we would expect to be shunned by a model of virtuous violence. Or, 
to put it another way, there is no instance in which the hubris described in the poems 
is something which would be seen as virtuous. Thus, Zeus punishing those who use 
hubris (Works and Days 238) and Hesiod’s exhortation to his brother to avoid it (213) 
provide no problem for the use of the AR model in relation to biē as a virtuous 
violence.  
 
Having examined the usage of hubris and its difference from biē, we are left with 
only one instance in which Hesiod appears to show biē in a seemingly intrinsically 
morally bad way: 
 
῏Ω Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα µετὰ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσι 
καὶ νυ δίκης ἐπάκουε, βίης δ᾽ ἐπιλήθεο πάµπαν.  [275] 
τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόµον διέταξε Κρονίων, 
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ἰχθύσι µὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς 
ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ µετ᾽ αὐτοῖς· 
ἀνθρώποισι δ᾽ ἔδωκε δίκην, ἣ πολλὸν ἀρίστη  
γίνεται· εἰ γάρ τίς κ᾽ ἐθέλῃ τὰ δίκαι᾽ ἀγορεῦσαι   [280] 
γινώσκων, τῷ µέν τ᾽ ὄλβον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεύς·  
ὃς δέ κε µαρτυρίῃσιν ἑκὼν ἐπίορκον ὀµόσσας  
ψεύσεται, ἐν δὲ δίκην βλάψας νήκεστον ἀασθῇ,  
τοῦ δέ τ᾽ ἀµαυροτέρη γενεὴ µετόπισθε λέλειπται· 
ἀνδρὸς δ᾽ εὐόρκου γενεὴ µετόπισθεν ἀµείνων.  [285] 
       (274-85) 
 
You, Perses, should store away in your mind all 
   that I tell you, 
and listen to justice, and put away 
   all notions of violence. 
Here is the law, as Zeus established it 
   for human beings; 
as for fish, and wild animals, and the flying birds, 
they feed on each other, since there is no idea 
   of justice among them; 
but to men he gave justice, and she in the end 
   is proved the best thing 
they have. If a man sees what is right 
   and is willing to argue it, 
Zeus of the wide brows grants him prosperity. 
But when one, knowingly tells lies and swears 
   an oath on it, 
when he is so wild as to do incurable damage 
   against justice, 
this man is left a diminished generation hereafter, 
but the generation of the true-sworn man 
   grows stronger. 
 
 
It is indeed biē that Hesiod advises Perses to abstain from altogether, rather than the 
hubris he had told him to avoid previously in verse 213. ‘Be attentive to justice!’ 
(δίκης ἐπάκουε [275]), he demands. ‘Forget violence entirely’ (βίης δ᾽ ἐπιλήθεο 
πάµπαν [275]). But why should Perses forget violence entirely? Zeus ordained a law 
for men requiring them to adhere to justice. He ordained no such thing for the 
animals. They eat each other, because justice is not within them. Zeus ordained a law 
that man should act with justice. The violence (biē), which Zeus ordained for animals, 
is what Perses should forget entirely – stop acting like an animal. Stop acting like a 
hawk. Stop using a violence that is not regulated by dikē.338  
                                                




In ordaining biē without dikē for animals, Zeus is placing them outside a hierarchy to 
which the AR model can be applied. Hubris represents the improper use of violence 
within a hierarchy or social group, but biē can represent both its legitimate use within 
a hierarchy or social group, and a violence that exists outside such frameworks, and 
which has the potential to disrupt or establish a hierarchy.  
 
This ordination to avoid biē and follow dikē is specifically for Perses – not for gods. 
Indeed, it cannot be applicable to gods given that Zeus possesses both Bie and Dike. 
Because Zeus possesses both of these figures, we must understand his possession of 
them as internally cohesive. Just as what is appropriate to the animals is not 
appropriate to man, what is appropriate to Perses is not appropriate to Zeus.  
 
Note that it is specifically Perses, not man in general, that Hesiod is exhorting to 
abstain from biē. The clue as to why this should be the case is given at the beginning 
of the Works and Days:  
 
  ἀλλ᾽ αὖθι διακρινώµεθα νεῖκος  
ἰθείῃσι δίκῃς, αἵ τ᾽ ἐκ Διός εἰσιν ἄρισται.  
ἤδη µὲν γὰρ κλῆρον ἐδασσάµεθ᾽, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ  
ἁρπάζων ἐφόρεις µέγα κυδαίνων βασιλῆας  
δωροφάγους, οἳ τήνδε δίκην ἐθέλουσι δίκασσαι.  
       (35-40) 
 
No, come, let us finally settle 
   our quarrel 
with straight decisions, which are from Zeus, 
   and are the fairest. 
Now once before we divided our inheritance, 
   but you seized  
the greater part and made off with it, 
   gratifying those kings 
who eat bribes, who are willing 
   to give out such a decision. 
 
Perses has perverted justice. He has cheated, and thus broken the social contract 
which should exist among equals. Hesiod is part of Perses’ social (and familial) 
group, and should not have been a target of Perses’ cheating. Indeed, when Hesiod 
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exhorts Perses to abstain from biē and to follow dikē, biē is equated with swearing 
false and breaking oaths (282-83). Perses’ violence works against justice, not 
alongside it. Keeping one’s oath is required in order to use biē in line with dikē, and 
indeed, defines all violence necessary to keep one’s oath as moral. The same is also 
true of the basilēs, if we take Hesiod’s advice to them to indicate that they have not 
been behaving as they ought: 
 
῏Ω βασιλῆς, ὑµεῖς δὲ καταφράζεσθε καὶ αὐτοὶ  
τήνδε δίκην· ἐγγὺς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἐόντες  
ἀθάνατοι φράζονται ὅσοι σκολιῇσι δίκῃσιν  
ἀλλήλους τρίβουσι θεῶν ὄπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες. 
      (248-50) 
 
You kings, also, cannot even you 
   understand for yourselves 
how justice works? For the immortals 
   are close to us, they mingle 
with men, and are aware of those who 
   by crooked decisions 
break other men, and care nothing  
   for what the gods think of it. 339 
 
This question to the basilēs suggests that, contrary to Hesiod’s prior statement, they 
do not understand the fable. They are also failing to follow dikē. Their position of 
authority should grant them the same access to truth as Hesiod, and yet either it does 
not, or they are choosing to ignore it. Hesiod must not only explain the moral, he must 
encourage them to follow it. As a rhapsode, he can reveal the nature of Zeus’ justice: 
it is the keeping of oaths.  
 
For Hesiod, it is oaths that underpin the AR model, ensuring that if followed, violence 
will be ‘virtuous’ – it will be just. Zeus’ use of biē is moral because it acts alongside 
justice – he keeps his oath. But Perses has shown that he cannot act justly, nor keep an 
oath, and thus he is unequipped to use biē – he is incapable of using it in a morally 
permissible way, and thus must abstain altogether. The exhortation to avoid biē is 
specific to Perses alone, not to mankind as a whole. It does not reflect an intrinsically 
immoral biē. Instead, it explains why Perses himself cannot use biē in an acceptable 
way. Here we see a direct connection between violence and oath: keeping an oath is 
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the guarantor of justice, and that justice does not involve abstaining from either biē or 
hatred, but using them in the appropriate way.  
 
 
Biē and the Works and Days 
Now that we understand the meaning of Hesiod’s advice to Perses to refrain from 
using biē, we can now investigate what else we can discover from the poem about the 
nature of biē.  
 
Having told his brother to abstain from biē, Hesiod then begins to explain the true 
nature of biē – when it is, and when it isn’t, appropriate. In verses 320-26, he explains 
one of the ways in which biē should not be used:  
 
χρήµατα δ᾽ οὐχ ἁρπακτά, θεόσδοτα πολλὸν ἀµείνω·  [320] 
εἰ γάρ τις καὶ χερσὶ βίῃ µέγαν ὄλβον ἕληται,  
ἢ ὅ γ᾽ ἀπὸ γλώσσης ληίσσεται, οἷά τε πολλὰ  
γίνεται, εὖτ᾽ ἂν δὴ κέρδος νόον ἐξαπατήσῃ  
ἀνθρώπων, αἰδῶ δέ τ᾽ ἀναιδείη κατοπάζῃ,  
ῥεῖα δέ µιν µαυροῦσι θεοί, µινύθουσι δὲ οἶκον   [325] 
ἀνέρι τῷ, παῦρον δέ τ᾽ ἐπὶ χρόνον ὄλβος ὀπηδεῖ.  
  
 
Goods are not to be grabbed; much better if God 
   lets you have them.  
If any man by force of hands wins him 
   a great fortune, 
or steals it by the cleverness of his tongue, 
   as so often 
happens among people when the intelligence 
   is blinded  
by greed, a man’s shameless spirit tramples 
   his sense of honour; 
lightly the gods wipe out that man, and diminish 
   the household 
of such a one, and his wealth stays with him 
   for only a short time.  
 
Man should not use biē to try to obtain profit – violence is not appropriate to this 
purpose, nor to man’s place in the universal hierarchy. Bie here represents the actions 
of the man of zēlos, who gains for himself by taking from others – who follows the 
bad Eris, rather than the good Eris. An improper use of zēlos goes hand-in-hand with 
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an improper use of biē. To use attempt to use biē against one’s fellow man would be 
hubristic.   
 
If Perses instead works himself, happiness will be granted him by the gods. This is in 
line with the idea that the violence of gods towards men can be moral, because they 
are figures higher up in the hierarchy, who can, and do, also dispense privileges to 
lower ranking members, as required by their position. Their permit to use violence is 
accompanied by an obligation to look after those who behave appropriately. The use 
of violence by a man to obtain goods for himself provides no benefit to others within 
the society, either communally or in recompense to subordinates – it is not virtuous.  
 
Hesiod also gives a specific list of the people and advises against specific types of 
violence towards them. His advice falls exactly in line with what we would expect to 
see from a model of virtuous violence: 
 
Ἶσον δ᾽ ὅς θ᾽ ἱκέτην ὅς τε ξεῖνον κακὸν ἔρξει,  
ὅς τε κασιγνήτοιο ἑοῦ ἀνὰ δέµνια βαίνῃ  
[κρυπταδίῃς εὐνῇς ἀλόχου, παρακαίρια ῥέζων],  
ὅς τέ τευ ἀφραδίῃς ἀλιταίνητ’ ὀρφανὰ τέκνα,    [330] 
ὅς τε γονῆα γέροντα κακῷ ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ  
νεικείῃ χαλεποῖσι καθαπτόµενος ἐπέεσσι· 
τῷ δ᾽ ἦ τοι Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἀγαίεται, ἐς δὲ τελευτὴν  
ἔργων ἀντ᾽ ἀδίκων χαλεπὴν ἐπέθηκεν ἀµοιβήν.  
       (327-34) 
 
It is the same when one does evil to guest 
   or suppliant,  
or goes up into the bed of his brother, to lie 
   in secret  
love with his brother’s wife, doing acts 
   that are against nature; 
or who unfeelingly abuses fatherless children,  
or speaks roughly with intemperate words 
   to his failing  
father who stands upon the evil doorstep  
   of old age; 
with all these Zeus in person is indignant, 
   and in the end  
he makes them pay a bitter price 
   for their unrighteous dealings.340  
                                                




These are the targets to whom a superior owes a duty of care, and the violence Hesiod 
advises against is specifically that which would breach that duty of care: the men of 
the family unit, the orphaned children of their family, and the suppliants and guests 
protected under the code of xenia. Further, within the broader cosmic model, humans 
as a whole represent a single tier within Zeus’ hierarchy. On this cosmic level they are 
inappropriate targets for each other’s violence, which should be directed towards 
targets outside the group, not within it. Just as with the hubris of the men of the silver 
and bronze ages, any attempt by Perses to use biē in this way would instead result in 
hubris. His violence, like that of the men of the silver and bronze ages, should be a 
model of Communal Sharing, a violence directed outwards, not inwards to the group.    
 
The textual evidence in both the Theogony and the Works and Days, then, strongly 
supports the use of an AR model to understand Hesiod’s conception of biē and its 
functions. Ouranos and Kronos’ misuses of violence are acts of hubris and cause the 
downfall of their respective social groups; Zeus’ use of violence forms and maintains 
both his social group of divine figures and also the hierarchy of mortals he oversees, 
and the use of violence by humans is inappropriate to their place in Zeus’ cosmic 
hierarchy. Typhoeus’ behaviour is hubristic, and he is overthrown by the biē of Zeus’ 
lightning. Once again, Hesiod has represented a force as both good and bad, both 
dangerous and useful. Just as zēlos, nikē and kratos are all both things to be avoided 
as harmful, and things to be prized as a source of productivity and power, so too does 
biē support a social order, and sometimes overthrow it. If used incorrectly, it 
manifests as hubris. Even a just use of biē manifests a terrifyingly destructive power – 
Zeus’ use of his thunderbolts reveals the power of biē to destroy the ordered universe 
– as it would do if he broke his oath. It is keeping his oath that allows him to wield 
biē, rather than hubris. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
word is κακῷ (kakōi, ‘evil, worthless’), which is not related to the words for hatred that we are 
examining. He also gives ‘is angry’ for ἀγαίεται (agaietai). The more accurate meaning is ‘is 




The final element of biē that we must note, which interlinks with kratos, is that both 
are connected in the Theogony to a sense of necessity and constraint. We have already 
seen the necessity of kratos indicated both by its pervasiveness in Zeus’ universe, and 
by the fact that it is essential to Zeus’ victory. We have also seen the necessity of biē 
for establishing and maintaining Zeus’ hierarchy. But Hesiod links the ideas even 
more explicitly than that. It is finally time to address the final two instances of kratos. 
The adjective krateros is used twice within the Theogony to describe the strength of 
bonds or constraints. It is used in verse 618 to describe the strength of the bond 
(δεσµός, desmos) with which Kronos bound the Hekatoncheires: δῆσε κρατερῷ ἐνὶ 
δεσµῷ (bound them in a strong bond). 
 
The noun desmos is again used to describe the bonds (plural, this time) of the 
Hekatoncheires in verse 501 and in verse 659 when they talk of their past 
confinement. It is applied again to the binding of the Titans by the Hekatoncheires 
(718). Finally, it is used of the binding of Prometheus twice – in verse 522, and verse 
616: 
 
οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἰαπετιονίδης ἀκάκητα Προµηθεὺς  
τοῖό γ᾽ ὑπεξήλυξε βαρὺν χόλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκης  
καὶ πολύιδριν ἐόντα µέγας κατὰ δεσµὸς ἐρύκει. 
(614-16) 
 
for not even the son of Iapetos, 
   the gentle Prometheus, 
was able to elude that heavy anger, 
   but, for all his 
numerous shifts, necessity 
   and the mighty chain confine him.341 
 
Another word which appears here, and which emphasises the idea of constraint, is 
ἀνάγκη (anagkē) meaning ‘constraint, necessity’. Anagkē makes clear the interlinking 
of binding forces and necessity. It is also the other word to which krateros is applied 
in relation to binding and constraint: in verse 517 it is used to describe the constraint 
under which Atlas holds up the heavens: Ἄτλας δ᾽ οὐρανὸν… ἔχει κρατερῆς ὑπ᾽ 
                                                
341Adapted from Lattimore to render anagkēs as ‘necessity’ rather than Lattimore’s ‘force’. 
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ἀνάγκης, ‘Atlas holds up the heavens through krateros constraint’. Atlas is confined 
to a single location, forced by his predicament to remain in that position. His bonds 
are not the chains of Prometheus, but he is just as constrained.  
 
Atlas is a brother of Prometheus, along with Menoitios and Epimetheus. All four 
brothers are punished by Zeus. Menoitios is one of the figures described as ὕβριστος, 
hubristos (514). He has a violence exceeding what is appropriate for him and Zeus 
punishes him by striking him down to Erebos (not Tartaros), with his ψολόεντι 
κεραυνῷ (psoloenti keraunōi), his ‘sooty thunderbolt’ (515) – i.e. his kratos and biē.  
 
Only Epimetheus, who poses no threat to Zeus, is punished in a way that does not 
include constraint or violence. After a lengthy digression into the crimes of 
Prometheus, Hesiod finally returns to Epimetheus. For Prometheus’ sins, Zeus 
fashions a white elephant for Epimetheus: Pandora. Through Pandora evils will be 
released on the world of men. Prometheus’ punishment will be shared communally by 
men, just as his gifts were – yet another example of violence in a communal sharing 
model. We shall have more to say about the sons of Iapetos in Chapter Four, but there 
is more to be said first regarding the connections between necessity and constraint, 
and kratos and biē. 
 
If we return briefly to the etymology of the words, we find Orion (5th century CE) 
giving bia and anagkē as the sources of the word bios (‘life’), on the cheery grounds 
that life is toil and hardship (Beta, p. 31: 1-2). The occurrence of anagkē alongside biē 
is unsurprising, given that βιάζω (biazō – or biaō in its epic form), a verb closely 
related to biē, also has the sense of ‘constrain’. Similarly, anagkē can also have the 
sense of ‘violence’. In Herodotus (5th century BCE) we find it used to indicate 
something done under threat of violence (1.116.4-5) and later by Polybius (3rd – 2nd 
century BCE) to describe instruments of torture (15.28.1-2).342  
 
The verb biazō appears once within the poems. It is in the Theogony, where it is used 
in a negated sense in relation to Hekate: ‘οὐδέ τί µιν Κρονίδης ἐβιήσατο…’ – ‘nor 
                                                
342 Pausanias (2.4.6) notes that Anagke and Bie have a sanctuary on mount Akrokorinthos (Ἀνάγκης 
καὶ Βίας ἐστὶν ἱερόν). Interestingly, he also notes that it is customary that no one enters this sanctuary 




did the son of Kronos constrain her…’ (423). To constrain Hekate would be to break 
his oath, and, given that she represents his will, it would be to constrain his own will.  
 
The idea of the connection between both kratos and biē, and constraint and necessity, 
is also strengthened by the appearance and role of Kratos and Bie in the Prometheus 
Bound. They arrive with Hephaistos to make sure that he binds Prometheus properly 
in his chains, and anagkē is used to refer to the binding of Prometheus (16, 72, 108), 
and the indestructible force of those constraints (105, 515).  
 
The idea of ‘constraining’, then, inextricably interlinks the idea of kratos and biē with 
qualities of Styx. As oath, Styx both constrains the actions of gods and men, and 
physically constrains those who break their oaths. As river, Styx constrains the 
ordered and disordered realms of Zeus’ universe, fencing them off from each other 
yet binding them together. Hatred keeps both the outgroup and the ingroup in their 





At this point we usually turn to examine the relationship between biē and hatred, but 
given that we have now inspected all four children, it will be more efficient to discuss 
the relationship between biē and hatred when discussing the interrelatedness of the 
whole family. Before doing so, let us remind ourselves about what we have learned of 
both kratos and biē so far.  
 
We have seen the interrelatedness of kratos, biē, and nikē. And just as with nikē, both 
kratos and biē have both positive and negative connotations. The most obvious 
element that both kratos and biē add to our understanding of hatred and hate scripts is 
the enacting of violence and imprisonment. Dealing as he is with largely immortal 
opponents, Zeus’ predominant use of kratos and biē is to defeat, constrain, and 
imprison, though when directed against mortals they can be used to kill.  
  
The association between hatred and violence is unsurprising, but Hesiod does more 
than associate the two. He provides information about how violence should be used, 
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and in doing so also provides information about how hatred should be used. Fisk and 
Rai’s model of virtuous violence allows us to understand when violence is and is not 
dysfunctional/immoral. Violence is dysfunctional/immoral when it threatens to upset 
a legitimate social group by destabilising the social group internally, such as when it 
is used by equal members of a social group against each other. The same is true when 
a superior uses violence without providing an equivalent benefit. Thus, the violence 
of Ouranos and Kronos is immoral, because they provide no benefit to their 
subordinates.  
 
Violence is morally good when used by a superior against a subordinate, to maintain 
the rules of a society which benefits all. It is morally positive when directed towards 
figures outside a group of equals, and who threaten its stability. Violence can also be 
moral when it is used to overthrow an unstable or dysfunctional social group which 
uses violence incorrectly. Zeus’ use of violence is moral because it functions as part 
of the justice of the society and is in line with its rules: Zeus provides the benefit of 
honours, and cements the stability of his hierarchy by introducing oath as a governing 
principle. Oaths are used to negate the threat presented to a social group by cheating 
and crooked judgements by providing an appropriate punishment for these breaches 
of the laws of the society. If one cannot obey justice, then one cannot use violence in 
a constructive way. The ambiguity of biē is reaffirmed: it is not intrinsically moral or 
immoral, dysfunctional or functional, but situationally so, depending on whether it 
abides by the laws of the social group. 
 
Hateful violence should not be wanton acts committed out of a desire only to destroy 
– the desire to destroy, or imprison, should be related to the desire to establish and 
preserve. Zeus’ use of violence and hatred establishes and preserves his new, just, 
order. It is a violence that protects. This is the script for correct use of hatred that 








Having investigated the qualities represented by the children of Styx and how they 
interact with hatred, we are now in a position to examine hatred as a whole within the 
poems of Hesiod. Some of these instances are identifiable because they explicitly use 
a word for hatred. But there will also be other potential scenes where, despite hatred 
not being explicitly mentioned, we might expect to see hatred based on the script we 
have developed over the preceding chapters.  
 
We will investigate each poem in turn, beginning with the Theogony, and with figures 
that are explicitly mentioned as either hating or being hated. The figures that are 
explicitly mentioned as either hating or hated can be divided into two groups. The 
first group of such figures is the patrilineal line of Ouranos, Kronos, and Zeus. A 
second group contains figures that relate to the laws underpinning Zeus’ universe. 
After these two groups we can look at who else in the Theogony might be hated. This 
discussion will include Prometheus. Based on the explicit description of Zeus’ 
attitude towards Prometheus, this will lead us to investigate anger in Hesiod, and thus 
the relationship between anger and hatred in Hesiod.  
 
Following the investigation of the Theogony we will move on to discuss the Works 
and Days, following the same format as for the Theogony. First we will examine the 
instances in which words for hatred are explicitly mentioned and then turn to 
instances in which, whilst a word for hatred is absent, the emotional script for hatred 
appears to be in operation.  
 
This chapter will therefore serve to interweave all the knowledge we have 
accumulated over the course of the previous chapters, constructing the final tapestry 





Theogony I: Ouranos, Kronos, Zeus 
The (narratological) first figure is one who is hating another – it is Kronos who ‘hated 
his engorged father’, Ouranos (θαλερὸν δ᾽ ἤχθηρε τοκῆα. [138]). Detienne and 
Vernant suggest that Kronos’ hatred stems from the fact that his father is θαλερός 
(thaleros) – he is ‘vigorous, full of vitality, full of sap’. He is sexually hyperactive. In 
practice, this means that ‘the nature of Ouranos, who is “avid for love” prevents the 
children he has engendered from occupying the place in the sun which is their due’.343 
Kronos hates his father because his father is depriving him of something. This is a 
hatred directed towards the incorrect use of violence in a hierarchical model – a 
violence which lacks any compensation. It is also a violence directed towards 
inherently unacceptable targets: family members.  
 
Detienne and Vernant extend Kronos’ hatred to all the children of Gaia and Ouranos, 
which seems reasonable, given that the situation is one shared by all. But is there 
textual justification for this? Why would Hesiod mention the hatred of Kronos alone 
if it is a sentiment shared by all? When Gaia asks for a volunteer to help stop 
Ouranos, the rest, we are told, are seized with fear (δέος, deos), and remain silent 
(167-8). Their fear prevents action. The fearful subject desires to stay away from the 
source of its fear, not to attack or harm it. Kronos alone – the hating one – is able to 
act. But, we may note, although his hatred extends as far as an extreme act of violence 
against his father, it does not lead to ostracisation. Ouranos retreats from his union 
with Gaia, but retreats only so far as his proper place in the heavens. Note that this is 
the only instance in Hesiod’s poems where a word that undeniably means ‘fear’ 
appears. The fear of the other children, and their inability to act, is contrasted sharply 
with Kronos’ hatred of his father and his ability to act violently against him. If we 
recall one of the studies conducted by Halperin, fear was associated with a judgement 
that one’s ability to control a situation was low.344 In this instance, the fear of the 
other children of Ouranos becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy in relation to their ability 
to handle a situation: their fear prevents them from even trying to control it. Their fear 
trumps any hatred they might have, and prevents access to the tools of hatred which 
would allow them to act.  
 
                                                
343 Detienne & Vernant (1991: 63).  
344 Halperin (2008: 723-24). 
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This instance of hatred reveals two things: first, that hatred can be a motivator to 
violent action if it is the dominant emotion, and secondly, that hatred is not governed 
only by one’s circumstances, but also by an individual’s character: despite their 
shared circumstances, hatred is not the emotion experienced by all of the children. 
Their lack of hatred allows them to be dominated by other emotions that prevent 
action. Their inability to act – to hate as Kronos does – reveals that they do not have 
the necessary strength of character to express biē or kratos, to conquer their opponent, 
and establish and maintain their rule. Kronos’ hatred is what allows him to act: to 
rebel, to overcome, to be victorious, and to rule. 
 
This is an idea we see addressed far more explicitly in the Works and Days, where 
Hesiod makes clear the association between character, emotions, and the ability to act 
correctly or justly. The man who loves work, toil, and the good Eris behaves justly 
and appropriately; the men at the end of the final age are governed by an envy and a 
hatred which they do not know how to control, and thus act unjustly. The envious 
rivalries described between craftsmen at the start of the Works and Days is expressed 
in a way that demonstrates their good character through their ability to act 
appropriately and productively upon on emotion. Those overwhelmed by hubris 
display a bad character and act unjustly. And the man of bad character will more 
quickly succumb to hubris than the man of good character.     
 
The chronological first mention of hatred is that of Ouranos himself, who hates some 
(or all) of his offspring from the start: 
 
 Ἅλλοι δ᾽ αὖ Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἐξεγένοντο  
τρεῖς παῖδες µεγάλοι <τε> καὶ ὄβριµοι, οὐκ ὀνοµαστοί,  
Κόττος τε Βριάρεώς τε Γύγης θ᾽, ὑπερήφανα τέκνα.  
τῶν ἑκατὸν µὲν χεῖρες ἀπ᾽ ὤµων ἀίσσοντο,    [150] 
ἄπλαστοι, κεφαλαὶ δὲ ἑκάστῳ πεντήκοντα  
ἐξ ὤµων ἐπέφυκον ἐπὶ στιβαροῖσι µέλεσσιν,  
ἰσχὺς τ᾽ ἄπλητος κρατερὴ µεγάλῳ ἐπὶ εἴδει.  
 Ὅσσοι γὰρ Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἐξεγένοντο,  
δεινότατοι παίδων, σφετέρῳ δ᾽ ἤχθοντο τοκῆι   [155] 
ἐξ ἀρχῆς· 
       (147-56) 
 
      And still other children were born 
   to Gaia and Ouranos, 
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three sons, big and powerful, so great 
   they could never be told of, 
Kottos, Briareos, and Gyes, 
   overmastering children.  
Each had a hundred intolerably strong arms 
   bursting 
out of his shoulders, 
   and on the shoulders of each grew fifty 
heads, above their massive bodies; 
   irresistible  
and staunch strength matched the appearance 
   of their big bodies, 
and of all children ever born 
   to Gaia and Ouranos 
these were the most terrible, 
   and they were hated by their father 
from the beginning, …  345 
 
This passage presents another ambiguity: what is the range of children to whom the 
ἤχθοντο (ēchthonto [155]) applies? It could be the Hekatoncheires alone, or the 
Hekatoncheires and the Cyclopes, or all the children of Gaia and Ouranos. Frazer and 
West opt for this last possibility, as do Detienne and Vernant, Hine, and Nelson.346 
Mair, Evelyn-White, and Lattimore opt for the first. 347  Most applies it to the 
Hekatoncheires and the Cyclopes.348 None explain their logic.  
 
Later in the poem we are given a more detailed explanation of Ouranos’ hatred 
towards his children, and in this instance it is inarguably just the Hekatoncheires he 
hates. Their imprisonment is recapped when Zeus frees them and asks for their 
support: 
 
 Βριάρεῳ δ᾽ ὡς πρῶτα πατὴρ ὠδύσσατο θυµῷ  
Κόττῳ τ᾽ ἠδὲ Γύγῃ, δῆσε κρατερῷ ἐνὶ δεσµῷ, 
ἠνορέην ὑπέροπλον ἀγώµενος ἠδὲ καὶ εἶδος  
καὶ µέγεθος, κατένασσε δ᾽ ὑπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης. 
       (617-20) 
 
                                                
345 I have adapted the translation of the last two verses here, because Lattimore chose to translate 
σφετέρῳ δ᾽ ἤχθοντο τοκῆι | ἐξ ἀρχῆς as meaning that the Hekatoncheires hated their father Ouranos, 
evidently taking ἤχθοντο as a middle verb. But in Homer this verb (ἔχθοµαι, echthomai) is always 
passive in meaning, construed with the dative of the person by whom the subject is hated. 
346 Frazer (1983: 34); West (1988: 7); Detienne & Vernant (1991: 62-63); Hine (2005: 59); Nelson 
(2009: 28).  
347 Mair (1908: 36); Evelyn-White (1914: 91); Lattimore (1959: 132).  
348 Most (2007a:15). 
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      Now, when Ouranos their father  
   bore a hating spirit against Obriareos 
and Kottos and Gyes (because he was so struck 
   by their towering 
vigor, and their stature and beauty), 
   therefore he bound them 
in strong bonds, and settled them  
   under the wide-wayed earth.349  
 
In this instance we are reminded that they are ‘hated’ (ὠδύσσατο, ōdussato [617])350 
from the first, which might suggest that we should interpret the earlier verses as 
telling us that Ouranos hates only the Hekatoncheires. However, the fact that Kronos 
keeps both the Hekatoncheires and the Cyclopes constrained despite his victory, 
suggests that, regardless of whom the ēchthonto of verse 155 applies to, the Cyclopes 
are hated figures by both Ouranos and Kronos. Imprisoning is a script we have 
already seen associated with an action-provoking hatred – Styx imprisons the hated 
oath-breaker within her waters. Given that Ouranos hates the Hekatoncheires and 
confines them, we can take this to be indicative of his hatred for all the children. The 
fact that Kronos later maintains their confinement suggests that he hates them too.  
 
Note that Ouranos does not just hate the Hekatoncheires in verses 617-20: he is also 
envious, or jealous, of them. The ἀγώµενος (agōmenos) of verse 619 is a participle 
form of ἀγάοµαι, an epic form of ἄγαµαι (agamai). This word shares a similar range 
of meanings to that which we see in zēlos. Ouranos is jealous, envious, or admiring of 
the Hekatoncheires. We are also told the cause of Ouranos’ hatred and envy towards 
them: it is their ‘presumptuous manhood’ (ἠνορέην ὑπέροπλον, ēnoreēn huperoplon 
[619]); their ‘physique’, or ‘comeliness’ (εἶδος, eidos); and their ‘greatness’, or ‘great 
size’ (µέγεθος, megethos). These are the qualities that represent the physically 
embodied kratos and biē of the Hekatoncheires, which we have already discussed in 
depth in Chapter Three. Ouranos’ hatred is compounded by envy, which, by its very 
nature, suggests at least a concern that the other may in fact be superior. He may hate 
all of his children, but he especially hates the Hekatoncheires.  
 
                                                
349 Adapted from Lattimore, who gives ‘bitter at heart’ for ὠδύσσατο θυµῷ (ōdussato thumōi). My 
adaptation is inarguably clumsy, but preserves the meaning of ‘hated’ for ōdussato, and ‘spirit’ 
matches how I have translated thumos throughout.   
350 This is the only occurrence of the word in Hesiod.  
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Another element of the hate script we have seen in Styx is hatred in response to a 
threat – Styx acts against those who threaten the stability of the universe by breaking 
their oaths. If Ouranos imprisons all of his children, it is because he sees them all as a 
threat. Singling out the Hekatoncheires to be explicitly described as hated suggests 
that Ouranos is acutely aware of the threat they specifically represent. And yet, 
Ouranos is evidently mistaken in his perception of threat levels. Given that the 
Hekatoncheires do not manage to conquer for themselves, or to rule, then we must 
conclude that the Hekatoncheires lack the hatred necessary to utilise their strength and 
violence, and thus also lack the ability to conquer and rule. But because hatred, as we 
have seen, can be an individual character trait, Ouranos cannot know whether they 
have the capacity to manifest their kratos and biē. They represent a threat not because 
they can manifest hatred, but because, as far as Ouranos knows, they might be able to.  
 
Ouranos also fails to understand that Kronos’ qualities represent the greatest threat: he 
is cunning (ἀγκυλοµήτης, agkulomētēs [137, 168]), and most terrible of the children 
(δεινότατος παίδων, deinotatos paidōn [138]); he has the right type of character to 
express his hatred toward his father. The primary factor, then, for being able to 
successfully rebel against a jailer, is hatred. It is hatred that allows action – without it, 
the other qualities that one might possess are irrelevant. In being unable to correctly 
identify who possesses the level of hate necessary to act against him, Ouranos proves 
he lacks the capacity to master hatred. In being unable to master hatred he proves 
himself incapable of maintaining his rule.  
 
But Ouranos also demonstrates his failure to master hatred in another way: any child 
of Ouranos and Gaia is an incorrect target for violence. They are members of his 
familial unit. They belong to his group, and, as head of that group, he owes them a 
duty of care. If functioning correctly, hatred should, in this instance, be expressed as 
violence towards outsiders who threaten the group, or, in a hierarchy, be paired with a 
compensatory benefit. Ouranos’ hatred and violence neither protects the group nor 
provides any other sort of compensatory benefit. In an irony typical of Greek myth, it 
is Ouranos’ incorrect usage of hatred in attempting to avert his fate that provokes the 
situation he wished to avoid: his violence towards his children is what sparks the 
hatred in Kronos that allows him to utilise violent cunning to conquer his father and 




In using violence to overcome Ouranos’ immoral society, Kronos demonstrates some 
ability to use hatred correctly. He is better than his father, but ultimately still gets it 
wrong in key ways: firstly, by continuing the imprisonment of the Cyclopes and the 
Hekatoncheires – his own siblings, who should be part of his ingroup – and secondly 
by perpetuating the cycle of violence against his own children. He falls into the same 
error that ultimately toppled Ouranos, and like Ouranos, his attempts to avoid his fate 
are what will ensure it. In swallowing his children he follows the same imprisonment 
hate-script as his father. And like his father, Zeus reacts in the same way – he 
overcomes his father with his own cunning and violence.  
 
But Zeus himself is never actually imprisoned by his father – he alone escapes this 
fate. The fact that he still acts against his father shows part of his ability to use hatred 
correctly. Zeus as an individual might not be imprisoned, but his siblings – the 
members of his ingroup – are. Not only does he direct his hatred towards the correct 
target, he also strengthens his connection to the ingroup – his hatred and violence free 
them and protect them. Further, Kronos’ continued confinement of the 
Hekatoncheires and the Cyclopes also allows Zeus to gain their support by freeing 
them. He uses his hatred to their benefit, and in response they will use their kratos and 
biē in his service. In freeing both his siblings and the Hekatoncheires and Cyclopes, 
Zeus demonstrates his mastery over hatred and thus proves worthy of those qualities 
represented by the children of Styx.  
 
Although he is not directly mentioned as hating his father, Zeus’ hatred is the most 
explicit of all: Styx is physically present on the side of Zeus. He hates all who oppose 
him. He hates Kronos and his allies because his ingroup suffered injustice from 
Kronos, and he hates Typhoeus because he represents a threat. Just as Kronos’ hatred 
proved he had the strength and violence necessary to conquer his own father and rule, 
Zeus has an even greater hatred, which not only allows him to overthrow Kronos, but 
also allows him to maintain his position of sovereignty. Zeus’ hatred is functional – it 
first spurs the overthrowing of a dysfunctional society, and then protects and 
maintains a functional society from an outside threat.   
 
In the above instances, then, hatred is associated with action: those who do not hate 
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do not act and do not commit the type of violence that leads to victory. Ouranos hates 
all of his children and acts against them; most of his children do not hate him and thus 
do not act against him. The child who does hate him, Kronos, is the one to act against 
him. In turn, Zeus possesses Styx, and ultimately defeats all who oppose him. What 
we see here, is violence motivated by a threat and violence motivated by the suffering 
of injustice – of being cheated or betrayed by one who should consider you part of 
their ingroup or society. It is a violence that disrupts dysfunctional groups, and a 
violence that reacts to disruptions of the group. It is a hatred that duplicates the scripts 
we have seen demonstrated by Styx herself – violence against a (perceived) threat, 
resulting in imprisonment.   
 
But just as his forefathers did, Zeus punishes those whom he considers a threat with 
imprisonment. In the case of Typhoeus, this is clearly functional, because he 
represents an outside threat to a social group. But what of the others Zeus imprisons, 
such as Metis?: 
 
 Ζεὺς δὲ θεῶν βασιλεὺς πρώτην ἄλοχον θέτο Μῆτιν,  
πλεῖστα θεῶν εἰδυῖαν ἰδὲ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.  
ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε δὴ ῥ᾽ ἔµελλε θεὰν γλαυκῶπιν Ἀθήνην  
τέξεσθαι, τότ᾽ ἔπειτα δόλῳ φρένας ἐξαπατήσας  
αἱµυλίοισι λόγοισιν ἑὴν ἐσκάτθετο νηδὺν,    [890] 
Γαίης φραδµοσύνῃσι καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος·  
τὼς γάρ οἱ φρασάτην, ἵνα µὴ βασιληίδα τιµὴν  
ἄλλος ἔχοι Διὸς ἀντὶ θεῶν αἰειγενετάων·  
ἐκ γὰρ τῆς εἵµαρτο περίφρονα τέκνα γενέσθαι,  
πρώτην µὲν κούρην γλαυκώπιδα Τριτογένειαν  [895]  
ἶσον ἔχουσαν πατρὶ µένος καὶ ἐπίφρονα βουλήν,  
αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ᾽ ἄρα παῖδα θεῶν βασιλῆα καὶ ἀνδρῶν  
ἤµελλεν τέξεσθαι, ὑπέρβιον ἦτορ ἔχοντα.  
ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα µιν Ζεὺς πρόσθεν ἑὴν ἐσκάτθετο νηδύν,  
ὡς οἱ συµφράσσαιτο θεὰ ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε.   [900] 
       (886-900) 
 
Zeus, as King of the gods, 
   took as his first wife Metis, 
and she knew more than all the gods 
   or mortal people.  
But when she was about to be delivered 
   of the goddess, gray-eyed 
Athene, then Zeus, deceiving her perception 
   by treachery 
and by slippery speeches, 
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   put her away inside his own belly. 
This was by the advices of Gaia, 
   and starry Ouranos, 
for so they counseled, 
   in order that no other everlasting 
god, beside Zeus, should even be given 
   the kingly position.  
For it had been arranged that, from her,  
   children surpassing in wisdom 
should be born, first the gray-eyed girl, 
   the Tritogeneia 
Athene; and she is the equal of her father 
   in strength 
and wise counsel; but then a son to be King 
   over gods and mortals 
was to be born to her, and he 
   would have overwhelming passion: 
but before this Zeus put her away 
   inside his own belly 
so that the goddess should think for him, 
   for good and for evil.351  
 
Just as with Styx, Metis’ generative power threatens to create a figure capable of 
conquering him. Metis’ first child, Athena, already matches her father in ‘wise 
counsel’ (ἐπίφρονα βουλήν, epiphrona boulēn) and strength (µένος, menos). The son 
who would come after would exceed Zeus, and not only be ‘surpassing in wisdom’, 
but also be ὑπέρβιος (huperbios). This word is a compound of the preposition ὑπέρ 
(huper) and bia – violence. The meaning is one familiar to us from our discussion of 
hubris – overwhelming violence. Huperbios appears twice in the Theogony, and once 
in the Works and Days. In the Works and Days it is a distinctly negative thing: 
      
µηδ᾽ ἐν νηυσὶν ἅπαντα βίον κοΐλῃσι τίθεσθαι,  
ἀλλὰ πλέω λείπειν, τὰ δὲ µείονα φορτίζεσθαι·  
δεινὸν γὰρ πόντου µετὰ κύµασι πήµατι κύρσαι· 
δεινὸν δ᾽ εἴ κ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἄµαξαν ὑπέρβιον ἄχθος ἀείρας  
ἄξονα καυάξαις καὶ φορτία µαυρωθείη.  
 (689-93) 
 
Do not adventure your entire livelihood 
   in hollow ships.  
Leave the greater part ashore and make 
                                                
351 Adapted from Lattimore, who transposes ‘strength’ and ‘wise counsel’. Lattimore also translates 
ὑπέρβιον ἦτορ (huperbion ētor) in such a way as to split the two words. I have changed these not only 
to bring the two words back together, but also to make the translation of huperbion match that which 
Lattimore uses elsewhere.   
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   the lesser part cargo. 
For it is awful to run on disaster in the waves 
   of the open 
water, and awful to put an overwhelming load 
   on your wagon 
and break the axle, and have all the freight 
   go to nothing.  
 
Hesiod advises his brother not to put a huperbios load on the cart, for doing so will 
break the cart. Something that is huperbios very literally breaks things. Here, it breaks 
the cart and undermines the industry towards which Hesiod urges his brother. In the 
case of Metis’ second child, it is Zeus’ society that he threatens to break.  
 
The other usage of huperbios in the Theogony is with reference to the Cyclopes: 
 
 Γείνατο δ᾽ αὖ Κύκλωπας ὑπέρβιον ἦτορ ἔχοντας,  
Βρόντην τε Στερόπην τε καὶ Ἄργην ὀβριµόθυµον,  
οἳ Ζηνὶ βροντήν τε δόσαν τεῦξάν τε κεραυνόν.  
      (139-41) 
 
      She brought forth also the Cyclopes, 
   who have overwhelming passion. 
Brontes and Steropes, and Arges 
   of the violent spirit, 
who made the thunder and gave it to Zeus, 
   and fashioned the lightning.352  
 
The Cyclopes have an ‘overwhelming passion’ (ὑπέρβιον ἦτορ, huperbion ētor); the 
phrase is the same as that used in relation the prophesied child of Metis. The threat 
that Metis’ future son would pose to Zeus is the same threat that the Cyclopes posed 
to Ouranos and Kronos – or rather, the same threat that Ouranos and Kronos thought 
the Cyclopes posed. As we have already discussed, Ouranos and Kronos both failed to 
recognise whether the Cyclopes and the Hekatoncheires actually possessed the 
capacity to use the threatening qualities they represented. Even though the Cyclopes 
have an ‘overwhelming passion’, the weapons they create when they are freed are 
imbued with biē, not ὑπερβίη (huperbiē). They do not engage in battle themselves – 
they do not possess the ability to use their huperbiē in such a way. Zeus understands 
                                                
352 Adapted from Lattimore in order to maintain the translation of huperbios as ‘overwhelming’, and to 
maintain the transliteration of Cyclopes (Lattimore uses Kyklopes). The word that Lattimore has 
translated as ‘violent spirit’ is ὀβριµόθυµον (obrimothumon).  
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this; Kronos and Ouranos do not. Zeus’ mastery of hatred allows him to access the 
violence of the Cyclopes as biē, rather than being overwhelmed by their huperbiē. 
Kronos treats the Cyclopes (and the Hekatoncheires) as if they are a threat – but they 
are not the threat he was warned about. They are not, in fact, a threat at all, as 
demonstrated by the fact that they, like Kronos’ other siblings, were seized with fear 
when Gaia approached them for help against Ouranos.      
 
Zeus, on the other hand, has explicitly been told that his future son would overthrow 
him. This son will have the ability to utilise that overwhelming passion. This is the 
threat that Zeus seeks to avoid – the huperbios aspect of his future son. Zeus then 
responds to this by swallowing Metis. But this behaviour matches the actions of 
Kronos. Surely, then, this is a dysfunctional use of violence and hatred? However, in 
swallowing Metis he differs from his father. Firstly, Zeus swallows the mother, not 
just the offspring, and in doing so ensures that the maternal figure is not around to 
help her children overthrow him. Secondly, Zeus swallows Metis just as she is about 
to bring forth (τέξεσθαι, texesthai) Athena. Zeus does not wait for his son to be born 
so that he can then imprison him. In fact, he does not even wait for him to be 
conceived. Zeus does not have to imprison his son because his son will never exist. 
Zeus strikes pre-emptively, not reactively.  
 
And Zeus, again different from Kronos, also does not imprison his daughter. 
Although Metis is about to give birth to her, it is Zeus that actually does so:  
 
Αὐτὸς δ᾽ ἐκ κεφαλῆς γλαυκώπιδα γείνατ᾽ Ἀθήνην,  
δεινὴν ἐγρεκύδοιµον ἀγέστρατον ἀτρυτώνην  
πότνιαν, ᾗ κέλαδοί τε ἅδον πόλεµοί τε µάχαι τε· 
(924-6) 
 
      Then from his head, by himself, 
   he produced Athene of the gray eyes,  
great goddess, weariless, 
   waker of battle noise, leader of armies, 
a goddess queen who delights in war cries, 
   onslaughts, and battles. 
 
Zeus appropriates for himself the generative power of Metis (as we have already 
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discussed in Chapter Two).353  But he does more than appropriate the generative 
nature of Metis for himself; he gains the ability to generate, but also the ability to 
prevent generation. In doing so he also makes himself the conduit for her expression 
into his universe, rather than that which kept her from her rightful place in it. The fact 
that Zeus gains Metis’ powers – generative and intellectual – for himself indicates her 
deeper incorporation into Zeus’ universe, rather than her expulsion. Just as being 
forever in his presence is an honour to the children of Styx, Zeus’ swallowing of 
Metis, making them inseparable, is a form of honouring her, rather than enacting a 
hate-script by imprisoning her.  
 
 
Theogony II: The Inevitable Ones 
The second group of figures described as hated contains Moros (211), Eris (226), and 
Styx (775). They are all described as being hateful (stugeros). Thanatos too, is hated 
(echthros [766]). Finally, the gods hate (stugeō) a specific place: 
 
 Ἔνθα δὲ γῆς δνοφερῆς καὶ Ταρτάρου ἠερόεντος  
πόντου τ᾽ ἀτρυγέτοιο καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος  
ἑξείης πάντων πηγαὶ καὶ πείρατ᾽ ἔασιν, 
ἀργαλέ᾽ εὐρώεντα, τά τε στυγέουσι θεοί περ· 
   
       (736-39 & 767-70) 
 
      And there, for the gloomy earth, 
   and for Tartaros of the mists, 
and for the barren great sea 
   and the starry heaven, 
for all these, the springs 
   and the sources stand there, all in order; 
an unpleasant, moldy place, 
   and even the gods loathe it. 
 
This place is conceived of as being within Tartaros, but it is not the whole of Tartaros 
– it is only the place within Tartaros where Tartaros begins. Here too are the 
beginnings of earth (gē - i.e. gaia), the sea (pontos), and the heavens (ouranos). The 
above verses appear twice, framing Hesiod’s description of the underworld. This 
framing device, fencing in the description of Tartaros, mirrors the hated place that 
forms the fence at which Tartaros, gaia, pontos, and ouranos all meet. We have 
                                                
353 Arthur (1982: 77).  
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already seen in Chapter One that this place at the edge of Tartaros, where earth, sea, 
and heaven all meet is where we find Styx. Styx is there, at the boundary of these 
geographic planes, preventing their expansion and limiting them by encircling them in 
her river. She is a force that constrains them.  
 
When coupled with the hatred the gods have for Styx, Moros (Fate or Doom),354 and 
Thanatos, the picture that emerges is that the gods hate all things that limit them, 
represent limits, or are inevitable. Thanatos may not be a limitation or inevitability for 
the gods, but it is an inevitability and limitation for their mortal playthings and 
offspring.  
 
The implication of this list is that Eris is also considered as either a limiting, 
inevitable, or necessary force. Clay interprets the existence of Eris as a necessary 
opposition to Eros. Both are necessary (and yet also dangerous) to the functioning of 
the Universe.355 One without the other is destructive or infertile. Clay points out that, 
whilst Eros and Eris both come into existence before Ouranos (and therefore before 
his imprisonment of his children), Hesiod does not actually name Eris until after the 
castration of Ouranos. Eris is a child of Night, but when Hesiod begins to name the 
children of Night, he only gets as far as Aether and Himera before interrupting 
himself to progress along the genealogy that leads into the story of Ouranos’ actions. 
He pushes the rest of the list of the children of Night – including Eris – back until 
narratologically after the castration of Ouranos. Eros brought Gaia and Ouranos 
together; it is Eris that pushes them apart.356 Zeus’ stable universe would not be 
possible without Eris to balance out Eros. The necessity of Eris is emphasised in the 
Works and Days, where men must, through necessity (anagkē), worship her even 
though no man loves her (15-6).  
 
It also indicates that, given Styx is hated, both oath and hatred itself are seen as 
inevitable. Indeed, after the passage describing Styx which starts with the fact that she 
is hated (775), Styx’s waters are also described as ἄφθιτον (aphthiton, ‘unperishing’) 
                                                
354 Hesiod mentions Moros, Ker, and Thanatos, a trio with overlapping functions – Moros can be Fate 
or Doom, Ker can be Doom and Death, and Thanatos is Death. Much later, the Moirai are introduced 
as the children of Zeus and Themis (904). There is little textual evidence to aid in understanding how 
Hesiod might have conceived of all these beings as separate entities.  
355 Clay (2009: 20). 
356 Clay (2009: 20).  
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and ὠγύγιον (ōgugion, ‘primeval, primal’). These descriptors give the idea of Styx as 
something that has always been there, and as something which will always be there: 
she is inevitable.  
 
But the hatred against these figures is one devoid of accompanying violence. Given 
the nature of the hated figures this is unsurprising. They do not represent threats that 
can be avoided. They are inevitable, and violence against the inevitable would be 
wholly ineffectual: by their very nature they cannot be conquered. The hatred that is 
directed towards them is that of the hated towards the ones who constrain them.  
 
Further, although Styx and the others like her present constraints, these limitations 
form part of the ordering of Zeus’ universe. The constraining violence of Styx is 
moral because it is ultimately controlled by Zeus, who also grants the gods 
compensatory benefits. Thus, to act upon the hatred threat would here be immoral, 
because, once again, it would cause a destabilisation of the society. The stability of 
Zeus’ society is reaffirmed by the fact that its participants refrain from immoral 
displays of hatred.  
 
This gives us some interesting points about Hesiod’s ideas of the nature of hatred: in 
the case of threats, they always lead to hatred and that hatred can, but does not 
always, manifest in violence. Ouranos imprisons his children, but the gods do not act 
against Styx. Whether the hatred is functional or dysfunctional, just or unjust, is 
determined by whether and how its violence manifests. There is nothing dysfunctional 
about the gods’ hatred of Styx, because it is devoid of violence. On the other hand, 
Ouranos’ response to the threat represented by his children is to violently constrain 
them. But this treatment is unjust: it offers no benefit and thus breaches the code of 
the society. Because of this, it creates a reciprocal feeling of hatred in the oppressed – 
Ouranos’ unjust violence causes Kronos to hate him strongly enough to act upon that 
hatred.  
 
This hatred felt by Kronos towards the oppressing figure of Ouranos is functional in 
nature because it destroys a corrupt society in order to establish a new one. This 
specific use of hatred generates no further reciprocal hatred: Hesiod makes no 
mention of the former oppressor feeling hatred towards those who overthrew them. 
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There is no mention of the Titans hating Zeus after he has confined them to Tartaros, 
nor of Prometheus hating Zeus after Zeus has punished him. Indeed, even if they do 
hate him, they do not experience that hatred strongly enough to be able to act upon it 
– Zeus’ hatred in keeping them confined is stronger. Thus, acting upon hatred 
inappropriately is ultimately self-destructive – it causes further hatred in figures 
strong enough to act upon it. Acting on hatred appropriately is the opposite – it 
preserves a society because it does not generate further acts of violence. The morality 
of hatred is determined not by whether one experiences it or not, but whether one acts 
upon it appropriately or not. And being able to express hatred in a moral manner 
depends upon an understanding of the role hatred has to play in maintaining an 
ordered society, in a stable, just, universe.  
 
To summarise: if the violence of hatred breaks the laws of a society (by offering no 
compensatory benefit, or as an act of cheating), then it is destructive and immoral. If 
the violence of hatred destroys an immoral community in order to replace it with 
another community, then it is moral. When the violence is used to protect a moral 
society from a threat that would destroy it, that expression of hatred too, is moral. But 
violence of hatred against threats that are accepted as part of the lawful function of a 
successful hierarchy would be immoral.  
 
The consequence of this is that we must accept that for Hesiod, hatred could be felt 
towards virtuous actions and figures, because even though there are compensatory 
benefits to accepting the threat they represent, they still have the potential to cause 
harm. Further, the authority to rule is proven by the ability to master hatred, to use it 
in a way which benefits rather than harms, and to know when it should and should not 
be acted upon. Hatred can still exist inside a system, as long as it is not acted upon 
inappropriately, and this is true for all members of the social group: both the superior 
and the inferiors. The stability of a society is based on the ability of its participants to 
understand how to appropriately use hatred. 
 
Ouranos fails completely to use hatred appropriately, and is thus deposed. Kronos 
displays the ability to use hatred appropriately, but does not always do so in practice 
and, as a result, he is also overthrown. Only Zeus gets it right. Zeus masters hatred 
through possession of her children. In having the children, he controls the ways and 
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circumstances in which hatred can manifest in a stable society. Zeus’ justice is, in 
part, based on the ability to judge whether the enaction of hatred would be moral or 
immoral.   
 
 
Zeus and Anger 
Based on the elements of hatred we have seen so far it would be reasonable to think of 
Prometheus, and Zeus’ treatment of him, when looking for other examples of hatred 
in the Theogony. There is an emotion that is mentioned repeatedly in relation to 
Prometheus, but it is not hatred. It is anger. The primary word in question is χόλος 
(cholos), though there is also one instance of ὀχθέω (ochtheō). Another word that can 
mean ‘anger’ is thumos, but it is never used in this sense in Hesiod.357 Harris claims 
that the gods in Hesiod are ‘scarcely less irascible than Homer’s’,358 citing multiple 
verses as examples.359 Some of the examples Harris cites are instances in which the 
word used is not cholos, but koteō, νέµεσις (nemesis), or ἀγαίοµαι (agaiomai). Let us 
briefly examine these three words before turning to cholos.  
 
Koteō is a word we have already encountered – it appears alongside phthonos in the 
early verses of the Works and Days when Hesiod describes the healthy competition 
between workers caused by the good Eris: 
 
καὶ κεραµεὺς κεραµεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων,  
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ. 
       (25-26) 
 
Then potter bears grudge against potter,  
   and craftsman against craftsman, 
tramp is jealous of tramp, 
   and singer of singer. 
 
The noun form of koteō, κότος (kotos) means ‘grudge’ or ‘ill-will’ (a phrase that came 
up repeatedly in the definitions of English words associated with hatred (see p. 24). 
Given that Hesiod is talking about long-term sentiments which encourage men to 
work, ‘grudge’ or ‘ill-will’ seem much better contextual fits than ‘anger’. 
                                                
357 Cairns notes that the same is true of Homer (2003: 21). 
358 Harris (2001: 137). 




What of nemesis? The example Harris gives of nemesis as meaning ‘anger’ is verse 
303 of the Works and Days, where the word is νεµεσῶσι (nemesōsi): a verb form of 
nemesis. Unlike any other word we might take to mean ‘anger’, Nemesis is 
personified by Hesiod. It is not my intention to discuss the exact nature of Nemesis in 
Hesiod’s works, though such an analysis would certainly be interesting. Instead, I 
shall discuss her only insofar as is necessary to establish that her character is not one 
of anger.  
 
Let us briefly examine more closely the verse that Harris cites: 
 
τῷ δὲ θεοὶ νεµεσῶσι καὶ ἀνέρες ὅς κεν ἀεργὸς  
ζώῃ, κηφήνεσσι κοθούροις εἴκελος ὀργήν,  
οἵ τε µελισσάων κάµατον τρύχουσιν ἀεργοὶ  
ἔσθοντες· 
 
Gods and men alike resent that man who, without work 
himself, lives the life of the stingless drones, 
who without working eats away the substance 
   of the honeybees’ 
hard work; 
       (303-6) 
 
Nemesis here is a reaction to the idle man who does not work – the man whom we 
have seen is closely associated with zēlos. It is indignation directed at the man who, 
through envy, takes from the enviable worker. Indeed, it is only a few lines later that 
zēlos is mentioned in regards to the unworking man, whose constant companion is 
Famine – Famine who hates the working man. The man who does not work but 
instead takes what he wants is the man acting in the way Hesiod predicts men will act 
at the end of the final age, when Zelos, with his hateful eyes, runs rampant, and men 
sack each other’s cities. And in this final age of man, Nemesis will abandon mortals: 
 
καὶ τότε δὴ πρὸς Ὄλυµπον ἀπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης  
λευκοῖσιν φάρεσσι καλυψαµένα χρόα καλὸν  
ἀθανάτων µετὰ φῦλον ἴτον προλιπόντ᾽ ἀνθρώπους  
Αἰδὼς καὶ Νέµεσις· τὰ δὲ λείψεται ἄλγεα λυγρὰ  
θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισι· κακοῦ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔσσεται ἀλκή. 




And at last Aidos and Nemesis,  
   shrouding 
their bright forms in pale mantles, shall go 
   from the wide-wayed 
 earth back on their way to Olympos, 
   forsaking the whole race 
of mortal men, and all that will be left by them 
   to mankind 
will be wretched pain. And there shall be no defense  
   against evil.360  
 
When Nemesis and Aidos (Respect, Shame) leave, all hell breaks loose. Nemesis is a 
daughter of Nyx, who bore her to bring misery to mortal men (πῆµα θνητοῖσι 
βροτοῖσι [Th. 223]). Based on her parentage and the ‘negative’ nature of her siblings, 
Konstan suggests that ‘it is plausible to suppose that Nemesis here bears the negative 
sense of “resentment” or even “hatred” rather than “righteous indignation”’.361 There 
are two points to note here – first, that one of Nemesis’ siblings is Φιλότης (Philotes) 
– Love/Friendship. Her siblings are not wholly ‘negative’. Secondly, that if she were 
wholly negative, this could not be used as an argument to assume the emotion 
represented is closer to hatred, given that, as I have demonstrated already, Styx is not 
intrinsically negative. For Nemesis to align with Styx, she too, must be a nuanced 
figure. 
 
The word used to describe the ‘misery’ that Nemesis brings to mortals is pēma, 
which, as we have already seen in Chapter One, is closely associated with oath. 
Indeed, it is only seven verses later when we are told that Horkos, last child of Eris 
(daughter of Night) brings misery to mortal men. But as we have seen in the case of 
Horkos, pēma does not preclude Nemesis from having a positive and necessary 
function. If anything, it assumes that there is a positive function, by drawing attention 
to the negative effects that it might also have. Like Oath, she brings misery, but is also 
necessary for a structured and moral society. 
 
Discussing Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Konstan notes that phthonos and to nemesan have ‘a 
great deal in common’,362 and indeed, Aristotle notes that some people consider them 
                                                
360 Adapted from Lattimore, who expanded the first verse to include translations of Aidos and Nemesis 
as ‘Decency’ and ‘Respect’. 
361 Konstan (2006a: 119). 
362 Konstan (2006a: 111).  
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the same thing (2.9, 1386b16-17). When the final days of the fifth age arrive in the 
Works and Days, Nemesis leaves as Envy (Zelos), with his hateful eyes, arrives, and 
oaths are broken. Based on this, it is fair to say that Hesiod’s Nemesis is conceptually 
associated with envy, rather than anger.  
 
Harris also claims that in the Works and Days, Zeus is angry towards those who abuse 
their family (327-34).363 The word in question there is ἀγαίοµαι (agaiomai), and is 
more commonly translated (like to nemesan) as ‘to be indignant’. Despite translating 
it as ‘anger’, Harris is forced to admit that the word ‘and its cognates are rare words 
of somewhat unclear meaning, but Zeus’ reaction is obviously negative.’364 But a 
clearly negative meaning is not strong enough grounds to assert that it is anger, and 
there is no strong argument to take it as such.  
 
There are two other words in the Theogony which may mean ‘anger’: koteousa, and 
acheuō. Each word appears once. Koteousa appears when describing Hera’s 
sentiment towards Herakles as she nurtures the Lernaean Hydra to bring him trouble 
(313-5). This is a participle form of a word we have already encountered in the Works 
and Days: koteō. There, it was taken by all to mean ‘grudge’, and was associated with 
phthonos (and thus with hatred).  
 
In verse 868 acheuō appears in relation to the Typhonomachy, as Zeus hurls 
Typhoeus down to Tartaros (ῥῖψε δέ µιν θυµῷ ἀκαχὼν ἐς Τάρταρον εὐρύν).365 The 
primary meaning of this word, however, is ‘grief’, rather than ‘anger’. In the Works 
and Days Hesiod warns his brother that if he does not work, he will be forced, in 
‘grieving spirit’ (θυµὸν ἀχεύων, thumon acheuōn), to beg from his neighbours for 
food (397-400). This phrase matches the θυµῷ ἀκαχών (thumōi akachōn) of verse 868 
in the Theogony. Cairns claims that achos (the noun form of acheuō) ‘represents the 
mental distress which is part of anger and other emotions’ (my emphasis).366 If 
Hesiod had here wished to display pure anger on the part of Zeus, he had other words 
at his disposal. Certainly Zeus hates Typhoeus, as we have already discussed, but it 
seems to be that the other emotion Zeus experiences here is far more complex and 
                                                
363 Harris (2002: 289).  
364 Harris (2002: 289 n. 13).  
365 ἀκαχὼν (akachōn) is a participle aorist form of acheuō. The aorist verb is ἤκαχον (ēkachon).  
366 Cairns (2003: 21).  
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nebulous than the pure anger displayed elsewhere.  
 
Let us return now to the words in Hesiod that can undisputedly be taken to mean 
‘anger’. Between the Theogony and the Works and Days there are eleven instances of 
cholos or related forms – eight in the Theogony, three in the Works and Days. Of the 
eight mentions in the Theogony, seven of them are in relation to Prometheus. The 
single instance of ochtheō is also in relation to Prometheus. In verse 533 cholos 
appears twice in relation to the end of Zeus’ anger when Herakles frees Prometheus 
from his bonds (desmoi [522]): 
 
τὸν µὲν ἄρ᾽ Ἀλκµήνης καλλισφύρου ἄλκιµος υἱὸς  
Ἡρακλέης ἔκτεινε, κακὴν δ᾽ ἀπὸ νοῦσον ἄλαλκεν  
Ἰαπετιονίδῃ καὶ ἐλύσατο δυσφροσυνάων,  
οὐκ ἀέκητι Ζηνὸς Ὀλυµπίου ὑψιµέδοντος,   [530] 
ὄφρ᾽ Ἡρακλῆος Θηβαγενέος κλέος εἴη  
πλεῖον ἔτ᾽ ἢ τὸ πάροιθεν ἐπὶ χθόνα πουλυβότειραν.  
ταῦτ᾽ ἄρα ἁζόµενος τίµα ἀριδείκετον υἱόν· 
καί περ χωόµενος παύθη χόλου ὃν πρὶν ἔχεσκεν,  
οὕνεκ᾽ ἐρίζετο βουλὰς ὑπερµενέι Κρονίωνι. 
     (526-34) 
 
But Herakles, the powerful son 
   of light-footed Alkmene,  
killed the eagle 
   and drove that pestilential affliction 
from Iapetos’ son, and set him free  
   from all his unhappiness, 
not without the will of high-minded Zeus 
   of Olympos 
in order that the reputation  
   of Thebes-born Herakles 
might be greater even than it had been 
   on the earth that feeds many.  
With such thoughts in mind he honoured his son 
   and made him glorious,  
and angry as he had been before,  
   he gave up his anger; 
for Prometheus once had matched wits 
   against the great son of Kronos.  
 
Zeus gives up his anger not because Prometheus has done anything to appease his 
anger, but because he has a greater desire to increase the reputation of his son.  
 
The fact that cholos appears twice in a single verse (533) suggests an intensity that is 
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only confirmed by verses 553-61, where cholos again appears twice, along with 
ochtheō: 
 
χερσὶ δ᾽ ὅ γ᾽ ἀµφοτέρῃσιν ἀνείλετο λευκὸν ἄλειφαρ· 
χώσατο δὲ φρένας ἀµφί, χόλος δέ µιν ἵκετο θυµόν,  
ὡς ἴδεν ὀστέα λευκὰ βοὸς δολίῃ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ.  [555] 
ἐκ τοῦ δ᾽ ἀθανάτοισιν ἐπὶ χθονὶ φῦλ᾽ ἀνθρώπων  
καίουσ᾽ ὀστέα λευκὰ θυηέντων ἐπὶ βωµῶν.  
τὸν δὲ µέγ᾽ ὀχθήσας προσέφη νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς· 
“Ἰαπετιονίδη, πάντων πέρι µήδεα εἰδώς,  
ὦ πέπον, οὐκ ἄρα πω δολίης ἐπιλήθεο τέχνης.”   [560] 
ὣς φάτο χωόµενος Ζεὺς ἄφθιτα µήδεα εἰδώς. 
     (553-61) 
 
In both his hands he took up the portion 
   of the white fat.  
And he was angry at heart 
   and the anger mounted in his spirit 
when he saw the white bones of the ox 
   in deceptive arrangement.  
 
Ever since that time the races of mortal men 
   on earth have burned 
the white bones to the immortals  
   on the smoky altars. 
 
Then Zeus the cloud-gatherer 
   being angered greatly said to him: 
“Son of Iapetos, versed in planning 
   beyond all others, 
old friend, so after all you did not forget 
   your treachery.” 
 
     So spoke angry Zeus, 
who knows imperishable counsels.367 
 
Even within this passage alone, the repetition of the word demonstrates the intensity 
of Zeus’ feelings towards Prometheus.  
 
The final mention of cholos in relation to Prometheus is in verse 615, where Hesiod 
compares the inescapable evils woman represents to as comparable to Zeus’ 
inescapable anger against Prometheus: 
                                                
367 Adapted from Lattimore primarily with regard to formatting, but also to change the translation of 
cholos in verse 554 to ‘anger’, rather than ‘spite’, and to maintain the grammatical forms of the word in 




Ὣς οὐκ ἔστι Διὸς κλέψαι νόον οὐδὲ παρελθεῖν·  
οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἰαπετιονίδης ἀκάκητα Προµηθεὺς  
τοῖό γ᾽ ὑπεξήλυξε βαρὺν χόλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκης 
καὶ πολύιδριν ἐόντα µέγας κατὰ δεσµὸς ἐρύκει. 
      (613-16) 
 
        So it is not possible to hide 
   from the mind of Zeus, nor escape it; 
for not even the son of Iapetos, 
   the gentle Prometheus, 
was able to elude that heavy anger, 
   but, for all his 
numerous shifts, necessity 
   and the mighty chain confine him.  
  
 
The preceding verses (590-612) comprise Hesiod’s intense diatribe against women. 
No man can escape the evils of women (brought about by Zeus), just as Prometheus 
could not escape the anger of Zeus. Pandora, and women, are the punishment received 
by men for Prometheus’ deceitful actions. The creation of Pandora is caused by Zeus’ 
anger against Prometheus, and the intensity of Hesiod’s negative portrayal of women 
matches the intensity of Zeus’ anger towards Prometheus.368   
 
In the Works and Days two of the uses of cholos are again in the context of the 
punishment Zeus directs towards men because of Prometheus’ actions. First we are 
told that the labour men must undergo to produce food from the earth is part of the 
punishment for the crimes of Prometheus. Then we are reminded twice (47, 53) of 
Zeus’ anger at Prometheus. This is immediately followed by the description of the 
creation of Pandora – man’s other punishment.  
 
The final mention in the Works and Days is Zeus’ anger toward the silver race of 
men, whom he hides under the earth because they would not honour the gods: 
 
οὐδ᾽ ἀθανάτους θεραπεύειν  
ἤθελον οὐδ᾽ ἔρδειν µακάρων ἱεροῖς ἐπὶ βωµοῖς,  
ἣ θέµις ἀνθρώποις κατὰ ἤθεα. τοὺς µὲν ἔπειτα  
                                                
368 See Lardinos (2003) for an interpretation of the whole of the Works and Days as an angry speech 
akin to the angry speeches in Homer.  
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Ζεὺς Κρονίδης ἔκρυψε χολούµενος, οὕνεκα τιµὰς  
οὐκ ἔδιδον µακάρεσσι θεοῖς οἳ Ὄλυµπον ἔχουσιν. 
     (135-39) 
 
   nor would they worship 
the gods, nor do sacrifice on the sacred altars 
   of the blessed ones,  
which is the right thing among the customs of men, 
   and therefore 
Zeus, son of Kronos, being angry engulfed them, 
   for they paid no due 
honours to the blessed gods who live on Olympos.369 
 
Here we are explicitly told that Zeus’ anger towards them is caused by the fact that 
they will not honour the gods: a form of contempt. In relation to the different groups 
of gods failing to show the honours due to each other, the dominant emotion, as we 
have seen, is hatred rather than anger. Why, then, should it be anger here? I suggest 
that the explanation is that in this instance, it is mortals failing to honour the gods: 
anger is an emotion directed by the gods towards mortals. Equally, though 
Prometheus may be a Titan, he has aligned himself with mortals and is acting on their 
behalf, and mortals share Prometheus’ punishment.  
 
In the Theogony there is one instance of cholos unrelated to Prometheus. It is in 
relation to the Fates (221), whose anger in pursuit of vengeance against gods and men 
is endless until they inflict their punishment: 
 
καὶ Μοίρας καὶ Κῆρας ἐγείνατο νηλεοποίνους,  
[Κλωθώ τε Λάχεσίν τε καὶ Ἄτροπον, αἵ τε βροτοῖσι  
γεινοµένοισι διδοῦσιν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε,]  
αἵ τ᾽ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε παραιβασίας ἐφέπουσιν, 
οὐδέ ποτε λήγουσι θεαὶ δεινοῖο χόλοιο 
πρίν γ᾽ ἀπὸ τῷ δώωσι κακὴν ὄπιν ὅς τις ἁµάρτῃ.   
(217-22) 
 
and she bore the destinies, the Moirai, 
   and the cruelly never-forgetful 
Fates, Klotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, 
   who at their birth  
bestow upon mortals their portion 
   of good and evil, 
                                                
369 Adapted from Lattimore and to maintain the grammatical form of the word in question in the 




and these control the transgressions 
   of both men and divinities, 
and these goddesses never remit 
   their dreaded anger 
until whoever has done wrong 
   gives them satisfaction. 
 
The goddesses pursue their anger against both mortals and gods until the sinner has 
been punished. It is undeniable that their anger may be directed against a god, but the 
presence of mortals makes their sentiment appropriate. In contrast to Zeus’ anger at 
Prometheus, though, the anger of the Fates ends when they have succeeded in 
punishing the offending target. 
 
Hesiod’s concept of anger seems far narrower than that of hatred: anger is associated 
exclusively with punishment, or those who are about to be punished. The punishment, 
like hatred, predominantly takes the form of imprisonment (we are not told the exact 
punishment that the Fates inflict). Like hatred, anger can be of a long duration, but 
can also be ended, just as the punishment for breaking the Styx oath does eventually 
end. Perhaps the only difference is that the repetition of cholos in relation to 
Prometheus suggests an explicit intensity.  
 
There are several differences between Hesiod’s portrayal of anger and that provided 
by Aristotle. Firstly, Hesiod’s hatred cannot be construed as a disinterested desire for 
harm to come to the hated target, regardless of whether one is involved in bringing it 
about, or is even aware of it. Hesiod’s haters either actively strive to obtain revenge 
and to punish, or understand that harm cannot come to those targets. For Hesiod, 
hatred in an even stronger motivator for revenge than anger is. Secondly, Aristotle 
claims that anger can only be directed towards individuals (Rhetoric 2.4, 1382a5-6; 
whilst this is the predominant usage of anger in Hesiod, Zeus is also angry at the 
whole race of Silver in the Works and Days.  
 
Further, in Aristotle’s account, anger ceases when revenge has been achieved 
(Nichomachean Ethics 1126a). This is certainly true of the Fates, but Zeus’ anger at 
Prometheus continues long after his punishments have been administered. He sets 
aside his anger not because his revenge has been achieved, but because he has a 
greater desire to see Herakles achieve further honour through the defeat of the eagle 
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that torments Prometheus. We might question whether his anger would ever have 
ceased had not the glory of his son been a factor. The anger of the Fates, however, 
does end when they have administered their due punishment to the offending party – 
just as Styx’s hatred ends after she has punished the perjurer. On the other hand, Styx 
as river, oath, and boundary, must exist in perpetuity. The Aristotelian differences 
between anger and hatred relating to their duration and whether they end or not do not 
align with Hesiod’s conception of anger and hate.  
 
Does Zeus’ anger preclude hatred? There is no reason to think so. Nothing in Hesiod 
suggests that Hesiod conceived of people being able to experience only one emotion 
at a time. Indeed, what we know of the sons of Iapetos, and Zeus’ actions toward 
them, fits many of the elements we have seen in our hate script. We are not told the 
specifics of the actions of Menoitios or Atlas. It is possible Hesiod’s audience would 
have assumed they took part in the Titanomachy, but while the Titans are confined in 
Tartaros, Menoitios is confined to Erebos, and Atlas is instead forced to hold up the 
heavens.  
 
Menoitios is hubristos – excessively violent. Atlas’ kratos is great enough that he can 
hold up the heavens, indicating that he is also capable of interfering with, and 
destroying, the physical order of Zeus’ universe. The individual mention of their 
qualities singles them out as threats, and thus their punishment and constraint must 
also be specifically mentioned. Prometheus’ qualities, too, single him out as a threat: 
he is cunning, and his attempt to best Zeus in cunning places him in direct individual 
rivalry with him.  
 
Zeus’ constraining of these three can therefore be seen as being caused by hating 
them due to the threat they present. Equally, Epimetheus’ lack of kratos or biē, and 
his abidance with the laws and will of Zeus suggest both that he is not a threat (as 
befits his name, ‘afterthought’), and that Zeus does not hate him. Consequently, he is 
not imprisoned. It is true that Zeus does harm Epimetheus by giving him Pandora as a 
bride, but his aim here is not to punish Epimetheus, but to introduce women to the 
world of men – it is part of the punishment of Prometheus. Even if it is thought of as a 
punishment, it is not a violent one. In fact, it is instead one that reinforces Zeus’ 




So far, then, we have seen that violence and hatred are directed towards threatening 
figures, and manifested in the form of constraining. We have also seen it directed 
towards figures that are causing harm to the hater, or limiting them in some way. But 
it is not always the case that the target of injustice are able to act upon their hatred. 
They must have the type of character that allows them to feel hatred strongly enough; 
they must have kratos and biē. If they do, both those who experience hatred due to a 
threat, and those who experience hatred due to the injustice of another’s actions, will 
be motivated to act upon it. Further, in cases where the subject is hated because they 
represent a limitation, hatred ought not to be acted upon. To be just is to be able to 
distinguish when hatred should or should not be acted upon.  
 
Works and Days 
We now turn to investigate the Works and Days and examine the occurrences of 
hatred in this poem. Doing so will allow us to further understand the full nature of 
hatred by refining what we have already learned from the Theogony. 
 
The first occurrence of a word relating to hatred in this poem is in verse 196:  
 
  [ἕτερος δ᾽ ἑτέρου πόλιν ἐξαλαπάξει·]  
οὐδέ τις εὐόρκου χάρις ἔσσεται οὐδὲ δικαίου  
οὔδ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ, µᾶλλον δὲ κακῶν ῥεκτῆρα καὶ ὕβριν  
ἀνέρα τιµήσουσι· δίκη δ᾽ ἐν χερσί· καὶ αἰδὼς  
οὐκ ἔσται, βλάψει δ᾽ ὁ κακὸς τὸν ἀρείονα φῶτα  
µύθοισι σκολιοῖς ἐνέπων, ἐπὶ δ᾽ ὅρκον ὀµεῖται. 
Ζῆλος δ᾽ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀιζυροῖσιν ἅπασι  
δυσκέλαδος κακόχαρτος ὁµαρτήσει, στυγερώπης. 
       (189-96) 
 
Strong of hand, one man shall seek  
   the city of another. 
There will be no favour for the man 
   who keeps his oath, for the righteous 
and the good man, rather men shall give their praise 
   to hubris 
and the doer of evil. Right will be in the arm. 
   Shame will  
not be. The vile man will crowd his better out, 
   and attack him 
with twisted accusations and swear an oath 
   to his story.  
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The spirit of Envy, with hateful look 
   and screaming voice, who delights 
in evil, will be the constant companion 
   of wretched humanity.370  
 
We have already discussed this passage in relation to the ‘hateful look’ of zēlos. Here, 
hatred is a necessary ingredient to act on envy. And this action results in the breaking 
of oaths and the swearing of false oaths. Here, as in the case of Ouranos, the envious 
violence is immoral – the hateful envy causes a violence that is directed towards 
incorrect targets: internal and equal ranking members of a social group. The result of 
this expression of hatred and envy is, once again, self-destructive: it is part of the 
inevitable downfall of the current age of man.  
 
This destructive and violent envy that Hesiod predicts for the future is at odds with 
the model of behaviour Hesiod provided at the beginning of the poem: 
 
εἰς ἕτερον γάρ τίς τε ἴδεν ἔργοιο χατίζων  
πλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει µὲν ἀρόµεναι ἠδὲ φυτεύειν  
οἶκόν τ᾽ εὖ θέσθαι· ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων  
εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ᾽· ἀγαθὴ δ᾽ Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν.  
καὶ κεραµεὺς κεραµεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων,  
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ. 
       (21-26) 
 
A man looks at his neighbour who is rich: 
   then he too 
wants to work; for the rich man presses on with 
   his ploughing and planting 
and the ordering of his state. 
   So the neighbour envies the neighbour 
who presses on toward wealth. Such strife  
   is a good friend to mortals.  
Then potter bears grudge against potter,  
   and craftsman against craftsman; 
tramp is jealous of tramp, 
   and singer of singer.371 
  
Envious hatred is acted upon here, but not in a destructive way: it is not directed 
violently towards the rival, but towards one’s own effort. It is self-creative rather than 
                                                
370 Adapted from Lattimore to preserve the meaning of στυγερώπης as ‘hateful look’.  
371 Adapted from Lattimore. Lattimore translates κοτέει as ‘enemy’ and ‘rival’, but the word is not 
associated with any of the words we have examined as meaning either ‘enemy’ or ‘rival’, I have 
therefore changed it to ‘bears grudge against’ so as not to confuse the reader of the translation.   
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self-destructive. Zeus has ordered his universe such as to allow zēlos, and thus hatred, 
to be channelled productively by specifying where it can be targeted in order to be 
superior, enviable, and to obtain a just victory. If used correctly, then, zēlos allows 
hatred to be channelled away from the actual target of hatred when it would be 
immoral to act against that target, and instead motivates action to remove oneself 
from hateful position of inferiority or unproductivity. It is directed toward an 
exchange of the unenviable inferior position and the enviable superior position which, 
devoid of violence, provides a stable, cyclical exchange of roles. Part of mastering 
hatred, then, is the ability to master zēlos. Expressed incorrectly it feeds the immoral 
manifestation of violence, expressed correctly it channels the expression of hatred to a 
constructive end. Hatred is still present in non-violent zēlos, and still the motivator for 
action. It is only the manifestation of that hatred which has changed. Thus, being able 
to master zēlos is an essential component of being able to use hatred positively, and 
provides another way for hatred to lead to a just victory.  
 
The next instance of a word related to hatred is in verse 300: 
 
ἐργάζευ, Πέρση, δῖον γένος, ὄφρα σε Λιµὸς  
ἐχθαίρῃ, φιλέῃ δέ σ᾽ ἐυστέφανος Δηµήτηρ  
αἰδοίη, βιότου δὲ τεὴν πιµπλῇσι καλιήν· 
Λιµὸς γάρ τοι πάµπαν ἀεργῷ σύµφορος ἀνδρί· 
      (299-302) 
 
Work, O Perses, illustrious-born, work on, 
   so that Famine  
will avoid you, and august and garlanded Demeter 
will be your friend, and fill your barn 
   with substance of living; 
Famine is the unworking man’s most constant 
   companion. 
 
We have already discussed these verses in Chapter Two (p. 94), and noted both that 
Famine stays away from the target of hatred, and that he instead lives with the idle 
man who envies the industrious man. This behaviour matches that which we have 
seen in relation to the gods and the inevitable forces of the universe. It is not the case 
that the industrious man represents a comparable inevitable force, but he does 
represent the correct functioning of Zeus’ universe. Nelson argues that the true 
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function of the section of the Works and Days generally known as the ‘farmer’s 
almanac’ is not to give genuine farming advice, but to vividly place the listener (or 
reader) in the position of the farmer, where the farm is presented as ‘a microcosm of 
the order of Zeus’.372 On this model, we can understand Hesiod’s advice on farming 
as combining the practical justice of farming with the cosmic ordering of Zeus’ 
universe.373 Laura Slatkin underlines the connection with the observation that Dike is 
one of the Horai (‘Seasons’) (Th. 901-2): Justice is not just intrinsically related to the 
work of men, but to ‘the cyclic order of the seasons, which defines time itself’.374 To 
engage with Zeus’ world is, by its very nature, to engage with justice. Any violence, 
then, toward the industrious man would undermine the moral stability of the universe, 
just as breaking oaths does; it would be an incorrect use of hatred.   
 
Finally, in verse 342 ἐχθρόν (echthron) is used by Hesiod in his advice to his brother: 
τὸν φιλέοντ᾽ ἐπὶ δαῖτα καλεῖν, τὸν δ᾽ ἐχθρὸν ἐᾶσαι (‘call your friend to a feast but 
leave your enemy alone’). This advice appears at first little more vague – it tells us to 
leave an enemy alone, but provides no immediate clue as to why we might consider 
someone an enemy. However, these verses appear in a long, direct address to Perses. 
It is specifically Perses that he is advising to leave his enemy alone. We know already 
what kind of man Perses is, and what qualities he possesses. Perses’ enemies are those 
whom he envies, those whom he will seek to cheat, those whom he will injure through 
false and broken oaths. His enemy is his brother, a member of his familial unit, an 
equal. Perses’ enemy is not an appropriate target to manifest hatred against. What 
Perses should be doing is, as Hesiod advises, leaving his enemy alone.  
 
Ultimately, then, all but one instance of hatred in the Works and Days is about leaving 
the target of hatred alone when acting towards that target would be immoral. Though 
a man be an enemy, if attacking him would be disruptive to the social group, then he 
is not an appropriate target for violence. Whether the manifestation of hate in envy 
and violence is moral or not is governed by whether it would be creative or 
destructive. The only instance in which hatred is used to directly harm its target is in 
the final age of man. Here, the use of hatred directly contributes to the destruction of 
                                                
372 Nelson (1998: 51). 
373 Nelson (1998: 47-58). Clay (2009: 78-79) also comments on the relationship between agrarian work 
and justice in the Works and Days. 
374 Slatkin (2003: 47). 
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society, and thus represents the consequences of acting upon hatred inappropriately. 
Just as Hesiod counsels Perses to avoid biē because he does not know how to use it 
properly, he also counsels his brother not to act upon hatred, because Perses has 
demonstrated that he cannot use it correctly. Perses cannot use hatred to obtain a just 
victory, and thus should simply attempt to stick to not causing harm nor provoking 
reciprocal (and morally just) hatred.   
 
In terms of instances of hatred in the Works and Days in which words for hatred do 
not explicitly appear, but a script for hatred can be identified, there are several.  
 
The departure of Nemesis and Aidos at the end of the final age of man can be read as 
an instance where a hate script is present. Just as Famine avoids and hates the 
working man, Nemesis and Aidos avoid and hate the humans at the end of the final 
age. This is not to suggest that the comings and goings of every god and mortal can be 
taken as examples of hatred: an apocalypse is a rather extreme event, but Aidos and 
Nemesis are explicitly mentioned. The fact that the departure of goddesses such as 
Nemesis and Aidos can be motivated by hatred underlines how fundamental hatred is 
as one of the forces which governs relationships fundamental to the stability of Zeus’ 
universe. Of course, Nemesis and Aidos are not the only gods that appear in this 
scene. Zelos arrives with his hateful eyes, embodying the other hate script we have 
seen in Hesiod: the desire to punish and destroy. Nemesis and Aidos retreat as Zelos 
arrives, keeping their distance not just from humans, but from the son of Styx – just as 
the gods keep their distance from Styx herself.  
 
The man who is granted victory by Zeus through Hekate is he who demonstrates the 
necessary kratos and biē to overcome his rivals. This is such a strong example that it 
almost appears odd that he is not explicitly described as hating. When men arm 
themselves for ‘man-destroying war’ (πόλεµον φθισήνορα, polemon phthisēnora 
[431]) the victorious side is that which has directed its hatred as violence towards the 
enemy; when men engage in athletics, no destructive violence is directed toward the 
opponent. The fact that the victorious man can act upon his kratos and biē in the 
appropriate ways for different rivalries demonstrates that he has mastered the correct 
use of hatred. His victory is tied to the fact that he understands how to act in a way 




Another rather obvious example would be the punishment Zeus inflicts on the cities 
of kings who rule unjustly. Horkos accompanies those who make crooked judgements 
(219), and the idea of breaking an oath is closely associated with miscarriages of 
justice. Those cities in which men harm their fellow citizens by breaking oaths or 
perverting the course of justice (245-69) are unpityingly destroyed by Zeus. Zeus’ 
actions here position him as bestowing the punishment for breaking an oath, just as 
Styx bestows the punishment on the gods; just as Styx’s punishment is an act of 
hatred, so too is Zeus’. But might we also understand the just members of a society 
hating the perjurer and those who destabilise their society from within their own 
ranks? If so, would we expect to see them turning on those members within their own 
society that act in a hateful way? Among the gods the expression of hatred toward 
those who act unjustly by breaking their oaths is ostracisation. It is a long but 
ultimately temporary quarantine to prevent contamination of the rest of the group. 
Their hatred ends, and the perjurer can be reintegrated into society. For humans, 
however, the punishment is destruction, and it comes from Zeus, not fellow men. In 
fact, Hesiod does not give details of how people should react in the specific case of 
unjust oaths or corruption of kings within a society.  
 
The Theogony portrays the upheaval of unjust cosmic hierarchies, in which hatred 
was acted upon destructively, to enable the establishment of a new, just, and stable 
order. Once the old societies have been overthrown and a new, just, universe 
established, the instances in which hatred can be legitimately acted upon are restricted 
to those times in which it is useful.  
 
It is noticeable in this regard that there is only one instance of a kratos-related word in 
the Works and Days; it is in verse 147 and appears in the description of the 
kraterophrona thumon, the ‘strong-willed spirit’ of the bronze age of men (perhaps 
the absence of kratos is one of the reasons Hesiod particularly emphasises the 
importance of correct application of biē). The kratos that was necessary to justly enact 
hatred in a way that topples an unjust society is absent from the men of Hesiod’s age.  
 
The very fact that Hesiod depends on Zeus to enact justice against the kings suggests 
an understanding of the reality that individuals such as himself and Perses have little 
 
219 
power within the hierarchy of human society. Lacking the necessary kratos and biē, 
men such as they cannot overthrow an unjust society themselves; correction must 
come from higher up in the hierarchy. The role of the working man is not to rebel, but 
to tend the land in a way harmonious with Zeus’ cosmological structure. This order 
involves understanding when acting upon hatred is appropriate for men, and what 
expression that hatred should have. 
 
Hesiod is explicit that injustice on the part of the kings, which involves the breaking 
of oaths and the incorrect use of violence, will be lead to a punishment that includes 
the destruction of innocent people, as when descendants are punished for their 
ancestors’ crimes (W&D 280-85, 325-26). This certainly seems harsh to a modern 
reader, and raises questions about the justice of Zeus’ actions and the nature of hatred. 
Nelson argues that, as dubious as the justice of Zeus’ actions might seem to a modern 
audience, it is not something that Hesiod would even consider as needing addressing 
or an explanation. A Christian understanding, in which Zeus both punishes the guilty 
and spares the innocent, is simply not applicable to Hesiod. Justice is subservient to 
Zeus. It is a condition for humans, not for the gods.375 This argument, however, is at 
odds with the importance of the oath of the gods, which even Zeus has bound himself 
to follow. 
 
But we can understand Zeus’ justice, and use of hatred and violence to destroy whole 
societies in terms of cosmic justice. Zeus’ duty is not to protect individuals within a 
human society, but to protect the functionality of the larger cosmic model; a 
microcosmic unjust society goes against the whole cosmic model. Zeus’ role as 
maintainer of order includes destroying societies that threaten that order by failing to 
follow his divine law. If a whole human society must be destroyed in order to do that, 
then so be it.  
 
Such an interpretation is in keeping with archaic Greek notions of miasma that tie the 
behaviours of kings especially to the fate of their communities.376 For Robert Parker 
this particular idea of the miasma of a king causing the destruction of a whole society 
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is ‘in part at least, a kind of moral level for use by subjects against their ruler’.377 The 
‘moral level’, is, of course, the divine justice of Zeus – he who has the qualities of 
hatred necessary to enforce the justice of the ordered universe. For Hesiod, there is 
nothing unjust about destroying innocent people, because they are contaminated by 
their fellow societal members. This miasmic model is in keeping with the Communal 
Sharing model of virtuous violence, in which a group as a whole share the 
punishments (and rewards) of all.    
 
Even within an unjust human society innocent men should not use destructive hatred. 
As part of the larger cosmic order men should focus on behaving in accordance with 
the justice that their rank affords them. They should behave as if the did live in a just 
society, because, on the largest scale, they still do: they live in Zeus’ universe. Justice 
is a divine construct, and it is divine law they must abide by. Given this, Hesiod is not 
concerned with telling his brother how he should react to the injustice of kings, but 
focuses on how he should act justly with regard to their own position in a hierarchy. 
He tells him how he should occupy himself and how he should treat those who are 
either physically close (neighbours), or family members. The closest advice Hesiod 
gives on the matter is when he tells his brother to leave his enemy alone (342). Of 
course, if his brother truly understood how society should work, he would understand 
that his enemies are those members of society who are unjust.  
 
It is unsurprising, then, that the dominant form of hatred we see in the Works and 
Days is to do with avoidance. Men lack (or have been deprived of) the full range of 
tools required for the full, just, range of hate-scripts because they are a small part of 
Zeus’ universe. Man’s role is to do his part to stabilise his society; it is only Zeus who 
can justly use hatred to overthrow an immoral society.    
                                                







Much of the scholarly research which has investigated either a single figure or a small 
cluster of figures in Hesiod’s works has thus far focused on figures other than Styx. 
Detienne and Vernant concentrate on the function of Metis in the Theogony as the 
most important force ensuring Zeus’ continued reign. They make her more important 
even than Kratos and Bie.378 Metis belongs to a different group of concepts: she 
represents cunning and skilful superiority. But this is not a superior group of 
concepts. Zeus’ ability to unify the cosmos and bring stability is tied to his ability to 
bring together cunning, violence, and emotions in a mutually supportive way.  
 
Other scholars have focused on Hekate, to whom Hesiod dedicates so many verses 
and honours. Marquardt points out the importance of Hekate in relation to both her 
involvement in human affairs, and to her character as one who wills things.379 
Boedeker highlights her role as a force unifying disparate groups – men and gods, 
Titans and Olympians, new and old.380 Clay develops these idea further, by proposing 
that she functions as a conduit between humans and gods.381 Marquardt and Clay 
work on the assumption that Hekate is herself the one whose will she is enacting, but 
as we have seen, it is ultimately Zeus’ will she represents. It is this that gives her the 
ability to dispense those qualities (kratos, biē, and nikē) that belong to Zeus. The will 
of Zeus in these affairs is that which will support the stability of the universe. For the 
universe to continue in its stable state, then the only way Hekate can operate is in 
accordance with his will.  
 
 Rudhardt observes that Hekate’s position makes her a figure who is able to harm as 
well as help.382 She can grant fishermen a good haul, but just as easily take it away 
(Th. 442-43). Hekate represents a boundary between humans and gods, just as Styx 
represents a boundary around the world above, and that outside Zeus’ order. Given 
                                                
378 Detienne & Vernant (1991: 90).  
379 Marquardt (1981). 
380 Boedeker (1983).  
381 Clay (1984).  
382 Rudhardt (1993: 213).  
 
222 
the parallels between her position and that of Styx, it is unsurprising that she should 
share the dual aspects of being both helpful and dangerous. Just as Metis represents 
cunning, and Styx and her children represent qualities tied to emotions, Hekate 
represents yet another quality – that of will.  
 
Only a few scholars, such Blickman and as Lye, have written anything that focuses 
specifically on Styx.383 Blickman provides some valuable insight between the nature 
of oath and the justice of Zeus, but misses both the importance of Styx as hatred and 
of her connection to her children. Lye highlights some of the geographical functions 
of Styx as a boundary and limiting force, and rightly relates this to her role as oath, 
but still does not comment on the relation of these two things with hatred or the 
children of Styx. A key contribution of this thesis is to fully explore Styx as oath, 
river, and emotion, and to demonstrate the interrelations between them.  
 
What a close analysis of the text has revealed is that Styx and her children are both 
dangerous and of fundamental importance to Zeus’ universe and his maintenance of 
his position as ruler. Styx and her children, who have hitherto been considered minor 
characters in Hesiod’s work, are, in fact, fundamentally important to the functioning 
of the cosmos and of society; we have ignored them to our detriment. 
 
Another long-running scholarly focus is on the nature of dikē in Hesiod’s works. 
Despite dismissing any connection between Styx and her role as oath, Solmsen 
highlights the importance of dikē for mortals in the Works and Days,384 asserting that 
Hesiod’s unique treatment of Dike is a result of his dealings with his brother. But, 
Solmsen thinks, Hesiod understands justice as not in itself sufficient for success. 
Success also requires the hard work involved in tilling the land.385 Much more 
recently Nelson and Clay have returned to this topic, revising our understanding of 
Dike by presenting it as part of, rather than separate from, the idea of manual 
labour.386 Both explore its connection to farming, and how this demonstrates that dikē 
for humans involves aligning their actions with the ordering of the universe, but 
neither connect dikē to emotions. And whilst Arthur has noted the central cosmogonic 
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role of Eros and Aphrodite as ‘love’, the potential relationship of either these specific 
emotions – or emotions in general – to dikē has not been explored. But as the example 
of Styx demonstrates, Hesiod’s idea of human justice as aligning with a cosmic 
ordering also involves being able to express emotions correctly. 
 
Another strand of scholarship on dikē has focused on the fable of the hawk and the 
nightingale in the Works and Days, and how to interpret it. Many scholars have 
contributed to this discussion. Older scholarship suggested we take the fable not to be 
a fable at all.387 More recently, Nelson has suggested Hesiod’s intention was that the 
listener revise their understanding of the meaning of the fable as Hesiod’s narrative 
progresses.388 This leads to a conclusion shared by Mordine: that Hesiod meant us to 
revaluate our understanding of the moral as the poem continues, and that a complete 
reading reveals Hesiod’s belief that what constitutes justice and appropriate use of 
violence is different for animals, men, and gods.389 Mordine’s approach focuses on 
investigating the full meanings of ainos in order to understand the fable. Nelson’s 
argument takes the approach of investigating the nature of justice, which leads to the 
claim that the actions of the hawk (when taken to be Zeus) are just, because it is Zeus 
that decides what justice is.390 But even if this is the case, Zeus has bound himself to 
justice as a fundamental pillar of his continued order.  
 
The understanding of the rules surrounding appropriate and inappropriate emotions 
and behaviour in different societal models afforded to us by Fiske and Rai supports a 
reading along the lines of that of Mordine, in which we understand that the biē 
appropriate to Zeus is not the same as that which is appropriate to men. The types of 
justice available to different members within a hierarchy is dependent on their place 
within that hierarchy. Although Mordine touches on the nature of hubris, neither 
Mordine nor Nelson focus on understanding the nature of biē, or what types of 
violence are appropriate to man. A sociological approach such as that of virtuous 
violence furthers our understanding of the fable by allowing us to examine the details 
of the differences in the roles of violence for men and Zeus, and thus, the different 
functions of hatred for different members of a society.  
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 This thesis, through the examination of the roles, functions, and manifestations of 
hatred, begins the task of exploring how emotions fit into Hesiod’s universe on a 
cosmic, moral, and social level. The nature of Hesiod’s texts and his primary concerns 
with the ordering of the universe, and the ordering of societies within that universe, is 
enhanced by an understanding of contemporary, sociological approaches to the nature 
and function of emotions, such as that of Fischer and Manstead, where even emotions 
that seek to distance one from others are necessary and appropriate, depending on the 
circumstances.391 The work of Halperin and colleagues on the impact of hatred 
between communities provides a model in which we can assess hatred between 
different groups in the Theogony and the Works and Days.392 Combined with the 
theories of Fiske and Rai, this framework allows us to investigate the nature of dikē 
from the perspective of emotions.  
 
Such a sociological approach must be underpinned by culturally-specific knowledge 
of what ‘hatred’ means to Hesiod. To this end, another contemporary approach serves 
us well: prototype analysis. Without such an analysis, based on close textual evidence, 
we can only investigate whether our own contemporary conception of hatred is 
present in Hesiod, rather than the unique qualities of Hesiod’s concept of hatred. The 
result of the application of this approach is an enhanced understanding of the qualities 
and nature of hatred in Hesiod’s poems.  
 
Hatred is something that causes destructive action, but also avoidance, and it is also, 
for Hesiod, something that has a positive function in the maintenance of an ordered 
universe. It is something that the qualities of zēlos, nikē, kratos, and biē are closely 
related to, and governed by. Only by understanding how hatred should be acted upon 
can these qualities be used correctly.  
 
This thesis also contributes insight into the on going discussions surrounding Hekate 
and the fable of the hawk and the nightingale, furthering our understanding of the 
nature of Hekate, and the full details of the moral of the fable of the hawk and the 
nightingale. Further, this thesis contributes to our understanding of the nature of 
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justice in Zeus’ universe by outlining its relationship to hatred.    
 
 
Hatred, Styx, and Oath 
As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, Styx is particularly suited to the role 
she plays as the oath of the gods. She embodies both his promise of a stable and just 
universe, and the downfall of that universe should he break his oath. While Zeus 
keeps his oath, the destructive envy that others might have held towards him based on 
his position of power, his possession of victory, and his use of violence, are mitigated 
by the fact that he has subjected himself to the same threat represented by Styx. 
Whilst he keeps his oath, any hatred that would have been felt by his subordinates 
towards Zeus as the victor is redirected towards Styx instead. And so long as Zeus 
keeps his oath, Styx is not just a threat to him, but a threat to all of them. All of them 
must follow Zeus’ example and keep their oaths. Should Zeus break his oath the 
structure of his society would disintegrate. The other gods would themselves no 
longer be bound by oath, and their hatred instead would be redirected towards Zeus, 
who, in breaking his oath, has deprived them all of the benefits that made their lower 
positions in the hierarchy tolerable.  
  
Styx holds a liminal place in the world of the Olympians, as far away from them as 
she can possibly be – they go near her, or allow her near them, only when they have 
need of her services. It is a hatred that manifests as avoidance because there is nothing 
that can be done about it – recall Halperin’s suggestion that, in the absence of a desire 
to improve the target (which might result in anger instead), hatred is associated with 
‘despair of any potential change.’393 In Halperin’s human conflict, this despair is 
caused by understanding that there could be a potential change in the behaviour of the 
hated other, but that it will not happen. In Hesiod’s universe, a change in behaviour of 
the hated other would be catastrophic. The gods’ avoidance of hated figures such as 
Styx is not caused by the idea that they will not change, but by the understanding that, 
for order to be maintained, they cannot change. Whatever potential damage the hated 
target may inflict – whether by punishing the oath breaker, or depriving humans 
beloved of the gods of their lives – it is necessary that it happen in order to keep the 
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universe in order. To go near the hated gods is to be confronted with one’s 
limitations.394 In Halperin’s research, this despair was associated with hatred towards 
a member of the outgroup. In Hesiod, we see it directed at members (begrudgingly) 
acknowledged to be not only part of the ingroup, but essential to its continued 
survival.  
 
Styx’ punishment of the gods who break their oaths can also be seen as a 
manifestation of her hatred. But Styx’s hatred lacks any element of despair of 
potential change, nor is it tied to the intrinsic quality of the target. Instead, her hatred 
is caused by a specific type of offence, and the punishment her hatred inflicts is 
predicated on the idea that after the punishment is over, the god will be integrated 
back into society. Of more use to us in understanding this particular manifestation of 
hatred is the research on hate mail conducted by Temkin and Yanay, which we 
discussed in the introduction. Expressions of intragroup hatred can, they claim, serve 
a dual function: of punishment and potential reintegration.  
 
Styx’s expression of hatred does not just serve a function of punishment, but is also 
an attempt to persuade the individual to reform. The hope of all is that the 
punishment, or even the threat of it, will lead an individual to change their ways, 
preventing any weakening of the identity of the ingroup at all if they change their 
ways before they are punished, or by restoring or refortifying the identity of the 
ingroup if they change their ways after the punishment. Recall that Styx’s punishment 
can be seen as a metaphorical death and rebirth – of exclusion and re-inclusion. 
Temkin and Yanay discuss the idea that the targets of the hate mail were seen as 
behaving in accordance with values that undermined the moral basis and cohesion of 
the ingroup: precisely the behaviour which Styx is there to prevent and punish. Those 
who weaken the cohesion of the ingroup blur the boundary between ingroup and 
outgroup, weakening the communal identity. Styx, as the metaphorical boundary of 
oath and the literal boundary as river, prevents the blurring of the boundaries.  
 
The letters studied by Temkin and Yanay drew on symbols of hate recognised by all 
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within the community as reminders of the dangers of aggression and hatred from 
outside the community – symbols which are reminders of things that are a danger, and 
are feared.395 In the same vein, the punishment of Styx reminds the gods of their 
previous state of being unhonoured and, in the case of Olympians, of being entombed 
within their father. The punishment of Styx is a fearful and grim reminder of what 
their lives were like before, of the external threats which face them should they not 
overcome the internal threats. Contra Aristotle then, Hesiod’s hatred is not always 
endless. When directed towards individual who is a member of the ingroup it can end 
when due atonement has been made.  
  
Fischer and Manstead suggested that even strongly negative emotions that 
predominantly serve a distancing function can still serve an affiliation function in 
strengthening the identity of an ingroup through a communally hated target.396 The 
gods’ communal hatred of Styx helps solidify their identity as part of Zeus’ group, 
and their commitment to his laws and order. Styx’ necessity represents a potential 
threat which they must guard against – but it is not a threat from outside the group, 
rather, it is a threat which arises from inside. The agreement of all to follow Zeus’ 
laws or accept the punishment creates a constant awareness of the threat to their social 
group, but also a commitment to protect it by ostracising those whose actions threaten 
to destabilise it. She is a force that keeps them in check, so that all may continue to 
benefit from Zeus’ reign. The superiority of her position may lead to envy of Styx, but 
it is an envy that must be engaged with by improving oneself – or, at the very least, by 
refraining from denigrating oneself by breaking oaths. Only if everyone behaves as 
they ought to can victory be obtained by all.  
 
Hatred as punishment is associated with water and with frigid cold. But when 
involved in conflict, in the form of kratos and biē, it switches to the other extreme – 
fire, boiling, and burning. We might suppose that this difference aligns with the 
different actions of hatred we have seen in Hesiod, and the fact that he does not fully 
distinguish between anger and hatred: in all situations where anger is present, so too is 
a script for hatred.  In the introduction we saw that many people associate hatred with 
coldness, and anger with heat. Mapping different kinds of hatred, Sternberg referred 
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to the different types with varying metaphors of temperature – from ‘cold hate’ to 
‘boiling hate’ and ‘burning hate’. Sternberg characterises ‘cold hate’ as having a 
predominant component of contempt. It is characterised by the idea that the target is 
‘unworthy’ somehow.397 Sternberg’s model of ‘cold hate’ does not map neatly on to 
Hesiod. The ‘cold hate’ of Sternberg’s model emphasises indoctrination as a frequent 
component, and treats it predominantly as hatred towards a group. But we could 
perhaps see in Styx’ hatred of oath breakers an element of contempt – the concept 
closest to contempt that we have seen in Hesiod is the depriving or denying of 
honours. One who breaks a Styx oath has proven themselves unworthy of their 
position, and is temporarily deprived of their honours.  
 
Hesiod does not advocate for a world in which hatred is banished or somehow absent. 
It is there as a pervasive force – Styx’s water is unperishing (ἄφθιτος, aphthitos) and 
primeval (ὠγύγιος, ōgugios) (805-6). She has always been, and always will be. She 
encircles the world, marking the boundary – not just as oath, but as hatred. On one 
side are the Olympians, governed by Zeus and bound under his laws and justice. On 
the other side are those defeated targets of Zeus’ hatred: imprisoned in Tartaros, a 
hated place, and surrounded by the hated river.  
 
 
Hatred, Styx, and her children 
To rule, to possess nikē, Zeus must be enviable – he must be an object of envy to 
others, otherwise his victory and rulership is meaningless. But being an object of envy 
is intrinsically risky – when envy is present, it is a source of motivation to action. 
Whether envy motivates the subject to better themself or to attack the envied target, it 
still represents a potential threat. Regardless of how the victory is achieved, it always 
poses the possibility of the superior becoming inferior – of being outdone fairly, or 
violently overthrown. And regardless of how victory is sought, it is always motivated 
by an element of zēlos – and of hatred. One manifestation of Hesiod’s hatred is a 
desire to destroy, but that includes outdoing the subject of hatred – destroying their 
position by making it one of inferiority rather than superiority. This is what Styx 
herself does when she inflicts her punishment for breaking an oath. Styx embodies 
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these two different aspects of zēlos – of making oneself superior through harming the 
other, and making oneself superior by performing one’s appropriate role.  
 
Hatred is also an essential component of victory. Zeus’ victory, just as Kronos’, is 
achieved by hatred-driven violence. But unlike Zeus, Kronos lacks the ability to 
maintain his position. He can conquer, but he cannot remain the conqueror. To gain 
and maintain power is to be able to wield hatred correctly. It is to understand how to 
direct one’s own hatred, but also how to direct and control the hatred of others. 
Kronos’ inability to correctly wield hatred is demonstrated by the fact that he keeps 
the Hekatoncheires and the Cyclopes – potent forces of kratos and biē – imprisoned. 
It is Zeus alone that understands how to correctly utilise these forces.  
 
Styx’s children Kratos and Bie find their fullest form in the burning forces of Zeus’ 
thunderbolts, and Typhoeus’ flaming eyes. This type of hatred is associated 
predominantly with threats that come from outside the group – with the Titan 
generation (to which even Prometheus belongs), and Typhoeus. In these instances a 
different hate script must be utilised in order to protect the ingroup. To fend off a 
threat from outside one must engage in conflict. Envy from outside may lead to other 
figures attempting destructive action against the ingroup – attempting to defeat the 
ingroup and claim victory for oneself. In these instances, victory must be actively 
maintained by showing one’s superiority and right to rule through defeat in combat.  
 
Zeus’ possession of the children of Styx, and her allegiance to him – so long as he 
himself also keeps his oath – allows him to protect his ordered universe in two ways, 
warding off threats from both inside and outside the group. In either scenario, hatred 
is essential. In contemporary society, we attempt to regulate war and conflict. We 
argue over whether there is such a thing as ‘moral violence’, and expect that once a 
war is over, friendlier relationships should be attempted, and reparations made. 
Hesiod has no such idea. In Hesiod’s world, perpetual imprisonment or exclusion of 




Hesiod’s model of hatred, as something that has a fundamental place in a just world, 
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as something which can be productive instead of just destructive, is at odds with 
contemporary ideas of hatred. For Aristotle, phthonos was the only emotion that was 
wholly bad. For contemporary Western society, hatred, too, is on that list. Laws exist 
in many countries to curb ‘hate speech’. We distinguish certain crimes as ‘hate 
crimes’. For the archaic and ancient Greeks, the prevalent sentiment was that one 
should love one’s friends and hate one’s enemies. It is the sentiment by which the 
allies of the Greeks and Trojans are drawn into their war; it is expressed in Pindar 
(Pythian 2. 83-5), and later by the logographer Lysias (IX. 20). For Aristotle, part of 
the nature of friendship is that friends hate each other’s enemies (Rhet. 1381a).  
 
In the contemporary Western world, however, the on-going influence of Christianity 
advocates for loving one’s enemies and helping them (Matthew 5. 44, Luke 6. 35). 
Only in some instances, where the specific aim is to kill or destroy, do some members 
of a society approach the idea that it is ‘okay to hate the enemy’, whether that be an 
enemy in physical war, or one who is perceived as destabilising a society: few object 
to expressing hatred for convicted paedophiles.  
 
The research by Eran Halperin demonstrates a commitment to understanding the role 
that hatred has in conflict between societies, but the ultimate goal of the research is to 
try and understand how such situations might be non-violently defused. When an 
emotion would lead to a violent outcome, our focus should be on strategies to defuse 
or avoid the arousal of that emotion. To this extent, the difference between 
contemporary societies and Hesiod is not so much over whether hatred can be 
constructive or just, but what exactly constitutes ‘constructive’ or ‘just’ uses of 
hatred. Hesiod is committed to a world in which a single social hierarchy is the 
correct model. It is moral to destroy societies that do not conform to this model. In 
contrast, the contemporary Western world has a more complex relationship with the 
destruction of other societies. We accept that certain forms of society can co-exist and 
that different social groups do not intrinsically represent a threat to our own.  
 
Certainly, there are certain times when we enact what for Hesiod would be an 
appropriate hate-script. When we dedicate ourselves to self-improvement in order to 
triumph over a rival and prove our superiority, we behave in a way that Hesiod sees 
not just as moral, but as driven by hatred as well: it is a moral expression of hatred. 
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But in contemporary Western society ‘friendly rivalries’ are considered more 
acceptable, whilst the actions of hated rivals are generally assumed, or perceived to 
be, destructive. Views that present hatred as intrinsically negative seek to remove 
hatred from the qualities of rivalry and victory. The question becomes whether hatred 
really is inevitable and intrinsic. When we seek to detach rivalry and victory from 
notions of hatred, are we simply denying that we feel hatred, re-defining hatred into a 
narrower emotion that than which Hesiod considered? Or are we actively seeking to 
suppress what both Hesiod and contemporary Western society understand as ‘hatred’? 
And in doing so, are we proving that hatred is not essential for a stable society, or are 
we simply decreasing our own ability to maintain that society? Would society be 
better if we all accepted it was not just okay to hate Nazis, but that doing so was 
necessary and moral in maintaining an ordered and stable society? That punching 
Nazis is a correct expression of hatred? 
 
But why do these differences between our own and Hesiod’s conceptions of the 
morality of hatred exist at all? Hesiod’s cosmogony and philosophy is shaped by his 
lived reality. The differences between his world and that of contemporary society are 
too great to enumerate.  
 
Certainly, despite frequent failure to abide by it, the Abrahamic ideal of loving one’s 
enemy has had a profound impact on dominant modes of morality in contemporary 
Western societies. Vengeful Greek gods destroying the whole for the sins of one have 
been replaced by a benevolent God who, the sake of a few good men, would have 
spared Sodom and Gomorrah. 
 
Our world is much bigger than Hesiod’s. Our cities are far larger, our societies much 
bigger, and different societies are in perpetual contact with a far broader range of 
different cultures. War, politics, international trade, and migration were of course part 
of the archaic world. Ships capable of transporting both people and goods were in 
use.398 Hesiod acknowledges this in his recounting of his father’s migration (W&D 
635-40), and the advice on transporting cargo by sea, (618-32) though he is clearly 
distrustful of the latter and does not seem to consider it necessary.  
                                                




In contemporary Western society, the power of central government and the state is 
inextricably woven into the lives of everyone within a geographical area in ways that 
are alien to Hesiod’s world, where states ‘were only just beginning to form’.399 And 
such a state is ‘normally one of many organizations within a given area, defined by its 
superiority over other organizations in wielding force.’400 This is certainly a model of 
power questioned by Hesiod in the Works and Days, who argues that it is not 
appropriate for mortals.  
 
What city there is, Hesiod advises Perses to stay away from, exhorting him not to 
waste time listening to quarrels in the agora (W&D 27-29). In essence, Hesiod 
advises his brother to focus on his own job, and ignore the political wrangling of 
society. But with states still in their infancy, one is far more sheltered from the 
broader impacts of national and international events and relations. Though many 
today still like to abide by this idea, and seek to avoid active political engagement, 
their avoidance provides no shelter from the impact of politics as it might have done 
for Hesiod and Perses.  
 
In Hesiod’s world, hatred can be usefully manifested as avoiding one’s enemies, and 
there is no suggestion that doing so is ever bad. But the enormity of the shift between 
political and economic models mean that doing so today does not provide the benefit 
it would have done for Hesiod or Perses. Whilst on an interpersonal level, avoiding 
one’s enemies is still something generally considered advisable in contemporary 
Western society, the legal, ethical, political, and economic structures woven into 
society frequently prevent this from being practical or even possible.  
 
Our hatred cannot be managed by Hesiod’s model; the necessity of engagement with 
people we hate prevents even the possibility of manifesting hate in a productive way. 
Either it will explode destructively, in a way that harms us, or it must be contained. 
For Hesiod, the question of how to supress hatred is irrelevant: it can always be 
expressed in a functional way. For contemporary Western society, on the other hand, 
it is a most pressing concern.    
                                                
399 Ulf (2009: 83). 
400 Morris (2009: 71). 
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